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ABSTRACT 
THE STATE, LAW AND WORKERS' PARTICIPATION POLICIES IN ZAMBIA, 
1969-1989 
Ernest Muketoi Beele 
This thesis is a study of the origins and development of 
law and workers' participation policies in Zambia from their 
inception in 1969 to 1989. The research was focussed at three 
levels of investigation: why was workers' participation 
introduced; what factors have determined its development; and 
whether the results suggest that state involvement, and the 
use of law in particular, has made a useful contribution to 
these industrial relations policies. 
The value of the work is threefold. First, it makes a 
modest but significant contribution to the understanding of 
law and industrial relations in post-independence Zambia. 
Second, it disputes and, in large measure, seeks to contradict 
earlier explanations thought to have determined the origins 
and development of participation policies in the country. 
Third, it provides original insights into the 1971 and 1988 
workers' participation legislation. 
The methods of investigation have been largely historical 
and comparative. It analysed primary and secondary materials, 
supplemented by discussion interviews. Theoretical guidance 
was drawn from critical studies of corporations, labour law 
and industrial relations. 
The study reveals that the origins of workers' participation 
in Zambia is connected to the political objective in the 1960s 
of assuring the participation of Zambians in the ownership and 
management of the economy. Consequently, it argues that the 
development of these policies is best understood in the 
context of this origin as well as of the structures and 
institutions upon which they were erected in the 1970s. 
Turning to the assessment, it found that very little 
industrial relations effects have been demonstrated. This was 
partly a result of three interlocking factors. First, weak and 
inconsistent laws. Second, the failure to develop the widest 
possible consensus on participation policies. Third, the 
absence of economic and political conditions under which the 
confidence of managers and workers could be won towards state 
policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines development of workers' participation 
policies in Zambia over an extended period of twenty years. 
The object of this introductory chapter is to define the scope 
of the study. We shall also explain why the study has been 
undertaken and provide information on the methods used to 
collect materials for writing it. The chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 1 gives a statement of the problems in the 
study. Section 2 outlines the main aims and objectives of the 
dissertation. Section 3 explains the framework of approach and 
justification of the study. Section 4 defines the main 
concepts of state, law and workers' participation on which the 
study centres. The research methods adopted and their limita- 
tions are presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 summari- 
ses the plan and logic of the study. 
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS FOR INVESTIGATION 
.. ýrrrrrrrwr. +rrrrrrrrrrwrrrrrrrrrrrrwrwrrrrrý 
The Zambian Industrial Relations Act, 1971 introduced in 
that country the concept of workers' participation in manage- 
ment decisions. Initially announced by President Kaunda in 
December 1969 as a new industrial relations policy, workers' 
participation came to occupy a central place in Zambia's post- 
independence labour policies. The creation of the Department 
of Industrial Participatory Democracy(IPD) in 1975; the commi- 
ssioning of the International Labour Organisation(ILO) to 
-1- 
advise on workers' participation in 1982; the decision to put 
trade union leaders on boards of directors of public companies 
in 1983; and the enactment of a Self-Management Enterprises 
Act in 1988 are all different aspects which illustrate the 
extent to which the Zambian Government has been wedded to the 
ideas of industrial democracy and greater workers' partici- 
pation in management decisions. Precisely why the Zambian 
Government introduced workers' participation in industry; the 
factors that have encouraged continuation of the policy; and 
the practical results realised during this period are the 
major areas of investigation in this study. 
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main aim of this dissertation is to study the legal 
aspects of workers' participation policies in Zambia. Our 
objectives are twofold. First, to describe and analyse how the 
Zambian state developed policies and laws respecting workers' 
participation in management decisions. Second, to investigate, 
analyse and assess the significance of these measures in the 
context of that country's post-independence policies. Thus, 
this study involves detailed analysis at three levels: - 
a) An investigation into the origins and objectives of 
workers' participation policies. Why was a policy of 
workers' participation introduced, and what was the 
expectation with this particular industrial relations 
policy? 
-2- 
b) An examination and evaluation of workers' partici- 
pation legislation in the context of structural and 
institutional frameworks introduced by Zambia's post- 
independence policies. By structural and institu- 
tional frameworks we mean economic, political, indus- 
trial relations, and legal contexts of the country in 
which the attempt was made to introduce and enforce 
the law of workers' participation in management 
decisions. Thus, we are interested specifically in 
studying the Zambian participation policy in the 
context of the foundations upon which it was erected. 
c) An assessment of the contribution of workers' parti- 
cipation to the development of industrial relations 
in Zambia. given its origins, form of legislation and 
the organisation of institutions through which the 
policy was promoted. 
3. FRAMEWORK OF APPROACH AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
.... rrrrr rr.. r.. rr rr rý. rr rr ý.. r rar rrý.. nýrrrýrrrýr ýý rr. ýrr r ýr. ýý 
our focus in this study is on the Zambian policy of 
workers' participation, better known there as Industrial 
Participatory Democracy. While there has been a great deal of 
interest in this policy over the last fifteen years or so(l), 
we know relatively little about its origins and possibly 
understand even less the factors that have sustained the 
policy for the last two decades. 
One reason for this has to be attributed to the nature of 
-3- 
interest that has been shown in workers' participation 
policies in that country. In Zambia, workers' participation 
typically constitute less of a topic of study in its own right 
than a factor causing or reflecting particular 'problems' of 
the Zambian Government's management of the economy and 
industrial policies. 
Thus, John Mulwila, in Parastatal Companies-and the Law 
in Zambia(2), provides a chapter on workers' participation 
law. The purpose of including the subject is to substantiate 
the thesis that there has existed in Zambia since 
nationalisation policies in the 1960s a variety of legal and 
extra-legal institutions that have operated to blur company 
law as was understood and inherited from Britain. There is no 
focus on workers' participation as such. A similar perspective 
of workers' participation law as a 'problem' in the develop- 
ment of Zambian corporate jurisprudence is given by Remmy 
tlushota in Control of Mining Companies Under-Zambian- Compare 
And Mining Law(3). The difference between the two is that the 
former discusses the implications of participation laws 
across the spectrum of Zambian state companies whilst the 
latter is more specific to the mining sector. A management 
study by George Simwinga also includes a description of 
workers' participation law and policy in Zambia, but again 
only for the purpose of isolating these as one factor impeding 
'corporate autonomy' in the management of the Zambian state 
companies(4). 
-4- 
Slightly different, but still on similar lines, is the 
treatment of Zambian workers' participation law and policy by 
Shimaponda in The Evolution of the Zambian Industrial 
Relations 
___ 
S stem(5). In this study, Zambian workers' 
participation laws and policies are described for the purpose 
of attributing these as one aspect of Zambian industrial 
relations policies derived through the influence of ILO. 
Evance Kalula, on the other hand, has described workers' 
participation laws and policies in Zambia as one more aspect 
of state-trade union 'incorporation' policies in the country- 
(6). 
It can be seen from these studies that the subject of 
workers' participation has been approached in a rather strange 
way. Specifically, none of the different major studies of law, 
management and industrial relations outlined above has approa- 
ched the Zambian workers' participation policy as an object 
of study in itself. Instead, the subject has been given 
tangential treatment(7). This in itself does not mean that 
these studies have not contributed to our understanding of the 
development of workers' participation policy in Zambia. By 
recording the fact of existence of workers' participation in 
the Zambian industrial relations system, these studies have 
helped to alert us to the point that workers' participation 
is one aspect of Zambian post-independence developments which 
has become almost impossible to ignore in any examination of 
state, law and industrial policies in the country. Nonethe- 
-5- 
less, it is fair to imply from the manner of treatment 
explained that the subject has been accorded insufficient 
attention. Workers' participation in Zambia has been institu- 
tionalized on the statute book, in workplace institutions and 
in structures of Government. From this perspective, it must be 
surprising that an area of policy so much in the public 
domain should have been until now approached only in a 
tangential manner. 
It would be misleading to create the impression that there 
have been no Zambian studies that have looked directly at the 
policy of workers' participation. The main point, as we shall 
indicate below, is that even these studies have been far less 
than systematic inquiries into workers' participation poli- 
cies. Either they have been too limited in time frame or too 
specific in scope to have constituted a sustained inquiry into 
a policy that has defined, more than any, state involvement in 
industrial relations in Zambia. 
The earlier study of works councils by Charles Schmidt was 
an assessment of attitudes of managers, trade unionists and 
workers to workers' participation "After The First Year of 
Implementation"(8). Schmidt, in fact, focussed on Zambian 
workers' participation law and policy as if this began in 
1976. He writes thus, 
Although works councils were established as a national 
policy and with high priorities in 1976, intervening 
-6- 
events and circumstances (especially over the past year) 
may have resulted in a policy and administrative de- 
emphasis of the Works Council national programme. If the 
preceding is the case, these survey results are quite 
likely to remain relatively constant until the political 
and economic circumstances have stabilised. Conversely, if 
a forward movement has been achieved in the intervening 20 
month period, the 20-month data lag must be more seriously 
considered by readers of this study(9). 
We know that workers' participation was established as a 
national industrial relations policy much earlier than 1976 
and under economic and political circumstances which were far 
from being stable(10). But such are the consequences of cross- 
sectional studies in an area which is otherwise dynamic and 
historically more composite than the author assumes. Closer to 
Schmidt was the study into the implementation of workers' 
participation in Zambia by Fincham and Zulu in 1979(11). 
Though the latter seemed more historical, it also portrayed a 
simplistic class conspiracy style of analysis. Its perspec- 
tives concentrated on what the writers call "a critical 
analysis of the concept of workers' participation"(12). They 
attributed the origins of workers' participation in Zambia to 
attempts by the state to 'buy off' at a cheap price a radical 
upsurge in working class militancy in the 1960s. In this 
mould, the study of Finchman and Zulu, like that of Schmidt, 
fails to explain more fully the ongoing dynamics of workers' 
-7- 
participation regardless of the original aims of the policy. 
It is hardly surprising that some three years after these 
studies were published, Manfred Weiss, invited by the Zambian 
Government to advise on the functioning of the works councils, 
dismissed them as simply "outdated"(13). 
Yet, the other direct studies of Zambian workers' partici- 
pation law and policy commissioned either by the Zambian 
Government(14) or the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions(15) 
tended also to be devoid of the broader political and 
economic context. They too lacked historical perspectives. By 
their nature the commissioned studies were technically biased. 
They did not question the premises of state policies but 
sought to advise on how best to proceed however faulty or 
otherwise, those premises and direction of Government 
policies. Manfred Weiss wrote, for instance, 
It would, however, seem that no final decision has yet 
been made in Zambia on the basic structure to be given to 
the national industrial relations system in the future. 
Discussions are indeed still going on concerning the role 
to be played and the relationship to be established 
between the various decision-making processes enumerated 
above in the years to come. Such decisions are obviously 
of the greatest political importance and can therefore 
only be taken by the Zambians themselves. The expert has 
consequently refrained from expressing any opinion on 
these basic problems and has limited himself, whenever 
- ö- 
such problems were involved, to indicating the various 
alternatives which present themselves as regards the 
future of works councils in Zambia(16). 
This restraint to question policy and its direction 
characteristic of commissioned work finds its counterpart in 
studies of workers' participation initiated by Management 
Consultants(17). Though also full of useful insights into the 
existing situation, these studies emphasize ways and means 
of making the best of circumstances. For example, counselling 
the adoption of 'appropriate attitudes', as though the major 
barriers to greater workers' participation were in the minds 
of industrial relations practitioners. 
Thus far, we have remarked at the restricted approaches 
which have characterised studies of workers' participation in 
Zambia. The lack of direct focus on workers' participation 
policy characteristic of tangential studies has been high- 
lighted. We have also observed that neither snap-shot surveys 
nor commissioned studies have been equipped to assess in 
detail the complexities that has been posited by state, law 
and workers' participation policies in Zambia. 
Those remarks form the background against which this 
study was undertaken. They indicate at once both our 
justification for the study and its underlying approach. 
Specifically, the origins of this dissertation are in the view 
that, if workers' participation policies are as important as 
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law and policy suggests, they deserve more full analysis in 
their own right. Since 1969 a considerable amount of 
investment in time, human and financial resources has gone 
into the policy of workers' participation in Zambia. Between 
1986 and 1989 alone the total budgeted costs for running IPD 
was Two Million Seven Hundred and Fifty Three Thousand Kwacha 
(K2,753,000)(18). But much more was spent in the 1970s and 
early 80s with national and international seminars(19). We 
think that a programme of such magnitude and which has 
consumed so much of private and public resources over an 
extended time requires better examination than it has received 
up until now. 
Therefore, we seek in this study to contribute to a better 
understanding of how workers' participation policies have 
developed in the country since 1969. We believe a longitudinal 
study offers a better chance of examining carefully and 
systematically the development and contribution of Industrial 
Participatory Democracy in Zambia. For the same reasons, a 
broad view which interprets legal developments within the 
dynamic framework of institutions and structures of post- 
independence Zambia is preferred. 
The origins of workers' participation in Zambia is 
debated. The political, economic, industrial relations and 
legal contexts in which the Zambian participation policy was 
introduced are described. The way these came to affect 
subsequent developments in the law are assessed and analysed 
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up to 1989. In order always to mark out distinctly the 
peculiarities of Zambian developments we shall occasionally 
contrast these with international experience, especially as it 
was offered by countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia in 
the 1970s. But we should make it clear that we shall be 
looking at foreign materials in this thesis only for the 
purposes of seeking to understand better the Zambian 
developments. 
The argument of this thesis is that in order to understand 
the confusion, uncertainties and contradictions that have 
marked progress of the industrial relations policy of workers' 
participation in Zambia, regard should be had to the 
ambiguities surrounding its introduction and the foundations 
upon which it was erected. The structures and institutions 
engendered by post-independence development policies had no 
chance to cure the original ambiguities of the policy. If 
anything, they compounded these, resulting in a serious drift 
of law and policy to which the study testifies. 
4. DEFINITION OF MAIN CONCEPTS IN THE STUDY ý rr rrr r ý. r rrrý. rrrrrrrrý.. rr... rrrr rr rrr rrr rr rý 
The concepts of state, law and workers' participation on 
which our study focuses require clarification in order to 
signal the meaning which we assign to them in this study. 
4.1 THE CONCEPT OF STATE 
ý. ýr rrrrrrýrrý ý. r. r ý. rrr ý 
There are three distinguishable dimensions associated with 
the concept of state when discussed in the context of national 
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policies. First, the concept of state may be used to refer to 
specificity of territorial entity, as recognised, for ins- 
tance, under rules of international law. This is the physical 
dimension of the concept of state designating geographical and 
jurisdictional location of a country and its inhabitants: for 
instance, Zambia as a state in Central and Southern Africa. 
The second use of the concept of state takes on a more 
metaphysical dimension, in the sense that we can only 
conceptualize the reality of the state. In this form, state is 
the manifestation of historically organised social and 
political power, reflected in the existence and continuity of 
laws and allied institutions, as well as the apparatuses of 
civil and armed forces in the state territorially defined. 
Third, and finally, the concept of state may connote the 
social body of individuals who at any given time hold and 
exercise political power and authority in society. The latter 
is often the 'Government' dimension of the concept of state 
which emphasises the representative character through which 
state power and authority is actually exercised(20). 
In this study we employ the concept of state loosely to 
encompass, at different times and in different contexts, the 
three possible dimensions identified. For, in employing the 
concept of state we are concerned with the identification of 
the ways in which those with political power in the territory 
of Zambia have acted over an extended period of time to define 
and influence the direction of industrial policies of workers' 
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participation in management decisions. For this purpose, there 
should be no difficulty when we use the concept of state in 
order to identify Zambia as a constituted geographical and 
jurisdictional territory. Some difficulties do occur however 
in distinguishing state as the amorphous and abstract entity 
aggregating power in society, and when the word should be used 
to refer to a collection of individuals whose preferences, 
actions and decisions are the subject of discussion. This is 
not a new problem to understanding the nature of the state. It 
is the very phenomenon at the centre of discussions 
surrounding 'relative autonomy of the state' and the extent to 
which it is a captive of particular social classes at any 
given time in history(21). In order to separate and identify 
the collective of Zambian decision makers at particular points 
in time, the term 'Government' will sometimes be preferred in 
this study. 
4.2 THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
The concept of law is employed to designate a definitive 
description of rules of conduct designed to influence and 
govern human behaviour. New laws do not begin on empty slates 
in relation to individuals and organisations they propose to 
regulate. The consequent need for these to be sufficiently 
specific in their prescriptions are well recognised(22). That 
is to say, if laws have to be implemented and sanctions for 
breach applied, the makers of law must be sufficiently clear 
in the allocation of rights and duties(23). The Zambian 
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state's creation of rules respecting workers' participation 
in management decisions will be analysed in the light of this 
criterion. Though the question of circumstances under which 
states can dictate rules of behaviour may prove to be more 
important to our understanding of law in this study than the 
traditional analysis of rights, duties and sanctions. 
4.3 WORKERS' PARTICIPATION POLICIES 
Policies are programmes of individual, institutional or 
national character which have the aim of shaping and 
influencing courses of action regarding that individual, 
institution, nation or sections of it(24). Therefore, when we 
speak about Zambian workers' participation policies we refer 
to programmes set out by the Zambian state to shape and 
influence conduct in industrial affairs in order to achieve 
the desired outcome of workers' participation in management 
decisions. Consequently, what is to be understood as workers' 
participation is, in this respect, the key concept. 
There is no standard definition to describe workers' 
participation in management decisions. Workers' participation 
has meant different things to different people, and meanings 
have varied with times and places(25). As used in this study, 
workers' participation denotes the ability of workers (or 
labour] to have a say and influence on decision making in 
companies. Inherent in the concept of workers' participation 
is the notion of power on part of employees to take on some or 
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all prerogatives in running business companies which have 
historically been the prerogatives of employers, managers [or 
capital]. The extent to which workers can take on or 
participate in management decisions depend on many factors, 
but it is thought that crucial to the process are the forms of 
arrangements made for employees to participate in management 
decisions. 
Thus, the history of state intervention in participation 
policies is itself linked up with struggles of workers seeking 
a favourable framework of social and economic treatment in the 
workplace(26). Consequently, the forms of arrangements made 
to redress and improve on workers demands have also influenced 
the content of workers' participation in management decisions. 
In places where state authorities encouraged voluntary 
collective bargaining arrangements, either by legislation or 
otherwise, as the main framework through which to improve 
social and economic conditions of workers, workers' partici- 
pation has been understood more loosely either as embracing 
collective bargaining itself or the other extra-collective 
bargaining arrangements made for employees to share in 
decision activities of companies. For example, joint consul- 
tation in works committees, profit sharing, share ownership, 
cooperatives and quality circles. The variety of 
institutions and structures through which workers have been 
allowed to associate in activities of companies have, to some 
extent, brought a great deal of imprecision to what is 
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entailed by workers' participation in management decisions. 
This imprecision as to what should constitute workers' 
participation is more evident in the capitalist countries of 
the common law heritage(27). 
On the other hand, in Western Europe and Scandinavia, 
where states have had traditions of legislation as a counter- 
part of collective bargaining to improve social and economic 
conditions of workers, the concept of workers' participation 
is much more established. Workers' participation is understood 
in more formal terms of arrangements sanctioned by the state 
by which employees are allowed to participate, alone or with 
employers, in decision activities of companies. In this more 
formal terms, George Vorbrugg has defined workers' partici- 
pation as "the right of employees and/ or their represe- 
ntatives or labour organisations to influence plant, shop and 
company policy beyond the mere negotiation of individual 
employment contracts or old fashioned collective bargaining 
agreements"(28). Nikolinakos, following Gorkum, similarly 
defines workers' participation as the "rights and powers of 
employees or their representatives which enable them to exert 
influence on the determination, implementation, supervision 
and control of company policy"(29). 
We shall review in more detail the different approaches to 
participation laws in Chapter 5. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to emphasise that the role of the state and the 
formalities associated with its intervention in participation 
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policies is a distinguishing feature of the definition of 
worker's participation and Industrial Democracy in Western 
Europe and Scandinavia. The insistence in Zambia to use law 
as the instrument by which to promote greater workers's 
participation, as we shall see in Chapter 3, pushes the 
country much closer to Western Europe and Scandinavian 
approaches to industrial democracy and workers' participation. 
But the reasons why such policies are adopted, the ways and 
extent to which workers have been allowed to participate in 
decisions of industry, and the consequences of state 
involvement itself, are factors far less subject to 
generalisation. 
5. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
------------------------- 
Research methods are chosen on the basis that they allow 
the research question to be answered. In our study two 
research methods have been adopted: the historical and 
comparative research methods. 
An historical approach to research concerns helping to 
understand current problems through the examination of what 
happened in the past. We use this approach to understand how 
it came that Zambia adopted workers' participation policies; 
to appreciate the context of structures and institutions in 
which workers' participation was intended to operate; and to 
observe the dynamic processes shaping the development of 
participation law and policy during the period under study. 
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Though the history of workers participation dates back to 
the previous century, it was after the Second World War, and 
particularly during the 1960s and 70s that workers' 
participation in management decisions emerged as an important 
issue in law reforms(30). This was the precise time that inde- 
pendent Zambia was evolving her own industrial policies(31). 
The comparative approach thus enables us to bring into 
perspective the peculiarities of Zambian developments in 
relation to what was happening in other countries at around 
the same time. We have used this method of research in order 
to discover experience of other countries who have attempted 
to give effect to participation policies through the use of 
law. This research method has been of great value indeed in 
organising the results reported, though, as we have stressed, 
very little is said in the thesis about the experience of 
other countries with industrial democracy and workers' 
participation. 
The research carried out involved two major research 
techniques: Analysis of primary and secondary materials and 
Discussion Interviews. 
A) Analysis of Primary and Secondary Materials 
This was by far the main technique of research used in the 
study. It was justified by both the researcher's previous 
experience in the field of study and the specific levels of 
research and rigour demanded by the research question(32). 
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Primary materials came in the form of Government reports; 
Acts of Parliament and Draft Bills; Parliamentary Debates; 
Court Case Reports; Speeches and Policy Documents. These were 
largely Zambian materials. Secondary materials came from 
books; journal articles; research reports; symposia, seminar 
and conference papers; and occasionally newspaper reports and 
analysis. 
B) Discussion Interviews 
Discussion interviews were conducted at the fieldwork 
stage in December 1989. But the scope and intensity with which 
we conducted these interviews was limited. This was for two 
reasons. First, the problems of time and financial resources- 
(33). Second, and mainly, we did not think that an extended 
programme of interviews would have helped significantly the 
perspectives of this study. The reason we conducted discussion 
interviews at all was to gain a more current general under- 
standing of the processes at work in the development of law 
and participation policy in Zambia. The information obtained 
was thus used to supplement and collaborate the documentary 
evidence of the issues investigated. For this reason, we 
contacted only some of the individuals directly involved in 
the implementation of workers' participation policies in the 
country. At the same time semi-structured discussion inter- 
views were preferred over the more formal administration of 
questionnaires(34). 
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Notes were taken either during discussion or as soon as 
it was possible thereafter to identify the sources of 
particular perspectives. The actual names of persons we 
interviewed have either been acknowledged or are cited where 
relevant in the study. For purposes of general indication, 
interviews were held with selected officials at the two 
Ministries of Labour, Cultural Services and Social Development 
and Commerce and Industry; Department of Industrial 
Participatory Democracy; Law Development 'Commission; and the 
Industrial Relations Court. In the trade union movement, 
information was obtained from representatives of the Zambia 
Congress of Trade Unions and National Union of Commercial and 
Industrial Workers. Because of the policy of one Industry, One 
Union followed in Zambia since the 1960s, the National Union 
of Commercial and Industrial Workers is a key representative 
of many of the industries whose workers are covered by 
participation policies(35). 
Prior to 1988 there was only one law respecting workers' 
participation in Zambia contained in Part 7 of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971. There was no difference between public 
and private companies in the way the law was applied. But in 
order to gain a broader picture we visited and held interviews 
with works councillors/ managers in two state enterprises and 
two private sector companies. The state sector companies were 
Scaw Ltd (Foundry Engineering) and National Breweries Ltd 
(Manufacturer of opaque beer). The private sector companies 
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were Medwich Clothing Ltd (Clothing manufacturer) and 
Specialty Foods (Zambia) Ltd ( Confectionery Food Processing). 
These companies were chosen for being well. established 
businesses, unionised, located in the central Copperbelt town 
of Kitwe where several unions are headquartered, including 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and National Union of 
Commercial and Industrial Workers, and for being companies 
with which the researcher has had no previous direct 
contact(36). These factors were thought relevant and 
sufficiently objective to obtaining the best possible 
information within the constraints of time and budget. 
The fifth company at which we spent some time was Zambia 
Pork Products SME (Meat Processing). Together with Choma 
Milling SME, Zambia Pork is one of the pioneering companies to 
operate under the Self-Management Enterprises legislation of 
1988. The discussions we conducted there helped to provide 
insights into a phenomenon which was relatively new in Zambia 
at the time of our research in 1989. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This study has relied mostly on written historical 
materials as supplemented by discussion interviews. While we 
found these research techniques most appropriate to gathering 
the information we were looking for, we recognise that both of 
our research techniques are susceptible to bias, distortion 
and at times sheer absence of accuracy. 
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Edmund Seddon has observed that "history unfolds through a 
process of gradual and almost imperceptible change, in which 
many threads are interwoven in a manner which produces only 
dominant patterns"(37). From this view, it follows that only 
dominant patterns can actually be found in historical sources. 
That already indicates the limits of what could be gained by 
our main research methods. It should be added however that 
historical information is often documented for purposes 
different from what a researcher would want to use it. All 
these compound difficulties of handling and interpreting 
historical materials. 
When it comes to the subject of workers' participation the 
same difficulties are duplicated by the controversial nature 
of workers' participation in management decisions. Workers' 
participation encompasses at once ideological, political, 
social and economic elements on which different views are 
held. Inevitably, what is recorded will normally reflect not 
only the views of those who organise production but also the 
balances of power in society. Where organisation of production 
and monopoly of social power were held predominantly by state 
institutions, as has been the case in Zambia for much of the 
period under study, the researcher is put in the most 
imponderable situations of dependence. We talked to the unions 
and ordinary workers and consulted whatever material was there 
written by non-state officials in order to obtain a balanced 
view of the Zambian developments. But the very absence of 
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comprehensive studies of many aspects of workers' partici- 
pation in Zambia have to be borne in mind as a real limitation 
to how far we could go at clarifying such a complicated policy 
in this thesis. 
6. PLAN AND LOGIC OF THE STUDY 
Fundamental to following the development of workers' 
participation in Zambia is the appreciation of the reasons why 
a policy of workers' participation was introduced in the 
country at all; the objects that were to be achieved through 
this policy; and the role law was envisaged to play in the 
process. These are points on which several views are found. 
We therefore examine carefully these introductory aspects of 
Zambian policies in two separate chapters. 
Chapter 2 introduces four main propositions supporting 
rather different positions as to the origins of workers' 
participation in Zambia: The Philosophy of Humanism; The 
political concept of Participatory Democracy; The idea of new 
role of labour in development; and the role of international 
influences. The Chapter also goes on to analyse in detail the 
social, economic and political context in the background of 
which workers' participation policies were introduced in 
independent Zambia. 
Chapter 3 builds on the specificity of, the Zambian 
historical context with an examination of both the purposes 
that were to be served by workers' participation and the role 
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envisaged to be played by law in that process of change. 
Presidential and ministerial statements made before and after 
the 1971 legislation are scrutinised to determine both stated 
objectives of workers' participation and the particular place 
of law. Conclusions will then be drawn regarding factors which 
lead to the adoption of workers' participation in Zambia. 
With the foundations of workers' participation policies 
sketched out, Chapter 4 investigates specifically the context 
of institutions and structures in which Zambian workers' 
participation law and policy was intended to function in the 
1970s. Political, economic, industrial relations and legal 
contexts are examined and assessed for their susceptibilities 
to notions of workers' participation in management decisions. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the provisions of the 1971 workers' 
participation law. Beginning with a general survey of approa- 
ches to workers' participation laws, we proceed to outline the 
Zambian Government's own approach to participation legislation 
in 1971. We review in detail both procedural and substantive 
elements of the workers' participation legislation. The out- 
come of the legislation in relation to what were the stated 
objectives of workers' participation is finally assessed. 
Chapter 6 is an account of the implementation of the 1971 
workers' participation law itself. We look in particular at 
the circumstances surrounding the decision to bring the law 
into force in 1976; the reactions of unions, workers and 
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management to the law in practice; its interpretation by the 
Industrial Relations Court; and the Zambian state's own 
reactions to the adequacy and appropriateness of the law's 
framework, sanctions and remedies. 
The Self-management legislation was enacted in 1988. 
Several other decisions had been taken by the Zambian 
Government in the intervening period since the mid-1970s to 
respond to challenges presented by the policy of workers' 
participation in management decisions. That general back- 
ground; the nature and significance of Self-management legis- 
lation to the promotion of Zambian policies are presented and 
reviewed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 reviews the main themes of 
the study and draws appropriate conclusions about the origins 
and development of workers' participation policy in Zambia up 
until 1989. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' PARTICIPATION POLICIES: HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL LACKGROITIID 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter, and the next, is to describe 
and analyse how the state in Zambia developed laws and 
policies respecting workers' participation in management 
decisions. In this chapter, we attempt to set a broad 
historical and political background, while in Chapter 3 we 
focus on the immediate context, in the background of which 
the policy of workers' participation was announced in 
independent Zambia. We shall also examine there the 
objectives of workers' participation and discuss the role of 
law in the attainment of those aims. 
The word 'origin' as used in the text is ambiguous. In 
ordinary English language, the word 'origin' means 'source' 
or 'starting point'(1). But in the context of state measures 
'source' or 'starting point' can be understood as having more 
than one meaning. First, 'source' may refer to the state 
official who introduces public measures as the source or 
starting point of those specific measures. Equally, 'source' 
or starting point of policies may refer to circumstances or 
factors leading to introduction of such measures by state 
officials. In the latter sense, the official is not the 
originator. He plays the role of a messenger of policies 
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forged by the 'reality' of circumstances in which the official 
exists. In this study, both elements of the meaning of origin 
in relation to state measures are regarded as important, 
though the second meaning will be found to form more of the 
conceptual framework of our discussion in this chapter and the 
following. 
The intention to introduce workers' participation in 
management decisions was first made public in Zambia by 
President Kaunda at the Second National Convention held in 
Kitwe in December 1969(2). This aspect of the origin of 
workers' participation in Zambia is significant in more than 
one way. 
First, we have specificity of time and place when workers' 
participation in Zambia originated as a serious subject of 
public policy discussion. Second, we know by whom workers' 
participation was first mooted, at least in public. These 
elements are not always so easily specified in histories of 
workers' participation policies in other countries. For 
example Germany, where workers' participation dates back to 
the 19th century and its history is interwoven with policies 
of governments, employers and trade unions(3). In those 
countries it has proved difficult to specify where and when, 
and by whom policies of workers' participation were first 
started. 
The implication is that in Zambia at least, the more 
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important area of inquiry for the origins of workers' 
participation is to discover the circumstances under which 
the government first announced its policy of workers' 
participation in management decisions. That is, to be able to 
understand the premises of Zambian policies, it is necessary 
to know how it came to pass that the President announced the 
industrial relations policy of workers' participation in 
management decisions. It is in this sense that our discussion 
here and in the next chapter will focus on the circumstantial 
aspects of the word 'origin' with regard to state policies. We 
shall review the political circumstances and discuss the 
economic, social and historical framework, in the background 
of which workers' participation was announced in 1969. 
To do this, it is necessary in the first place to find a 
working framework that justifies a broad historical approach 
to the subject. Such a framework is provided by the different 
perspectives which have been adopted in analysing industrial 
policies in Zambia, and workers' participation in particular. 
Four propositions are pertinent to the discussion that has 
taken place in Zambia since introduction of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971. They are: (1) the Philosophy of Humanism 
(2) the political concept of Participatory Democracy (3) the 
notion of the new role of labour in development and (4) the 
role of international influences. After an examination of 
these propositions in the first section, we shall proceed in 
section 2 to sketch in detail the local political, social and 
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economic developments which will serve to structure much of 
the subsequent discussion of how workers' participation 
originated in Zambia. 
1 Origins of workers' participation: Four Propositions 
1.1 The Philosophy of Humanism 
The first proposition likely to confront anyone coming to 
the subject of workers' participation in Zambia is that 
workers' participation originated in that country as a 
consequence of Zambia's adoption of the Philosophy of 
Humanism(4). President Kaunda, Ministers and officials at IPD 
all suggest that workers' participation in Zambia derived 
from the ascendancy of the Philosophy of Humanism in Zambia's 
political life(5). While support for Humanism may not be 
surprising from President Kaunda's government officials, it is 
fair to state that it, is not only government spokesmen who 
have attributed the development of workers' participation in 
Zambia to the Philosophy of Humanism. Many other external 
commentators have explained workers' participation in Zambia 
in terms of the Philosophy of Humanism. A clear example is 
Peter Machungwa in 'Zambian Humanism as the basis of workers' 
participation in management decision making'(6). Stanilav 
Grozdanic also asserted that The theoretical basis of Indus- 
trial Participatory Democracy as understood in Zambia is to be 
found in the national Philosophy of Humanise"(7). 
The attraction of Huaaniaa in explaining the origins of 
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workers' participation policies has to be seen from a chrono- 
logical perspective. Humanism was proclaimed as Zambia's 
national Philosophy in April 1967. With workers' participation 
policies coming in 1969, Miamian was already well poised to 
buttress any new policy measures. President Kaunda was indeed 
sufficiently explicit on the point in 1969 : 
time has come for us to establish relations between 
workers and the employer that are in keeping with the 
Philosophy of Humanise. In other words, our legislation 
must be such that it creates an atmosphere which will be 
conducive to the creation of a man-centred society... (8) 
From an investigative position, the question to ask is 
not whether, in fact, Humanism had influence, but what is 
Humanism and why was Humanism adopted in Zambia. To answer 
these questions it is necessary to know something about the 
context of post-independence policies in Zambia. We therefore 
wish to leave these and other related points to Chapter 3. 
1.2 The Political Concept of Participatory Democracy 
The second proposition, and one which is closely allied 
with the Philosophy of Humanism, states that workers' partici- 
pation originated in Zambia in order to carry into effect the 
political concept of Participatory Democracy. Participatory 
Democracy has been explained as an organisational concept 
encompassing all spheres of political, social and economic 
organisation in Zambia. outside political speeches, and they 
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are many, it has been given detailed study by Partrick Ollava 
in Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy of 
National Development-(9). According to this work, the 
underlying theme of the concept of Participatory Democracy is 
that people who have to be affected by decisions must in one 
way or the other be involved in making those decisions. Its 
populist slogan is "power to the people"(10). Practical 
manifestation of participatory democracy in Zambia has been in 
the proliferation of institutions structured in a way 
ostensibly intended to serve the aims of participatory 
democracy. Both government and Party administrative structures 
have been affected. 
The earliest steps in government thinking in this dire- 
ction can be traced to the Local Government Administration 
Act, 1965(11). This Act established a uniform pattern of 
democratic local authorities throughout the country. In 1969, 
further steps were taken. A cabinet Minister was appointed to 
head each of Zambia's nine Provinces(12). At the same time 
fifty-three District Governors were put in charge of indivi- 
dual districts. In 1970, the Registration and Development of 
Villages Act(13) followed. A revised and even much more 
ambitious exercise in participatory democracy appeared in 1980 
with the passage of a new Local Administration Act(14). This 
Act sought to establish local councils as administrative 
organs over which in principle residents were to have control 
through running schools, hospitals, courts, police, prisons, 
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roads and other public institutions and services. 
At the Party level, the village in rural areas, and the 
section in urban areas were established as the smallest units 
of political democratic control. The ward and the constituency 
were the intermediate, while the National Council and the 
General Conference, formed the upper echelons of Party 
democratic control(15). 
It can be argued, of course, that certain objective 
reasons existed which made these exercises inevitable. Indeed, 
it is hard, if not impossible, to cite any political system 
which does not create functional structures of governance. 
But this is beside the point. 'What is relevant is that under 
the Kaunda government these local and national administrative 
changes were pursued in the name of Participatory Democracy. 
Thus, within the broad use of the concept, introduction of 
workers' participation was presented as an extension of parti- 
cipatory democracy into the industrial aphere(16). 
Evidence tying the origins of workers' participation in 
Zambia to the above interpretation also comes in two other 
respects. The official designation of workers' participation 
policy in the country is Industrial Participatory Democracy. 
Secondly, the government department in charge of this policy 
goes by the title of Department of Industrial Participatory 
Democracy(IPD). Therefore, tenuous as the relationship may be, 
it is not far fetched to claim some justification in the 
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connection between the origins of workers' participation and 
the wider programmes of participatory democracy in Zambian 
society. 
Moreover, President Kaunda has explained the policy of 
Industrial Participatory Democracy as an "essential element of 
our policy of decentralisation of power"(17). Elsewhere, 
Kaunda adds that 
the policy of decentralisation promote the type of 
democracy in which citizens participate not only through 
their own freely elected representatives but also by their 
own direct involvement in the decision making process. The 
spirit behind the decentralisation of Party and Government 
is power to the people(18). 
The explanatory value of this proposition has to be 
examined in the context of the whole system in which 
democratic values were cherished. It therefore calls for more 
information which we shall present below. 
1.3 The new role of labour in development 
The third proposition of how workers' participation arose 
in Zambia comes from a slightly different angle. It states 
that workers' participation arose from a political requirement 
to channel labour into development goals as understood and 
defined by Zambia's governing elites. Exponents of this view 
do not always begin from a similar theoretical position but 
the materials of their analyses and the conclusions they draw 
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come from observed realities of conflicts between state 
authorities and the trade union movement or some sections of 
it in Zambia. Foremost in this this view was Bates (1971)(19), 
Fincham and Zulu (1980), and Kalula (1988)(20). In their 
different analyses, these writers have tried to show that 
the conflicts in industrial relations which followed Zambia's 
political independence in 1964 were instrumental to the 
adoption of participation policies in the country. According 
to this view, workers' participation was intended either to 
harness labour for productivity in the pursuit of development 
goals (Bates) or to buy labour peace at a cheap price (Fincham 
and Zulu) or simply to 'incorporate' the labour movement and 
workers for one or a combination of the above state objectives 
(lalula). How well this interpretation explains the develo- 
pment of workers' participation in Zambia will be discussed in 
Chapter 3 and assessed in the conclusions(21). It suffices at 
this stage to indicate that this line of argument has two 
advantages. First, it has direct relevance to industrial rela- 
tions. Secondly, its factual base is contemporaneous with 
Zambian developments in the 1960s. 
1.4 The Role of International Influences 
The fourth, and final, proposition states simply that the 
policy of workers' participation in Zambia derived from the 
country's contacts in the international community. Specifi- 
cally, the development of workers' participation is attributed 
to the influences of the ILO. This proposition is made most 
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forcefully by Shiaaponda in The Evolution of the Zambian 
Industrial Relations Systen(22). Shinaponda begins his expla- 
nation from the premise that encouragement of workers' parti- 
cipation among member nations was a policy of the ILO long 
before Zambia's independence in 1964. That policy, it is 
argued, goes back to the ILO's Philadelphia Declaration of 
10th May 1944. In that declaration, the ILO called on all 
member nations to adopt labour policies that would ensure 
the effective recognition of the right of collective 
bargaining, the cooperation of management and labour in 
the continuous improvement of efficiency, and collabora- 
tion of vorkers and employers in the preparation and 
application of social and economic measures(23). 
It is shown that that general declaration was followed in 
1952 with a recommendation and resolution on consultation and 
cooperation between workers and employers at the level of the 
undertaking. Further, that in 1966, the Governing Body of the 
ILO requested the Director General to institute studies 
intended to make available to member nations more information 
on practices of workers' participation at the level of the 
enterprise. Finally, in accordance with that request, two ILO 
meetings on the subject of workers' participation were held 
prior to Zambia's adoption of workers' participation policies 
in 1969. The most wellknown of these was the Technical Meeting 
on the rights of Trade Union Representatives and Participation 
of workers in Decisions within undertakings, held in Geneva in 
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1967(24). 
By December 1969, the thesis continues, workers' partici- 
pation in management was well on the agenda of the ILO for 
member nations to adopt in their conduct of industrial 
relations. To be sure, Shinaponda would have Britain to blame 
for what he considers as Zambia's late development of 
participation policies. According to him, if Britain, as the 
Colonial master, had been disposed towards schemes of workers' 
participation, Zambia night have had such policies much 
earlier than 1969(25). In the context, political independence 
gave Zambia latitude to introduce industrial relations 
practices that were outside the domain of British influence. 
In a nutshell, ILO support for industrial relations programmes 
of workers' participation provided the inspiration for Zambia. 
The continued collaboration between Zambia and the ILO(26) is 
cited to show Zambia's indebtedness to the ILO for support in 
industrial relations, and workers' participation in parti- 
cular. 
To be certain, Shimaponda does not deny the contribution 
of domestic factors to the development of workers' partici- 
pation in Zambia. The value of his suggestion, and perhaps of 
the whole thesis in The Evolution of the Zambian Industrial 
Relations System, is to indicate the practical sources of 
ideas which were arrived at in working out solutions to the 
country's industrial relations problems. 
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In assessing the significance of Shimaponda's suggestion, 
and by extension the contribution of the ILO in the matter 
under discussion, it should be indicated that between 1967 
and 1969, Zambia was in touch with that United Nations 
Organisation in a way that was more than mere membership. It 
was a time when the Zambian Government was actively looking to 
the ILO for ideas on several other industrial relations 
issues. The most significant outcome being the commissioning 
by the Zambian government, through the ILO, of Professor 
Turner to examine and advise her on wages and incomes 
policies(27). The point then is that the opportunity existed 
through which the Zambian government would have been made 
aware of industrial relations practices which were in tune 
with the general way they wanted their policies to go. From 
this perspective, there seems to be no necessary conflict 
between Shimaponda's proposition and the three others already 
considered which emphasize domestic policies. 
Conclusions 
Given these different perspectives, what conclusion can 
there be to explain the origins of workers' participation in 
Zambia? From what has been said, it seems more information 
needs to be given in order to reach more definitive 
conclusions. Nevertheless, it is possible, on the basis of the 
perspectives outlined above, to draw certain insights into the 
subject of workers' participation in Zambia. 
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Firstly, the circumstances which lead to the adoption of 
participation policies in Zambia, are not simple. What we 
have been presented with so far is a complex picture of perce- 
ptions in the Zambian system. These could suggest that behind 
the Philosophy of Humanism, Participatory Democracy, state- 
trade union policies and the search - for international 
practices in industrial relations were real issues which 
should require detailed study. 
The second point is that the above perspectives bring out 
the pre-eminent role of the state in the development of 
workers' participation in Zambia. In all of the four 
propositions considered, there is every indication that the 
state or its policies were responsible for the development of 
workers' participation in Zambia. The critical role of unions 
in putting workers' participation policies on the political 
agenda, so much discussed in Western Europe(28), is conspicuous 
by its absence in Zambia. Obviously, this raises the question 
why the state in Zambia, not trade unions, was the advocate 
of workers' participation in industry. 
These remarks suggest that in order to understand the 
origin of workers' participation in Zambia, and to fully 
explain the pre-eminent role of the state in the Zambian 
participation programme, much more needs to be said about the 
country and its social and economic history. It is not just 
the immediate history of workers' participation in the 1960s 
which seems to matter. The multifariousness of issues raised 
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by the different perspectives indicate strongly that the 
colonial history of Zambia to which post-independence 
policies related is relevant to any understanding of the 
origins of the Zambian variety of workers' participation. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that a good grasp of the Zambian 
background is essential to explaining not only how workers' 
participation started but also how this policy subsequently 
developed in the radically different political, social and 
economic circumstances of Zambia in the 1970s. 
In attempting a broad and detailed historical and 
political account, we keep in mind the advice of Jean de 
Givry, who, as Director-General of the ILO, warned of the 
temptation always to try to examine all problems of social 
policy under the heading of workers' participation in manage- 
ment(29). In order to avoid such a generalised discussion of 
Zambia's colonial history, we focus on three selected areas. 
These are found to have been crucial in evoking and moulding 
the direction of post-independence policies in Zambia. They 
are (1) the geographical location of the state and the nature 
of its political evolution, (2) social and economic organisa- 
tion of the colonial regime, and (3) its labour relations. We 
discuss each of these in section 2 under the heading of 
historical and political background. 
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2 Historical and Political Background 
2.1 Zambia - State Location and Political Evolution 
Zambia is located in Central Africa, and covers an area of 
about 291,000 square miles (753,000 square kilometres)(30). 
The country is land locked, bordered in the South by Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, and the Caprivi Strip (an extension of Namibia), on 
the South-East by Mozambique, in the East by Malawi, on the 
North-East by Tanzania, on the North and North West by Zaire, 
and in the West by Angola. While the geo-political location of 
Zambia is a historical accident, the location itself has had 
real influence on policy formulation in Zambia. At the time of 
independence in 1964, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique were yet to win their political independence. Of 
these, only Botswana received independence, in 1966, without a 
war of liberation. The other neighbours in the East, West and 
South, their wars of liberation were both protracted and viru- 
lent. 
To appreciate the significance of these external strugg- 
les to the formulation of domestic industrial policies in 
Zambia, it is necessary only to consider briefly the Zambian 
political evolution in the context of British colonialism in 
Central and Southern Africa. 
Zambia became a Sovereign Republic on 24th October 1964. 
Immediately prior to this date, the country was the territory 
of Northern Rhodesia under the direct administration of the 
-46- 
British Colonial Office. The actual evolution of Zambia as a 
unified political state began in the last decade of the 19th 
century when, in 1889, British South Africa Chartered Company 
(BSA), obtained authority from the British government to 
acquire and administer, among others, areas north of the 
Zambezi river(31). Until this time the areas north of Zambezi, 
which constitute modern Zambia, were not under unified 
political control. They belonged to tribal kingdoms of 
different sizes, embracing equally different state systems, 
languages and cultures. For instance, the Lozi in the West, 
Bemba in the North, Tonga-Ills -Lenje in South and Central and 
the Ngoni-Nsenga-Tumbuka in the East. The BSA Administration 
acknowledged the heterogeneity of the territory to some 
extent, when in 1895, they began to administer Zambia divided 
into North Eastern and North Western Rhodesia(32). 
The two territories were brought together in a unified 
Northern Rhodesia in 1911. The effective date of this unifi- 
cation is 17th August 1911, when the Northern Rhodesia order- 
in-Council came into force(33). The BSA's control of Northern 
Rhodesia was passed to the British Colonial Office in April 
1924. From then on the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, an the 
representative of the British Crown, became head of government 
in the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia(34). He was assisted 
by a Legislative Council composed of nominated Civil servants 
of the Crown, and increasingly by members elected from the 
white settler community of Northern Rhodesia. The doctrine of 
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indirect rule, as applied to Northern Rhodesia, preserved 
traditional systems of tribal political control known before 
colonialism, save the extent to which traditional systems were 
incompatible with central colonial control. African interests 
in the Legislative Council, and as called for by the Passfield 
Memorandum of 1930, were entrusted to white nominees. An 
indigenous Zambian entered the Legislative Council in 1949, 
but it was not until 1962 that Africans took control of the 
legislative Council(35). 
In the meantime, Between 1953 and 1963, Northern Rhodesia 
became part of British Central Africa Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, which brought together present Zimbabwe, Malawi 
and Zambia. The Federation was at once a political and 
economic alliance brought about by those politically and 
economically powerful in the region- the white settlers of 
Central and Southern Africa. Their ultimate aim was to create 
a dominion state in Central Africa under which European 
"ability, initiative and capital"(36) would superintend over 
the majority Africans. Opposition to Federation was one of 
the most galvanising issues in the nationalist politics of 
Central Africa, especially in the Protectorates of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi). Conversely, the break of the 
Federation in 1963, and the quick succession to black majority 
rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1964 shattered life 
dreams of the many politically minded white settlers of 
Central and Southern Africa. In the context, the Unilateral 
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Declaration of Independence (UDI) which followed in Rhodesia 
on 11 November 1965 may be interpreted as an act of 
desperation by a group who saw themselves as being robbed of 
Cecil John Rhodes' historical promises to the whites of 
Central Africa. Their marches into the region in the closing 
decade of the 19th century enabled the BSA company to attain 
its political ambitions for the British as against those of 
the Portugese, Germans and Belgians(37). The fear in Zambia of 
white domination in the economy after political independence 
acquires its true meaning when understood within the above 
social and political milieu from which Zambia developed. Ue 
return to more of these issues below. 
Since independence, Zambia has been ruled by the govern- 
ment of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) led by 
Dr Kenneth David Kaunda. Up until 13th December 1972, Kaunda 
ruled Zambia by virtue of UNIP's popularity over the other 
political parties in the country. Constitutional amendments in 
1972, created what is known officially as a One Party. Partici- 
patory Democracy. In simple language, the constitution per- 
mitted one political party to be the sole organ of political 
power. The Party named in the constitution throughout the 
period covered by this study was President Kaunda's UNIP(38). 
To conclude, it can be remarked that Zambia has had a 
rapid succession of systems of government in only a space of 
under 100 years. Viewed as a continuum from the multiple 
states of a century ago to a unified One Party Political 
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system of today, and the latter' imminent demise in the 19909, 
political evolution in Zambia suggests presence of underlying 
currents responsible for the successive systems of political 
control. Whatever the sources of such currents, and their 
nature, it is reasonable to suspect that these have had real 
impact on the policies of the day(39). 
In the next two sections we highlight colonial economic 
developments in general and social and labour relations in 
particular, for their contribution to moulding Zambia's post- 
independence policies, including workers' participation. 
2.2 Colonial Economic Developments 
Theoretically, modern economic development of Zambia, 
defined as the production and distribution of goods and 
services through the media of employment and cash exchange, 
followed in the framework suggested by Allen in his discussion 
of typologies of capitalist penetration in tropical Africa- 
(40). Allen hypothesized that climate, geology and topography 
conditioned three forms by which capitalism entered tropical 
Africa. 
The first of his propositions is that areas where climate 
was found suitable for European settlement, the economic 
resources were exploited by European colonists in the 
classical sense. That is, the indigenous population was 
dispossessed of its fertile land, and then recruited both by 
physical and market pressures as wage labourers. Examples 
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given of this group are Kenya and Zlnbabve. 
The second relate to areas whose climates were found un- 
suitable for European settlement, but where existed potential 
for large scale mineral exploitation. It is suggested that 
there was no need in this instance to acquire land from the 
indigenous population. The main strategy was on acquisition of 
mineral rights, which were then exploited by European capital 
under empire protection. Physical and market pressures were 
deployed to drive the local population from subsistence 
economies into the cash economy created by-large scale mineral 
production. Zambia furnishes examples in Central Africa. 
The final proposition concerns the pattern of economic 
development said to have been followed in tropical West 
Africa. Neither climate nor opportunities for large scale 
mineral production were found in this region. The device 
adopted was to leave the production of goods to traditional 
methods, while European capital mediated processing and 
marketing arrangements in the area. Physical and market 
pressures were exerted on the local population to get involved 
in the cash economy. Peasant production of cocoa and 
groundnuts in West Africa, according to Allen, began as a 
result of this line of European mediation of capitalist 
developments(41). Similar lines of analysis are found in the 
essay of Giovanni Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical 
Perspective: A study of the Proletarization of the African 
Peasantry in Rhodesia(42). This author demonstrates how 
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settler capital drove the local African population into wage 
labour in the mines and farms of Zimbabwe just in the way 
postulated by Allen. 
It is useful however, to recognise frameworks of discu- 
ssion for what they are. They are, as in this instance, help- 
ful ways of ordering rather complex historical developments. 
The penetration of capitalism in Africa did not follow a pre- 
ordained path. The criterion for action by individuals, groups 
and syndicates was dictated by the attraction of opportunities 
for profits given resources on part of these to engage in 
specific activities. Consequently, there has been a consi- 
derable overlap of ways by which capitalism entered non 
capitalist territories. This point is amplified by the Zambian 
case we shall consider below. 
Having said that, we still recognise that Allen's 
typologies offer a good starting point to analysing the 
pattern of capitalist economic development in Zambia. To start 
with, there was no tradition of urban dwelling in Zambia when 
the BSA company took control of the country some one hundred 
years ago. Zambians lived scattered in small communities orga- 
nised in kingdoms and chieftainship. Their livelihood was 
dependent on traditional economic activities: small-scale, 
non-mechanised farming, cattle herding, fishing and hunting. 
Labour for these subsistence activities was obtained, and 
distributed, through kinship networks(43). 
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From this perspective, Zambia's modern economic system, 
as defined above, began, to the extent it exists in the 
country, with European penetration in Central and Southern 
Africa. As with political administration, the introduction of 
European system of economic arrangements created an interface 
between that and the traditional systems. In attempts to get 
Africans to be involved in capitalist economic arrangements, 
conflicts were inevitable. Each former colonial possession 
has its own story, as indeed every other country where 
capitalist relations have developed. 
A peculiar feature in Zambian developments was the dual 
role of the British South Africa Chartered Company. Both 
European rule and capitalist economic relations were pushed at 
the same time by activities of this commercial company. That 
is to say, the BSA was at once a government and a commercial 
company in Northern Rhodesia. We are concerned in this part of 
the study with its role as a commercial company advancing 
capitalist values and ways of organising production. In this 
role, the BSA's initial interests in Northern Rhodesia were in 
the prospects of mineral riches. In retrospect, it was through 
discovery of minerals that Zambia's economic development began 
in earnest. Minerals however, could not be found everywhere in 
Zambia like Savannah grass and woodlands! In fact, the 
expectation of the BSA to find significant mineral deposits in 
Zambia in the 1890s did not materialise until well into the 
1920s when a rich area of copper deposits was discovered., 
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Therefore, up until the development of the copper 
industry in the 1930s, Zambia was predominantly a traditional 
society where cash employment, urban living and industriali- 
sation were either isolated and limited or non-existent at 
all. The imposition of a modern, highly mechanised copper 
mining industry upon a predominantly rural subsistence economy 
caused, as we shall see below, disparity between the affluence 
of the copper region and the deprivation of the rest of the 
country. The sense of urgency given to issues of racial 
economic disparity in both nationalist politics and post- 
independence policies had their sources in these historical 
developments. Before we examine the contribution of copper to 
the creation of the modern economic system in Zambia, it will 
be useful to explain what else was there before the copper 
boom in 1930s and 40s. 
Historically, the advent of copper industry coincides 
with the demise of company rule in Northern Rhodesia. In all 
thirty years had intervened since colonialism was forced on 
the area. Much of the foundations of capitalism in Zambia 
were erected during this period. Five principal areas of cash 
employment under company rule can be specified for the 
purposes of indicating the extent capitalism had penetrated 
before the copper industry in Zambia. 
First, since the 1880s, Company agents and Missionaries 
had always employed African labour in their stations as 
interpreters, guides, messengers, house servants, gardeners, 
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watchmen and builders. Through such employment, cash perco- 
lated into rural subsistence economies. By and large, this was 
a domestic service industry which by its nature could not 
lead to urban growth. The second source of employment came 
with the development of the Fabve (formerly, Broken Hill) 
mine in 1904. This followed discovery of deposits of Lead, 
Zinc and Vanadium at Kabwe, 80 miles north of Lusaka, in 1902. 
This discovery was important in more than one way. It lead to 
other commercial developments of subsequent importance to the 
economy. The main one was the creation of incentives to build 
a railway connecting Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to 
latanga Mines (South of present Zaire) passing through Babwe 
in Central Zambia. 
The building of this railway, starting in 1904 and 
finishing in 1910, offered the third most important source of 
employment in Northern Rhodesia under company rule. One of the 
oldest industrial companies in Zambia, Zambezi Saw Mills Ltd 
(formerly Redwood Investments), arrived in Zambia in 1908(44). 
The company came in the country as a branch of Rhodesia 
Mercantile Holdings of Southern Rhodesia, to exploit teak and 
other varieties of timber in the forests of South Western 
Zambia. Its base was Livingstone, the place where the railway 
crossed from Southern into Northern Rhodesia. For the purposes 
of transporting logs of timber to the mills in Livingstone, 
Zambezi Saw Mills constructed a railway track to the forest 
areas of Mulobezi and Sichili. This railway, the mills and the 
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associated lumbering remain a folklore in the history of 
Zambia's industrial and urban development outside the copper 
mining region(45). Livingstone, the home of Zambezi Saw Hills, 
was in fact the capital of the BSA administration in Northern 
Rhodesia despite its awkward siting in relation to the whole 
territory. 
The Fourth area of cash employment in Northern Rhodesia 
was provided by farmers and shopkeepers who gravitated to the 
North with the Railway. The Northern Rhodesia shopkeepers in 
particular, are celebrated in Zambia's industrial development 
for having produced the first African trade union organi- 
sation, Copperbelt Shop Assistants Union on 2 November, 
1947(46). But the arrival of European and Indian shopkeepers 
was much earlier than their subsequent concentration in the 
mining area. of the Copperbelt in the 1930s and 40s. For 
instance, a branch of South Africa Standard Bank had been 
established in Kalomo in 1906 to assist shopkeepers, contra- 
ctors and workers building the raiways(47). 
Farmers, came mostly during World War 1. They were granted 
land along the railway line. Africans were dispossessed and 
re-located to remoter areas. In practice, many of the Africans 
affected became farm workers of the new land owners. They were 
allowed to stay so long they agreed to shift around in 
accordance with the farmer's decisions on how best to use his 
land(48). In this context, farm work too became a source of 
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employment facilitating transition to the cash economy. 
Fifth, and lastly, a major source of employment during 
company rule was the farms, mines and industries of Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa. Employment was also available to 
natives of Northern Rhodesia in Katanga, Zaire. 
Statistics on wage labour during company rule are hard to 
come by in historical sources. But later estimates of 
employment in Northern Rhodesia make it plain that foreign 
lands provided the main stay of cash employment under the 
BSA regime. In 1928 for instance, some 21,334 Zambians were 
reckoned to be working in Southern Rhodesia alone. A total of 
10,500 Zambians were reported in the Katanga Copper mines of 
Zaire in 1929(49). We have not seen figures of Zambians 
working in South Africa, and perhaps Tanzania, during this 
period. But it is still reasonable to conclude that probably 
there were more Zambians working for cash in other countries 
than at home during the BSA administration. This conclusion 
is realistic in the light of a figure of 24,000 known to have 
been in cash employment in the whole of Northern Rhodesia in 
1928(50). By this date, construction had begun on the copper 
industry, whose first mine, Roan Antelope, became first 
operational in 1929. Without the added numbers of construction 
workers, the actual figure of workers in employment in 
Northern Rhodesia in 1928 might have been far much smaller 
compared to those reported working outside Northern Rhodesia. 
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To summarise, the point we have established is that by the 
advent of the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia, the 
foundations of a capitalist economy had been truly laid by 
activities of company officials and missionaries, Kabwe lead 
and zinc mine, the railways, Zambezi Saw Mills and migration 
to jobs in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We have also 
indicated that the main area of employment under the BSA 
government were jobs in neighbouring countries, particularly 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. 
The BSA's legacy of commercial agency in African labour 
was the issue never lost in Northern Rhodesia, both before 
and after independence. It appears that the BSA had reasoned 
from the start that if minerals could not be found in Northern 
Rhodesia, the country would still be useful as a labour 
reserve for its other commercial interests in Southern Africa. 
Thus, throughout the BSA administration, commercial agency in 
African labour was at the heart of the economy in Northern 
Rhodesia. Not only did the BSA collaborate with recruitment 
agencies like Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau and Robert 
Williams & Company but its administration also facilitated 
this business by imposing, as early as 1900, a hut tax on 
"every male person considered to be of sound body and mind and 
over the age of 18 years"(51). 
The imposition of the poll tax payable in cash on people 
living in a traditional system presented only two practical 
options to the men involved. The first of these was to travel 
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from villages to find work to earn the money. In early 
Northern Rhodesia, this meant leaving the country itself for 
other lands. The second way possible was to sell the produce 
of the traditional economy, mostly livestock, to the people 
with money. Given the circumstances, few people had money in 
Northern Rhodesia. Effectively, a buyer's economy was created 
with all the consequences that entailed for the local owners 
of produce. In the main, the people with money were the 
Southern Rhodesia white farmers who sent in agents into 
Northern Rhodesia to buy cattle for their farms in that 
country or for the more lucrative market in South Africa. The 
Susman Brothers who dominated the retail market in colonial 
Zambia are said to have made their fortune acting as 
intermediaries between Africans and the advanced markets of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa(52). On the other hand, 
the men who had cattle were the elderly, most favoured by the 
traditional systems of wealth distribution - inheritance and 
marriage dowry. The burden of migrant jobs therefore fell on 
the younger men, whom recruitment agencies searched for in 
rural areas and subsequently graded for suitability in mines, 
industry and farms of neighbouring countries(53). 
In a nutshell, that is the setting of the inequities in 
the BSA economy of migrant labour, which generated resentment 
and lasting political arguments in Northern Rhodesia. Three 
of the main criticisms of the BSA economy that formed an 
important element of reform in independent Zambia can be 
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identified straight away. 
First, it is contended that recruitment for southern 
states undermined traditional agricultural economies by 
depriving rural areas of their strongest male component. 
Secondly, the poll tax so collected was not used to provide 
infrastructure and services to rural areas. Thus, the 
economies of rural areas suffered deprivation without 
prospects of regeneration from the government. The resources 
either went to company profits or to defraying costs of a 
commercial company's involvement in government administration. 
The third, and related criticism was that the BSA's 'interests 
in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa spelled doom for 
Northern Rhodesia's economic development. The company had no 
real incentives to develop its most northern post in the 
absence of significant discovery of minerals which the company 
had hoped to find in the 1890s(54). 
Turning to assessment of these arguments, it is difficult 
to see how a large backward country could have been developed 
in the early twentieth century by the government of a 
commercial company which, for 30 years, did not find even what 
it originally sought. For this reason perhaps, Zambian 
economic politics are better understood in terms of the 
development of the copper industry which, as we have noted, 
coincided with the assumption of direct British rule over 
Northern Rhodesia. For all-its contribution to the creation of 
modern Zambia, the BSA's rule in Northern Rhodesia is a 
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ridiculed affair. Perhaps only as ridiculed as the legality of 
treaties with local chiefs upon which the company based its 
claims over the minerals of the country(55). 
Thus far, it begins to emerge that the issues of economic 
development have a long and unsatisfactory history in Zambia. 
Copper, even under indigenous control, has not been able to 
redress the age old grievances of modern Zambia. It is 
generally acknowledged, however, that the copper industry had 
immediate effects on Zambia's development. Large scale mining 
attracted a number of other industrial projects into Northern 
Rhodesia. These dealt in electric power generation, 
construction, transport, steel and metal products, timber and 
cement necessary to the mining industry. These industrial 
developments inflated local demand for manual wage labour. 
This new found capacity of Northern Rhodesia industry to 
absorb local labour fuelled the politics of native labour 
recruitment, leading in 1933, to the closure of Rhodesia 
Native Labour Bureau, though not the practice itself(56). 
lining activities were reduced during the depression of the 
early 1930s, but flourished after that to an estimated total 
of 29,000 employees by the end of 1939(57). After the war, 
mining labour expanded too to over 40,000 in 1954(58). By 
independence in 1964, the mining industry still employed some 
39,203 Africans(59). Overall, it has been written that, 
the development of the copper mining industry turned 
Zambia in twenty years from a backward rural territory 
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into one of the most rapidly growing economies in the 
world, making Zambia, one of Africa's most industrialised 
and urbanised states(60). 
Such lavish compliments to the role of copper should be 
countered with the view that the copper industry failed to 
bring development to the rest of the country. The disparity 
between the Copper mining region and the rest of the country, 
as we have intimated, is an issue to which politicians and 
academics alike have constantly returned. 
Copper's ability to extend developments throughout the 
country was very limited. Geologically, for instance, the 
copper ore was found in a small area of the country, now 
appropriately called the COPPERBELT. As against Zambia's total 
area of 291,000 square miles, the Copperbelt covers at best an 
area of a 30 mile radius. This means physical developments 
concerning the mining industry could not extend very far into 
the country. Secondly, the new copper mines located roughly 
in the same area as that already serviced by the 1910 railway 
line to Southern Zaire. This too necessitated no major opening 
up of the country. Thus, once the infrastructure of copper 
extraction and transportation were in place, the mining 
industry could relate to the whole country only in terms of 
its inputs. 
The most important and locally available input into the 
mining industry was African labour. Its treatment in the 
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mining industry was therefore to be of importance because it 
was through the relations with African labour that the 
benefits of copper could spread to the whole country. we 
discuss the labour relations element in colonial Zambia in the 
next section. 
One other way the copper industry could have helped the 
whole country is stimulating manufacturing industries(61). 
Those based on copper metal itself or others essential to 
mining supplies or for the consumption of the people who 
worked in the mines. In the event, the strategy of mining 
companies was to limit their investments to extraction and 
exportation of crude copper ore. This foreclosed the 
possibility of industries based on the exploitation of the 
locally available copper metal. At the other level, inputs of 
the mining industry, and consumer goods were imported from 
factories of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Britain as 
was the case before advent of the copper industry(62). 
The reasons why Northern Rhodesia was slow in developing a 
manufacturing infrastructure of her own are many and complex, 
but the basic ones can be presented fairly from the political 
and economic history of Northern Rhodesia sketched so far. 
Zambia was colonised by Britain from Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa through the agency of the British South Africa 
Chartered Company. We have seen too how the country was an 
extended labour market of those two countries during BSA rule. 
From this mixture of historical factors, establishment of 
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manufacturing industries in Zambia was a doomed prospect 
because there was initially no real market to service. The few 
who held jobs in the country could be serviced by scores of 
shopkeepers scrounging a capitalist living in the country. At 
any rate, the demands of rural people for manufactured goods 
during those early days of colonialism were very basic indeed- 
(63). 
Arguably, the market situation changed appreciably after 
the development of the mining industry. This brought together 
a sizable consumer population(64). The mining industry was 
itself a major consumer of industrial outputs. When combined 
these factors could have justified the presence of manufa- 
cturing companies. Other factors however, countered these 
advantages. 
First and foremost, development of the mining industry 
in an isolated end of Central Africa needed initially 
establishment of good road, rail and air links to the outside 
world for purpose of construction supplies. Once these 
facilities were in place, there remained few economic reasons 
why goods could not be supplied from established factories of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The earliest factories in 
fact, were those which dealt in bulk goods such as'brewing, 
milling and cement which could be brought to Northern Rhodesia 
only at a greater cost. It should be remembered too that the 
consumer market of Northern Rhodesia was concentrated on the 
copperbelt, an area already well connected to the outside 
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world. Thus, even without having to consider skills factors 
and the more vexing issue of the composition of investors in 
Central and Southern Africa, there were sufficient economic 
reasons for capitalists not to build their factories in 
Northern Rhodesia(65). 
Other factors of course, played a part. The history of 
Northern Rhodesia after the demise of the BSA, for example, is 
dominated by white agitation for amalgamation or federation 
with Southern Rhodesia. The formation of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 3 September 1953 was a direct 
outcome of this political activity. Under such sustained 
campaigns by the most powerful section of the community, it 
was reasonable for capitalists to choose to locate nearer the 
likely seat of government. This was clearly Salisbury [now 
Harare], the capital of Southern Rhodesia. The proximity of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to developed markets of 
the world through better rail, sea and air links cannot also 
be ignored in any objective examination of this scenario. 
The consequence was that Northern Rhodesia was at a 
disadvantage. The territory's status as a labour market in 
the BSA era was not improved by its new role as a consumer 
market for the goods from the Southern states. From the point 
of view of nationalists, this development was intolerable. 
They generally saw Northern Rhodesia as a country denied 
opportunities to develop in its own right. Good reasons could 
be found for the pessimism of Black politicians. For all 
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Northern Rhodesia's fame in the 1950s as the third largest 
copper producer in the world, much of the country had remained 
practically undeveloped; the people poor, unhealthy, uneduca- 
ted and without such facilities as extension and market 
services. This is how one economist later summed the episode: 
At the time of independence, Zambia inherited an 
archetypical dual economy. Its small export enclave was 
devoted almost entirely to crude copper, which constituted 
90-95 per cent of its exports. It imported almost all the 
manufactured goods consumed. Outside the limited enclave 
built around the copperbelt and about 1,000 line of rail 
settler estates, the rural areas stagnated. The drain of 
thousands of young men forced to seek wage employment by 
colonial taxes, and by regulations which hindered other 
forms of African participation in the so called 'modern' 
sector, disrupted and undermined the existing system of 
production in the regions(66). 
If discussion of colonial economic developments presents 
a picture of Zambia as a grieving nation at independence, the 
next will paint one of aggrieved individuals because we want 
to highlight, the human experience of African labour in 
Northern Rhodesia. 
2.3 Labour relations in Colonial Zambia 
The story of labour relations in colonial Zambia has been 
told too often enough to warrant detailed repetition here(67). 
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Attention is therefore drawn only to those aspects of colonial 
labour relations which fed into post-independence policies, 
and worker participation in particular. The general tenor of 
workers' participation policies, as explained in Chapter 1, 
concerns the involvement of employees in managerial decisions 
of companies. From a historical stand point, this is a progre- 
ssive development seeking to move labour-management relations 
from the position of conflict with, and subordination to 
capital towards a trajectory of cooperation and secured rights 
of employees in the workplace. Given this, how did Zambia's 
colonial labour relations prepare the independence government 
to adopt such a perspective of industrial relations? 
Before we go any further, we should dispose of a 
definition problem. The term 'labour relations' is usually 
reserved to describe relationships between management and 
representatives of organised labour(68). This is not the sense 
in which we want to understand labour relations in this 
section. Instead, we treat it more narrowly as a study of 
individual employer-employee relationship. We want to inquire 
into relationships, attitudes, practices and procedures which 
colonial employers adopted in their dealings with individual 
employees. One reason why we take a narrower view of labour 
relations is that we shall deal with the trade union aspects 
in Chapter four. The other is that the narrower view is much 
more relevant in a long term view of employment relationships 
in colonial Zambia. The history of organised labour occupies 
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short space, having been permitted to operate only in the 
last 15 years of colonialism. 
The greatest experience of labour relations in colonial 
Zambia was offered overwhelmingly by the mining 'industry and 
enterprises that clustered around the Copperbelt. The reasons 
lie in the history of industrial and commercial developments 
described in the previous section. Cherry Gertzel also pointed 
to the relevance of the mining industry when he observed that 
any survey of labour relations in Zambia: 
must necessarily acknowledge the central position within 
the economy of the copper mining industry which was the 
basis of the colonial economy, on which the country 
remains overwhelmingly dependent and which has had a major 
influence upon the development of industrial relations- 
(69). 
Objectively, there cannot be one view to the way African 
workers were treated under colonial Zambia. Individuals were 
recruited into the mines with their different personality 
qualities, industrial experience and levels of dependence on 
wage labour which were all offered into relationships with 
white supervisors and employers. Besides, the mining industry 
was, as it is now, a vast industrial complex with various 
divisions, departments and sections. The experience of 
individuals in the mines was, to some extent, differentiated 
by such sectional variations. 
-68- 
Despite the above qualifications, colonial labour 
relations in the mining industry was what it was: Black and 
marginal. It was black because the colour bar principle 
operated and blacks were the victims(70). Marginal because 
Africans as individuals lacked political and technical skills 
which could be offered as leverage in the complexity of 
underground mining. Africans were thus at a disadvantage. 
The description of black treatment in Northern Rhodesia 
indeed often defies a sense of balance. According to one 
political sociologist, Michael Burawoy, "overt and explicit 
racism was the organising principle", while "physical 
violence" on blacks "was the rule rather than the exception" 
in Northern Rhodesia mines(71). Charles Perrings also notes 
that, 
Violence in the interest of 'discipline' was also extre- 
mely common, and was cited by workers as the main cause of 
desertion at Roan Antelope in the 1930s(72). 
In view of the abundance of evidence, what can be done 
fruitfully is not to dwell on descriptions of the treatment of 
Africans, but to ask why there was such a harsh regime of 
labour relations in Colonial Zambia. From our reading, the 
answers point to the history of the country, and of the 
mining industry in particular. 
First and foremost, the history of thirty years under the 
government of a commercial company was in itself a fine 
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prelude to the harsh treatment of the African workforce. The 
BSA's strong connections with South Africa did not help the 
matter at all. Worse, was the fact that the BSA's initial 
economic activities centred around mediating African labour 
supplies to the factories and mines of southern states. 
Through the screening and grading processes, the African 
usually lost his dignity in the eyes of company officials. But 
other far seated cultural prejudices underpinned the severity 
of colonial labour relations in the whole of Southern Africa. 
The common perception among white employers in the region 
was that the African showed no disposition to paid work. He 
therefore required specific arrangements to get him to accept 
industrial discipline. This was not a naive view held only by 
low level management supervisors. It was one broadly supported 
at the highest level of colonial power in Southern Africa. 
The letter of Lord Miner, the British High Commissioner in 
South Africa to the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, on 
4 October 1901 illustrates the point: 
The black man is naturally inclined, much more than the 
white, to do nothing at all. As the economic compulsion 
which is found in European countries does not exist here, 
he will, if left to himself, generally live in absolute 
idleness, without adding in any way to the productivity 
power of the country in which he lives. I cannot conceive 
that, under any except the most distorted code of morals, 
it be thought right for us to encourage him in this 
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attitude, or even not to dissuade him from it by reaso- 
nable means(73) 
By the time of the copper industry in Zambia in the 1930s, 
the mining bosses were well sensitized to the view that 
Africans had a 
racial abhorrence of all hard work and sustained labour... 
the African will cover miles as a letter carrier..., cut 
wood, act as a policeman, undertake any task which lends 
itself to the enjoyment of occasional dawdling; but to 
set, resolute, and unfailing labour such as the mines, 
with their regular hours and ties on liberty, he 
represents an uncompromising front... (74) 
In the context, it is hardly surprising that mining 
companies negotiated and obtained for themselves civic 
jurisdiction over the mines, mining townships and mining 
personnel in Northern Rhodesia(75). The aim of these 
arrangements was to maintain African labour within the grip of 
'colonial despotism', by which, according to Jane Parpart, 
the subordination of Africans was completed from "home to 
the underground"(76). 
If the first source of harsh labour relations came from 
specific political arrangements of the mining companies, the 
second emanated from the more broader political environment 
of the colonial system. In particular, the contradictory 
policies that were pursued by the Colonial administration 
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towards Africans in the labour market. At one level, Africans 
were supposed to work and earn cash in order to improve their 
standard of living and to meet their government revenue 
obligations. At the other, they were not to remain in urban 
areas for any time longer than they were contracted for. The 
net result was that Africans oscillated between urban and 
rural areas depending on requirements of the employers. Thus, 
forced into a position of dependence on both wage labour and 
peasant or subsistence agriculture, most Africans were put in 
a position of real vulnerability, especially from the point of 
view of acquiring industrial skills(77). Africans could be 
used and discarded by employers not just because it made 
economic sense, but doubly that it was in conformity with what 
was politically encouraged. These were hardly circumstances in 
which African labour could have expected better treatment 
from its employers. 
The third element in the harsh labour relations of the 
mining industry is found in more subtle reasons. This dealt 
with the necessity on the part of the mining companies to 
import into Northern Rhodesia a large population of skilled 
white miners from America, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa. 
This has been explained on account of higher levels of skills 
that were needed to work deep underground mining in an area of 
poor geological formation, and at a time when the state of 
technology was an added constraint(78). The investment of the 
mining companies in the pay and social infrastructure which 
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was to induce Europeans to come to what was then a remote 
region of central Africa, had to be paid for in other ways. 
For the purposes of the analysis developed in this section, 
the strategy of the mining companies was to treat the entire 
African labour force as a periphery, using that term in its 
industrial relations context(79). It meant then poor working 
conditions, pay, training, housing and many other amenities 
that were provided on racial lines. 
Borrowing the concepts of 'core' and 'periphery' into a 
colonial situation is really a sophisticated, if not also 
mischievous, way of explaining things. Colonial officials were 
more forthcoming. Low wages were justified on the ground that 
apart from payment of taxes, the African could "live comfor- 
tably without any money at all"(80). Perrings repeats the 
point just made when he explained that low wages among 
Africans was in itself, 
a regime calculated both to serve and promote high rate of 
turnover in the workforce(81). 
Consistent with these explanations of colonial attitudes 
were the frequent advertisements by mining companies of 
Northern Rhodesia that their labour costs were the lowest in 
the world(82). 
From what has been explained above, it is apparent that 
the mining industry and colonial officials were not 
constrained to hide differences between Whites and Blacks in 
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terms of sophisticated labour market economics. That was 
obviously an option open to the officials. But in Central and 
Southern Africa 'frankness' with blacks served its own social 
and political purpose: to further settler aspirations to 
dominate over the indigenous Africans. In this context, the 
political motives of Whites in the region was another added 
element responsible for the severity of colonial labour 
relations in Northern Rhodesia. To the extent that Africans 
were seen as potential rivals to political and economic 
control of the region, their subjugation at the industrial 
level supported at the political front the desire of Europeans 
to remain senior partners in Central and Southern Africa. 
In conclusion, labour relations in colonial Zambia 
reflected a classic master and servant relationship, between 
white and black, the superior and the inferior. Viewed within 
its originating social and political milieu, colonial labour 
relations was a strategy of overall European control. In the 
words of Samir Amin, 
Africans were meant to undergo a form of colonial 
subjugation that was direct, crude and simple, providing 
no opportunity for the appearance among the natives of any 
equivalent to the big agrarian capitalists and comprado 
merchants of Asia and Latin America(83). 
Considering that employment was the most significant 
way by which Africans participated in the cash economy, it 
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would have been surprising if the independent government did 
not accord priority to industrial relations policies. 
Suamary 
The purpose of the preceding sections, and of the whole 
Chapter, was to provide an outline of Zambia's historical and 
political background. We do not claim to have done justice to 
the many complex issues in Zambia's 70 years of colonial rule. 
It is our hope, however, that sufficient information has come 
out to provide a backcloth against which we can proceed to the 
analysis of Zambia's economic and industrial policies. It will 
be unnecessary repetition if we attempted to re-cast what has 
been said in this Chapter. It suffices to emphasis that issues 
concerning the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and 
determination of the Whites to exclude the Africans from the 
political process; treatment of Northern Rhodesia as a labour 
and product market of southern territories; racism and African 
advancement in mining industry; and general lack of social 
infrastructure which characterised rural poverty, were, in 
the main, the very issues upon which Zambia's political 
independence was fought(84). They are the issues which still 
determined the agenda of post-independence policies to which 
we turn in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INDEPENDENCE POLICIES, OBJECTIVES OF WORKERS' PARTICIPATION AND 
THE ROLE OF LAW 
Introduction 
It has been suggested in the previous Chapter that Zambia's 
historical and political background is relevant to the 
understanding of the scheme of policies adopted after political 
independence. The country emerged from colonialism with a sense 
of grievance for the neglect she had suffered for much of the 
colonial period. There was political resentment directed 
against Britain, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa for their 
different roles in the history of Northern Rhodesia. 
This Chapter builds on the above analysis in three specific 
ways. First, it seeks to demonstrate the link between workers' 
participation and the evolution of other Zambian policies in 
the economy. Secondly, it investigates the objectives of 
workers' participation policies, by which it is meant the 
purposes which were to be served by workers' participation in 
management decisions. Third, and finally, it examines the role 
to be served by the law in the attainment of the stated 
objectives of workers' participation policies. Before we come 
to these themes, however, it is necessary initially to chart 
briefly the sequence of events which preceded new economic and 
industrial policies in Zambia. 
1. Background 
With independence in 1964, it was widely believed that for 
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once Zambia and its indigenous black people could be the focus 
of government decisions. More than that, that Zambians them- 
selves would be able to make decisions and generally set goals 
according to which more could be done for the country and its 
people than was ever attempted by the different factions of 
colonial interests since 1895. The idea of participation 
therefore, if broadly defined in the context of the 1960s, 
might have covered almost every aspect of the Zambian social, 
economic and political life where, by virtue of political 
independence, Africans felt entitled to enter. Government 
policies too could be linked to those specific demands in the 
1950s for human dignity, economic growth and social justice(1). 
For instance, the social investment of the Provisional and 
First National Development Plans (1965-1970), the adoption of 
the Philosophy of Humanism in 1967, the partial nationalisation 
of 1968-70, and the humanitarian and non-racial principles 
professed by the incumbent leadership of President Kaunda in 
foreign policy, especially in relation to the then white 
dominated Southern Africa, may all be interpreted as aspects 
sympathetic to notions of popular participation(2). 
Yet, there is a specific way by which one can underline the 
interconnection between the development of workers' partici- 
pation as a national industrial relations policy and the 
evolution of some of Zambia's economic policies in the 1960s. 
Workers' participation vas announced in the country in December 
1969. Set against the longer history of Zambia presented in 
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chapter 2, this policy was obviously something new and without 
any precedent(3). But within the immediate context of 
independence policies in the second half of the 1960s, workers' 
participation in management decisions was just another addition 
to a string of measures already under way by the Kaunda govern- 
ment to fight the remaining vestiges of colonial structures. 
The starting point of those post-independence measures 
might be put more appropriately in 1967 when Humanism was 
proclaimed as Zambia's national Philosophy. But the sheer 
complexity of circumstances under which public policies evolve 
demands us to pay particular attention to the sequence of 
events. Therefore, before we examine how Humanism was adopted 
in 1967, we explain why 1967 was the year in which the 
independent Government was able to announce new strategies to 
fight vestiges of colonialism. Why indeed, given the severity 
of Northern Rhodesia colonial system, did it take some three 
years before fundamental decisions were taken in the economy? 
Having remarked that national policies evolve in complex 
circumstances, it would be pretentious to assume that we can 
offer a comprehensive answer to the question posed. There are, 
however, three reasons why it may have taken the Zambian 
government until 1967 to decide on measures intended to break 
the social and economic structure inherited from colonialism. 
First and foremost, it should be understood that Zambian 
independence came at the time it did in 1964 primarily because 
of the sudden collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
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Nyasaland in December 1963. Until the independence of the West 
African state of Ghana in 1957, the idea of an independent, 
self governing black government in Northern Rhodesia was only 
vaguely articulated. The focus of nationalist politics for such 
of the 1950s was on opposition to the principle of Federation; 
demands for constitutional reforms to allow black political 
participation; campaigns to end discrimination; and for black 
advancement in industry, primarily the mines. The constitu- 
tional reforms of 1959 and 1962 which saw a measure of black 
participation in Northern Rhodesia were located within a frame- 
work that still respected overall British Crown protection. The 
independence of Ghana in 1957 gave a new dimension to African 
political struggles by opening the range of solutions which 
could be available to Africans suffering from colonialism. 
Events in Northern Rhodesia were not indeed the only ones 
determining the pace of political change in Central Africa. Dr 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, following on Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, 
returned to Nyasaland in 1958 avowed to bring down the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to proceed to African 
independence. Banda's political activities and those of his 
associates in Malawi, combined with those pushed elsewhere in 
the Federation to produce for the British government a general 
conclusion of 'black pathological opposition' to the 
Federation. This was at a delicate phase of the Federation 
experiment and at a time when discussions were under way to 
extend its lease in Central Africa. Forced to concede the 
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strength of black opposition to constitutional talky on the 
future of the union, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
was brought to an abrupt, end in December 1963. It was precisely 
in this flux of political developments that Zambia proceeded 
to her independence in 1964, far ahead of other countries in 
Southern Africa. 
In shifting strategies from one cause to another, it must 
be supposed that it was to be some time before a black 
government could put out its own ideas about independence 
policies and development goals. The next factor illustrates 
this point more plainly. 
At independence in 1964, and for reasons capable of being 
deduced from the historical notes in the previous chapter, 
Zambia faced an acute shortage of the most basic resource for a 
modern national government, trained and qualified manpower. A 
countdown at the end of 1963, showed that the country had fewer 
than 100 university graduates, and less than 1,000 secondary 
school leavers in a population of 4 uillion(4). On the other 
hand, the administrative job before the independence govern- 
nient was considerable. It was not just the burden of system 
transfer from colonialism to independence, but also the 
parallel work of dissolving, gathering and distributing 
structures and resources of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. These exercises needed skilled and experienced 
public administrators, qualities that were lacking among 
supporters of the black government now in power(5). It is 
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understandable then that the government retained for the first 
few years of independence a Civil Service, , 
Judiciary and 
Security Forces that were not Zambian in the true sense. 
That, however, was not without political cost to the 
Zambian government. In the context of the country's long and 
immediate history, black political initiatives in the domestic 
sphere required to pass much tougher tests of reasonableness in 
order to arouse the support of those who filled important posts 
in the administrative structures of the country(6). In 
practice, the new government concentrated efforts on less 
contentious social infrastructure programmes, building, for 
instance, secondary schools in every administrative district, 
new colleges, including a national University, hospitals and 
roads connecting major population centres. These facilities 
were easy to justify because they were largely absent 
throughout the country in the colonial period(7). At the same 
time the government managed to push through legislation out- 
lawing racial and poor practices in e©ployment(ß). Commissions 
of Inquiry were also instituted to advise on uniform salary, 
structures(9). The main point, however, is that there were 
obvious limits to the extent of the social agenda within the 
context of the system of private capitalism historically 
established in Northern Rhodesia. The fact that those initially 
opposed to a black government in Central Africa held the 
preponderance of senior administrative posts constituted a 
real constraint to the actions of the independent government. 
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Thus, until such time as Zambians themselves could move into 
positions of decision making the status quo seemed very 
practical. 
The final point is also essential to understand the timing 
of independence policies in Zambia. It is that barely twelve 
months after Zambian independence, on 11 November 1965, Ian 
Smith in Southern Rhodesia announced his Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (UDI) from Britain. UDI, as was commented upon 
in Chapter 2, was a true White settler rebellion with real 
political ramifications in Southern and Central Africa. In 
Zambia, the economic aspects of the rebellion were even more 
pronounced. Rhodesia was not just the historical source of 
supplies as previously discussed. In 1965, the railways, 
airways and electricity (from the Kariba Dam) in Zambia were 
still jointly owned with Rhodesia. Coal for use in the mines 
and other industries came from Wankie mines in Southern 
Rhodesia(10). 
The rebellion was thus both a political and economic 
dilemma for the new black government in Zambia. As a host 
nation to liberation movements in the region, the choices for 
Zambia were stark. Rightly or wrongly, the government responded 
with an urgent and expensive policy of 'Disengagement from the 
South'. This meant in principle opening new trading routes 
and also finding new suppliers from markets other than those 
established by the British South Africa Company and subsequent 
traders. The policies to diversify supply routes required, in 
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turn, the cooperation of experienced business operators who 
could reach out to the world and tap new markets. In the 
Zambian context of the 1960s, such policies could only be 
guaranteed by the Government itself and the established white 
and Asian business'houses(ll). 
This background should establish, to some extent, why 
Zambia continued in the mould of colonial administration and 
attendant structures of social and economic control for some 
time after independence. The 'crisis' in industrial relations 
in the opening years of Zambian independence, to which students 
of labour in development have drawn our attention(12)9 were 
really a result of frustration with a black government that was 
perceived as having internalised the logic of the system it 
was supposed to fight(13). 
2. Evolution of post-independence economic policies 
By 1967, however, time had provided the government oppor- 
tunity to think through her development strategies; the 
localisation of senior administrative posts had proceeded 
considerably; and the consequences of UDI had been weathered 
two years on. It was, as it were, time to address the 
fundamentals in the Zambian social and economic structure: the 
rural-urban gulf on the one hand, and the disparity between 
Africans and Europeans on the other. These are the issues that 
had been simmering since independence(14), and which achieved 
dramatic recognition in 1967. 
There are two identifiable stages in the evolution of new 
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economic policies before workers' participation in industry 
can be seen to fill its place in the historical context. 
Firstly, there was the unveiling of the Philosophy of Humanism 
in April 1967. Secondly, there was the coming of the first two 
of a three-pronged strategy in Economic Reforma(15). It is 
after these stages that it is possible to picture the histo- 
rical position of workers' participation policies at the Kitwe 
National Convention in December 1969. In the next three 
sections, we build up and illustrate these linkages. 
2.1 Introduction of the Philosophy of Humanism 
On 26 April 1967, President Kaunda presented, before the 
National Council of his ruling United National Independence 
Party meeting in Lusaka, his outline of the Philosophy of 
Humanism(16). From this date, there have been few explanations 
of Zambian policies that have failed to borrow liberally from 
the Philosophy of Humanism. We have seen in Chapter 2 that in 
the case of the industrial relations policy of workers' parti- 
cipation, Humanism is explicitly acknowledged as a factor in 
the adoption of that policy. Given such perspectives, it is 
essential to attempt some understanding of the Philosophy of 
Humanism in this thesis. 
What is Humanism? What are its central features? Why was it 
adopted by President Kaunda as the national Philosophy in 
Zambia? The answers to these questions differ depending on who 
is commenting, why he is commenting and when he is commenting. 
This is so because perceptions of individuals and their 
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policies tend to be dated(17). 
Strictly speaking, Zambian Humanism was to President Kaunda 
what was 'African Socialism' to Senghor of Senegal; 'Ujaana or 
Coznmunitarisu' to Nyerere of Tanzania; ' Conmunocracy' to Sekou 
Toure of Guinea; or 'Democratic, Socialist, Co-operative 
Democracy' to President Nasser of Egypt(18). Although presented 
as a national Philosophy, Humanism was, in essence, Dr. Kenneth 
David Kaunda's own personal contribution to the definition of 
national goals and the means of their achievement as he saw the 
situation in the 1960s. Therefore, seen within the generality 
of African Philosophies in the 1960s, Zambian Humanism 
reflected a new consciousness about African societies in the 
wake of political independence. As was in other African 
Philosophies (Ujaana, nearer home), Humanism emphasized selec- 
ted tenets in African societies which were assumed useful in 
constructing priorities for national development from the ruins 
of colonial societies. The spirit of co-operation in economic 
production was specifically pointed tO as something Africa 
could offer in a world posited by decolonisation. Alterna- 
tively, Kaunda's ideas in the Philosophy of Humanism may be 
presented as having grown out of the African challenge to the 
'colonial social science' which depicted nothing worthy 
recording in the history of African societies for modern social 
and economic development(19). 
The first two sentences to the preamble of Kaunda's first 
pamphlet on Zawbian Humanism are instructive on these points: 
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The art of colonialism, if it is to succeed, means a 
coloniser sees to it that the victim is not only colonised 
politically, but also economically and culturally. This 
being the case, the act of political independence forms but 
the first part of the process of decolonisation(20). 
This was the premise from which President Kaunda proceeded 
to present Humanism as a set of philosophical guidelines rooted 
in the Zambian cultural heritage, intended to unite the country 
in the common task of economic, social and political develo- 
pment. But in Humanism, President Kaunda identified several 
issues critical of colonialism and capitalism. Reminiscent of 
Social Reformers in 19th century England, Kaunda expressed fear 
of an 'invading money economy'. He warned of, 
the powerful forces from the West which have been aggre- 
ssively shattering in their individualistic, competitive 
and possessive approach(21). 
As against these, Kaunda longed for a traditional 'mutual 
aid society', which was "organised to satisfy the basic needs 
of all its members"(22). 
Ile praised a world where economic resources were owned 
and administered by chiefs and village headmen for the benefit 
of every one. He wrote nostalgically: 
If a villager required a new hut, all the men would turn to 
forests and fetch poles to erect the frame and bring grass 
for thatching. The women might be responsible for making 
the mud-plaster for the walls and two or three of them 
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would undoubtedly brew some beer so that all the workers 
would be refreshed after a hot but satisfying day's 
work(23). 
To these attributes, Kaunda added that the African society 
was accepting and inclusive: 
The slow, the inept and incapable were accepted as any 
other member in community life provided they were socially 
amenable... In the best tribal society people were valued 
not for what they could achieve but because they were 
there... The success-failure complex seems to be a disease 
of the age of individualism - the result of a society 
conditioned by the diploma, the examination and the 
selection procedure(24). 
Politically, Kaunda disapproved opposition based on 'haves' 
and 'have-nots', preferring instead, 
a society in which the Chief as an elected or appointed 
leader of the people held national property like land in 
trust for the people, and was fully aware he was 
responsible to them(25). 
Leaving aside President Kaunda's noted views on the ideal 
political system, the similarity between the basis of his 
ideas in Humanism and those of 19th the century Social 
Reformers are remarkably striking. Social Reformers saw as 
horrifying the way English industrialisation had undermined the 
old relationship between the rich and the poor, where it was 
said, each had known their place and duties. They criticised 
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the new social relationship of 'cash nexus', between labourer 
and employer where the former was left to starve if his labour 
was not required. Like President Kaunda, they longed for the 
organic, noncompetitive nature of pre-industrial society, and 
preferred the farm to the factory, the artisan to the 
manufacturer, social cooperation to competition and state 
legislation to laissez faire(26). 
In the second half of the twentieth century however, a 
return to the old ways, especially the nostalgic past, was a 
far fetched cry. The independence struggle indeed was not 
fought on a slate demanding a return to a lifestyle known 
before the rule of the British South Africa Chartered Company. 
The President did not pretend he could achieve that return 
through the Philosophy of Humanism. To the contrary, he 
counselled that in reconstructing the country as it emerges 
from a non- money economy to a money status, "we will have to 
take into consideration the impact the use of money has made on 
our society"(27). 
From the foregoing, it is not surprising to find that 
Zambian Humanism was conceptualised with three specific 
practical questions in mind: 
(1) in what respect the advent of a money economy will 
result in changes in the traditional society and 
social structure; 
(2) whether it is desirable that these structural changes 
be checked either in part or in full, and, if so; 
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(3) whether it is possible through policies implemented by 
government to impose the desired checks without also 
checking the growth of specialisation and of material 
wealth for our people(28). 
It would seen evident from the nature of topics covered in 
Humanism that Kaunda was posing to himself and his country 
deep seated and difficult moral and practical questions to 
which there could have been no obvious logical answers.. To date 
President Kaunda has not given any systematic answers to how a 
money economy can be lived in, and regenerated in harmony 
without exploitation of man by man, however defined. This is 
not to underrate the very considerable intellectual efforts he 
has put in over the years to explain the content and meaning 
of the Philosophy of Humanisn(29). These notwithstanding, 
Humanism has remained to many, 
a set of ambiguous statements, many mutually contradictory, 
and depending on voluntaristic and volitional rather than 
structural solutions to social problems(30). 
Since Zambian Humanism was intended as a guideline to 
practical Zambian questions in the 1960s, it was perhaps 
inevitable that there would be no singularly acceptable 
definition of the contents of Humanism. 'Problems' at both 
individual and society level come in multifarious forms. It is 
therefore extremely difficult to aggregate all of them into 
one framework of thought. In fact, even if it wan theoretically 
possible to do this at one time in history, there can be no 
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guarantee that those 'problems' will continue to be defined in 
the same way for individuals and the country in the future. 
Bastiaan Portman suggests a helpful way of approaching the 
Philosophy of Humanism in Zambia. According to Portman, Zambian 
Humanism is not an ideology in the sense of being a given set 
of ideas which enable people to interpret life without thin- 
king. Zambian Humanism, he explains, must be understood as part 
of "situation experiencing"(31). In effect, it is suggested 
that one has to place oneself in the shoes of Kaunda in the 
middle of the 1960s in order to be able to fully comprehend the 
development of his ideas in Zambian Humanism, at least in their 
original focus on harmony and the need to help each other. 
For our purposes, we interpret 'situation experiencing' as 
standing for the specificity of the Zambian historical 
experience already discussed. Consistently, we find Humanism 
taking a form of angled nationalism in economic and industrial 
policies. Nationalism, which in the 1960s, reflected on the 
colonial experience and its consequences in the form of rural- 
urban poverty, and European-African disparity in resource 
possession. 
2.2 The Economic Reforms 1968-70 
It has been suggested above that the Philosophy of Humanism 
was merely Kaunda's way of analysing structural problems and 
the way they could be approached for solutions. The economic 
reforms that followed successively in 1968,1969 and 1970 were 
the practical attempts by the government to seek solutions to 
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those problems identified in the country. By these economic 
reforms the government pledged to bring social and economic 
power into the hands of Zambians by means of 'radical 
measures', a phrase which, to some extent, spoke of an 
admission by the government that so long as the inherited 
structures of capitalism were permitted to remain commanding, 
they would restrict the range of solutions to how the African 
situation in Zambia might be improved. This perspective does 
not imply that economic reforms were undertaken simply because 
there was a well meaning black government. It does emphasise 
however that the nature of pressures on the state had altered 
in favour of the Africans. There was, for instance, pressure 
brought to bear on the state from the Zambian artisans and 
small business©en(32), organised workers in urban areas(33) and 
the politicians with rural and poorer constituencies(34). It 
cannot be over emphasized too that the Zambian government was 
under considerable pressure to deliver to its black consti- 
tuency in order to demonstrate to the rest of Southern Africa 
that blacks were fit to govern in territories with a substa- 
ntial white minority. 
The Philosophy of Humanism recognised these pressures on 
the Zambian state. It sav the African economic situation in 
Zambia essentially as a natural result of what had happened in 
Northern Rhodesia. Consequently, it its author postulated that, 
continued control of any economy by foreigners tends to 
impose limitations on freedom and independence and this 
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factor is a negation of humanisa(35). 
That the Philosophy Humanism was not the main explanation 
of the substance of government measures in the 1960s is made 
even more plain by President Kaunda's address in London to 
the Overseas Development Institute on 18th July 1968. This 
speech shows that nationalisation and the way it was undertaken 
in Zambia was not presented as being in pursuit of some 
abstract idea in human organisation revealed in the Philosophy 
of Humanism. Instead, it was presented as a practical attempt 
[never mind the simplicity] to reverse the colonial structures 
of social power. This is what Kaunda explained: 
Zambia achieved independence on the 24th October 1964. At 
that time the people of Zambia took over political control, 
but the economy was dominated by foreign and resident 
expatriate business. How this came about does not need 
going into at this particular moment. All I need to say is 
that when Zambia achieved independence all these foreign 
and resident expatriate businesses were operated by foreign 
and expatriate people. No Zambian had been given the 
opportunity to make a career in business. No Zambians could 
be found in jobs above those of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers in industry. It was obvious that during the time of 
the Federation the expatriate businessmen had chosen to 
create a closed shop very much like the European 
Mineworkers Union of Northern Rhodesia which had an 
agreement with the mining companies that only white people 
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could be employed in certain jobs on the nines(36). 
2.3 Workers' Participation: Introduction of the Policy 
It comes out from perusal of Zambian Humanism and the 
themes underlying economic reforms sponsored under its auspices 
that what was decisive in moulding the direction of Zambian 
independence policies was not the Philosophy of Humanism. There 
were instead, more specific reasons related to economic and 
social problems in the national system. The main reasons lay in 
the necessity to solve economic and social problems thrown up 
by previous structures and as demanded by internal pressure 
groups harbouring a nationalistic sentiment in the economy. 
We suggest in this thesis that the industrial relations 
policy of workers' participation in management decisions was 
adopted in Zambia within the broad outline of policies fighting 
vestiges of colonial structures. More precisely, workers' 
participation originated with the general wrap of measures 
taken after 1967 with the specific instrumental aim of assuring 
indigenous participation in the economy. 
The evidence is circumstantial. First, workers' partici- 
pation was announced in December 1969 in the middle of economic 
policy pronouncements. Like those economic measures, workers' 
participation was introduced without prior public warning. 
Secondly, the occasion at which workers' participation was 
announced establish the generality of the policy background. 
The paper from which President Kaunda introduced workers' 
participation was entitled Rural Development, Incomes, Vages 
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and Prices(37). The apparent lack of focus on workers' 
participation itself suggests that this was something just 
incidental to what else the government was doing. Thirdly, the 
theme of President Kaunda's address on the subject of workers' 
participation was similar to those he delivered in announcing 
economic reforms. On economic reforms, President Kaunda 
complained that Zambians had been left out of businesses and 
there was need to take measures to redress the problem of 
economic disparity between expatriates and African Zambians. On 
workers' participation the question was: "Is it right that 
employees should be excluded from participating in the 
functions of ownership and management just because they do not 
belong to these privileged groups? "(33) 
President Kaunda's reply was: 
I believe not. It is therefore the intention of my Party 
and Government to change the whole system of industrial 
relations, so that our workers(39) can effectively parti- 
cipate in the decisions of management(40). 
In a nutshell, that was the sequence of events pointing to 
how the idea of workers' participation arose in Zambia. It came 
as a general wrap of measures primarily directed at solving 
inherited structural problems. Humanism merely buttressed pre- 
conceived ideas which had their source in the Zambian colonial 
experience. President Kaunda thus ended his address on workers' 
participation with the following declaration: 
Today we are taking a deliberate step forward into a new 
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future for our nation. There will be no going back. Our 
commitment to the restructuring of our society in fundamental 
and we mean that Humanism will not only be discussed but lived. 
The right of the people of Zambia to control their own destiny 
is not negotiable(41). 
3. The Anomaly of the Workers' Participation Policy in Zambia 
We attempted in the foregoing dicussion to establish the 
linkages between Humanism, economic policies and the coming of 
the policy of workers' participation in management decisions. 
Before we turn to the assessment of, the objectives for which 
the policy of participation was introduced, it is necessary to 
underline first the distinctiveness of the social and political 
circumstances under which the Zambian policy started. The way 
we go about it is to compare and contrast, at a general level, 
how the issues giving rise to workers' participation in Zambia 
differed from those raised in the West at around the same time. 
To start with, the Bullock Committee on Industrial 
Democracy in Britain sum. arised_in Chapter 3 of their report 
what they found as main the 'pressures for change' to 
Industrial Democracy. For the Bullock Committee, industrial 
democracy was made more imperative because of what had occurred 
in the British economy, and to the society since the second 
World War. New factors included the growth in power, size and 
complexity of business enterprises requiring urgent measures to 
enhance corporate accountability; greater union strength which 
could be disruptive to companies unresponsive to democratic 
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control; the growth of education and rising standards of 
living, factors which encouraged the erosion of differential 
attitudes'; and events in other countries on participation, the 
European Economic Community in particular. These developments 
constituted a new era in the history of industrialisation which 
justified new initiatives encouraged by the -state in the 
organisation and management of business companies(42). 
Similarly, in North America, Nightingale has used the post- 
industrialism thesis to explain pressures for workers' 
participation in Canada. According to this author, the sprea- 
ding effects of entitlement brought by the post war boom; 
changes in attitudes brought by dependence on work organi- 
sations; the erosion of consent to authoritative practices 
precipitated by working spouses; due process clauses in 
collective agreements; statutory regulations governing dismi- 
ssals; unemployment benefits and society which offered many 
employment opportunities; the decline of public confidence in 
institutions of power such as government, business, trade 
unions, professions, church; and discrepancies between demo- 
cratic rights of individuals as citizens and as workers are 
factors that'have precipitated calls for workers' participation 
in management decisions in that country(43). 
The impression one gathers from reading the Bullock Report 
and Nightingale is that workers' participation was demanded in 
the two countries, and the West in general, by the workers and 
society at large primarily because of the levels of industria- 
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lisation and the accompanying conditions of relative economic 
affluence. These conditions created certain expectations, and 
workers' participation was one way of fulfilling them. 
However these explanations have not gone unchallenged. In 
the context of Britain, Harvie Ramsay(44) and Dennis 
Lavrence(45), among others(46), have challenged the central 
assumptions of the Bullock Report that there was any 
significant changes in the British economy and British society 
which justified public policies towards workers' participation 
in management decisions. These and other critics of workers' 
participation in Britain have pointed to events after election 
of a Conservative Government in 1979 as evidence that those 
changes chronicled by the Bullock Report were more apparent 
than real(47). 
As for North America, where Nightingale writes from, it 
is interesting to note in that respect that the more affluent 
United States has not shown propensity to public policies 
towards workers' participation in management decisions. There 
has been, in fact, actual opposition to schemes of workers' 
participation conceived on West European lines(48). 
From the nature of objections raised, it would appear that 
economic affluence in itself does - not lead to policies of 
workers' participation in management decisions. This, however, 
does not mean that economic affluence is not a relevant factor 
in moving towards industrial relations policies of workers' 
participation. Research has shown that economic performance, 
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even at company level, is the important factual base upon which 
experiments on workers' participation can be introduced(49). it 
is this factor too, to some extent, which explains the paradox 
that workers' participation is best known in some of the most 
affluent countries in the West, Sweden and Germany [the former 
Federal Republic]. 
Therefore, it is true that it has been on the basis of 
strong industrial structures that workers and the trade unions, 
and possibly society, have advocated state policies to assure 
workers' participation in management decisions. From that 
perspective, the analyses of the Bullock Report and Nightingale 
are accurate in asserting that progress in industrialisation 
pushed workers' participation on the political agenda of 
developed countries. Whether or not workers' participation 
actually receive state endorsement in the form of legislation 
depends on other factors. Among these would be the disposition 
of governments, the history of state intervention in industrial 
relations, and the force with which those who favour such 
policies put their case in the political arena(50). 
The Zambian experience we have presented is far from 
following the Western model. Firstly, whatever might be the 
contribution of economic affluence to schemes of workers' 
participation, it is clear from the history of Zambia and from 
complaints of contemporary politicians, that there was little 
substance in the country in- the 1960s, as it is now, to ask 
for workers' participation on the basis of a society in 
-108- 
relative affluence. Zambian 'workers and the whole of the 
Zambian society were then, as they are now, afflicted by 
conditions of economic underdevelopment (51). itoreover, post- 
industrialism theories made little sense in a country contemp- 
lating building industrial infrastructures, and where non- 
capitalist production modes were both qualitatively and 
quantitatively significant. 
The second point is that there is no evidence that the 
yyorkers, the trade unions and the society at large consciously 
demanded porkers' participation policies in Zanbia. There is no 
suggestion either that there was even a significant najority of 
these sections demanding xiorkers' participation in the country. 
Therefore, set against European developnents, the Zambian 
participation programme was an anomaly. It started not as a 
result of pressure from the workers, the trade unions and 
society(52), but as an elitist construct suggested and 
implemented by the state. Uhy this was so has not been 
explained satisfactorily in many of the accounts of the origins 
of workers' participation in Zambia. Since our perspectives in 
this study are very much structured by the conclusions on the 
initial objectives of workers' participation in Zambia, it is 
necessary to assess in more detail why the state, not the 
workers and unions, asked for participation policy in Zambia. 
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4. The Objectives of Workers' Participation Policy 
What the Zambian Government hoped to achieve by introducing 
a policy of workers' participation cannot be answered in any 
clear cut mechanical terms. The reasons are much interconnected 
with the political and historical origin of post-independence 
policies. In Chapter 2 we considered four propositions 
canvassed by some writers in order to indicate the variety of 
perspectives on the origins and possible objectives of 
workers' participation in Zambia. As it turns out, no one has 
yet unearthed the precise background to President Kaunda's 
announcement of workers' participation in 1969. Until such time 
as someone stumbles across private Presidential working papers 
on the origin of workers' participation within the Zambian 
leadership in the 1960s, we may never know empirically the 
origins and underlying state motivation for the policy of 
workers's participation in Zambia. As it is, matters concerning 
the origins and objectives of workers' participation revolve 
around what meaning each person gives to public statements, 
and how one reads the history of workers' participation in the 
country. It is precisely this state of affairs which has given 
rise to different and competing paradigms of interpretation. 
Writers like Fincham et al(53), and Kalula(54) who begin 
looking at workers' - participation from the history of state- 
trade union relations in Zambia conclude that the aims of 
workers' participation was to control workers and the trade 
unions. This may well have been the motivation of the Zambian 
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government. Within the urban-rural matrix of Zambia's post- 
independence problems, the government in power had all the 
reasons to seek to control the demands of urban workers and 
trade unions. Robert Bates(55) demonstrated, in fact, that 
Zambian workers, like their counterparts elsewhere in the Third 
World in the 1960s, received enough lessons on their own 
version of 'the Sermon on the Mount': the role of trade unions 
in developing countries(56). Through appeals and exhortation, 
workers and trade unions were urged by government officials to 
work hard and obey supervisors in the hope that industrial 
production would increase to create material wealth for distri- 
bution. The question is: was the policy of workers' partici- 
pation an integral part of this productionist theme? 
We have come to the conclusion that there are serious 
problems with the interpretation that workers' participation 
was started in Zambia in order to control workers and the trade 
unions. This analytical approach, logical as it may be, is 
simplistic and also dated. There is more to the history of 
workers' participation in Zambia than state concern with labour 
discipline and production goals as this study aims to show. The 
simplicity of the labour control or 'incorporation' thesis can 
be demonstrated by reference to the arguments of Evance Kalula. 
Kalula asserts on one hand that "workers' participation through 
works councils has been a central feature of the state's 
strategy of labour incorporation", and on the other that "trade 
unionists have always publicly welcomed workers' participation 
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in principle"(57). If we are to understand 'incorporation' an 
government "attempts to constrain the labour movements' and the 
rank and file's post-independence aspirations and expecta- 
tions"(58), surely the natural course for the trade unions 
would have been to publicly resent workers' participation 
policies and not to welcome them(59). This is the more so when 
it is also concluded that the trade union movement in Zambia 
has been strong since pre- independence days to the extent that 
the independent government has been unable to control it(60). ' 
Why, in that case, would a strong and supposedly rational body 
welcome measures central to its own control? 
A more plausible explanation should be that workers and the 
trade unions welcomed the introduction of participation in 
management decisions because it held out a promise which, at 
any reading, could not have been the control of independent 
trade union and worker action. That would have been 
nonsensical on part of the trade unions. This apart, we shall 
show below that the incorporation thesis does not quite tally 
with the tenor of statements made contemporaneously by the 
government in 1969 to support the introduction of workers' 
participation(61). 
A related point is that the incorporation thesis is dated. 
Much of the factual materials in support of it derive from the 
analysis of conflict between union leaders and politicians in 
the 1960s. Whatever might have been the merits of this 
background for the incorporation analysis, it cannot explain 
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the progress of the Zambian participation policy in the period 
after the "combative two cobras"(62) phase of the Zambian 
industrial relations in the 1960x. 
For the above reasons and those to be elaborated in Chapter 
8, we submit that the notion that workers' participation was 
introduced in Zambia in order to control workers and the trade 
unions is suspect. Yet, the other explanations that have been 
offered to explain the origins of workes' participation in 
Zambia are also not very convincing. , To maintain, as President 
Kaunda and other supporters of official orthodoxy have done, 
that workers' participation was introduced in-the country in 
order to carry out Humanism is not to convey anything at all 
because Humanism itself needs to be understood. Equally, to 
argue that workers' participation was introduced in order to 
further the political concept of participatory democracy 
reflects an uncritical acceptance of institutionalised views. 
The history of political democracy in Zambia undermines the 
credibility of this view thoroughly. 
In the final analysis, to discover the objectives of the 
workers' participation policy in Zambia one needs to return to 
the circumstances of its founding history. Our research, as we 
have reported, shows that the history of workers' participation 
in Zambia is inextricably linked to the Economic Reforms that 
were being ushered in the country after 1967. The overall 
objective of these was to bring the operation of the Zambian 
economy into the hands of indigenous Zambians. The methods of 
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actually achieving this aspiration were circumscribed by a 
framework respecting domestic constraints, the rule of law and 
international order, forces to which an economy based on the 
sale of copper on the international market was particularly 
sensitive(63). 
The result, we find, is a variety of strategies resorted 
to by the Zambian Government in order to achieve Zambianisation 
of the economy. First, there was partial nationalisation of 
existing medium and large scale foreign companies. This was 
undertaken on an incremental basis with general industrial and 
commercial companies in 1968, the mining industry in 1969 and 
financial companies in 1970. Second, there was the conscious 
creation of industrial and commercial companies by the state 
using copper resources. The majority of state enterprises in 
Zambia have grown through this route. Third, there were 
attempts at indigenization of capital through exclusive 
business zones. This in practice meant forcing foreign 
investors to sell their businesses to Zambians because the 
state, as the licensing authority, would not renew licences for 
non-Zambians in designated categories of business operations. 
Fourth, as we have argued, the policy of workers' participation 
in management decisions was but an integral part of the 
strategy to achieve overall Zambian participation in the the 
ownership and management of the Zambian economy. These are the 
measures which served to mitigate and reduce the social and 
economic inequalities perceived to be present in the Zambian 
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society after independence. The extract from President Kaunda's 
speech in Kitve provided in Appendix A leaves little doubt that 
past inequalities in social and economic power were the main 
stay of the industrial relations policy of workers' partici- 
pation in Zambia. 
Moreover, subsequent statements of policy have constantly 
returned to the elementary issues of social and economic 
inequalities manifested in the capitalist system of ownership 
and control as it had developed in Zambia. For instance, when 
the law of workers' participation was laid before Parliament 
some two years after 1969, the Minister of Labour said : 
Mr. Speaker Sir, the Bill which makes an important 
milestone in the history of industrial relations in this 
country closely follows the guidelines made public by his 
Excellence the President at the Second National Convention 
held in December 1969, and at subsequent seminars held in 
Lusaka and Mufulira respectively in March 1970. The Bill is 
intended to give practical effect to the Philosophy of 
Zambian Humanism by introducing participatory democracy in 
decision making in industry(64). 
It is a measure of how important worker's participation was 
in the overall strategy of 'wresting control'(65), that the 
Minister singled out workers' participation as though it was 
the main object of the Industrial Relations Bill, 1971. In 
fact, as we shall see in Chapter 5, workers' participation 
provisions occupied but a small corner of a ten part Bill whose 
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real business was to consolidate existing industrial relations 
laws(66). 
For reasons which will be explained in detail in Chapter 
6, there is a marked difference of emphasis between Kaunda's 
statement in 1969 and his analysis of the objectives of 
workers' participation in Chapter 13 of Humanise and a guide 
to its Implementation, Part 2, as the extended work is 
appropriately known. In the latter work, published in 1974, 
Kaunda visualises five postulates in the struggle for 
Industrial Participatory Democracy in Zambia: -- 
1. Workers and progressive managerial elements should 
seize control from a few who have organized themselves to 
exploit the working people. 
2. Workers and progressive managers are charged with 
responsibility for managing the seized industries. 
3. The seizure of the means of production by workers 
represents the initial step towards equity in the 
distribution of income. 
4. Workers' participation in industries also places on 
them the moral responsibility to promote the interests of 
the peasants. 
5. Workers' participation in industrial enterprises is 
essential for the realisation of the more global goal of 
promoting the interests of the common man(67). 
President Kaunda's concerns with the need to bring about 
fundamental changes in the ownership and management of Zambian 
-116- 
industries cone out well in the above statements. The only 
thing that is new is the style of communication which is rather 
different from that he used when he wrote Humanism Part 1 in 
1967. Then his model of social organisation was the African 
village. In 1974 he demonstrates the awareness of such higher 
ideological positions in the capitalist system of production. 
Kaunda's thesis, however, does not seem at all to be directed 
at the trade unions and workers. A 1982 reinstatement of the 
purpose for workers' participation in Zambia was even more 
straight forward. 
The objectives of industrial participatory democracy in 
Zambia is to bestow upon every worker the right to fully 
participate in the control and management of the enterprise 
in which he depends for his livelihood(68). 
To summarise, it is not easy to state why workers' 
participation was introduced in Zambia. Lack of prior detailed 
public and private discussions of workers' 'participation before 
it was promulgated as a national industrial relations policy 
makes it all the more difficult to go beyond speculation. 
However, it is our view in this thesis that the original 
objectives of workers' participation in Zambia are best 
understood in relation to the search for the integration of 
Zambians in the national economy, and in the processes of 
company decision-making in particular. This interpretation is 
consistent with the general background history of independence 
policies; specific official statements and above all - the 
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legislative method of introducing workers' participation in 
management decisions. We present the final point below. 
5. The Role of Law in [Workers' Participation Policies 
As well as asking for workers' participation in management 
decisions, President Kaunda called for the enactment of laws 
to implement that policy in Zambian industries(69). What we 
must ask now is why did the President call for laws to 
implement workers' participation in management decisions? That 
question does not assume significance unless there are other 
ways in which workers' participation could be brought about 
without recourse to legislation. This, in turn, begs the 
question whether the other ways which do not involve enactment 
of laws should be understood and interpreted in the same way as 
the schemes that are undertaken with recourse to the 
legislative method. 
In short, is there anything significant in the use of law 
to implement policies of workers' participation in management 
decisions? This we suppose is a general question about the use 
of law by the state to implement public policies. But it is one 
which assumes importance with regard to workers' participation 
in management decisions because this particular concept is an 
unequivocal one, in the sense that there is no agreement as to 
how it should be understood and interpreted more precisely. 
For instance, is a works council at Rover Motors in the 
United Kingdom the equivalent of a similar institution at a 
sister company in Vest Germany where companies are obliged by 
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the 1952 Works Council law to create works councils? Take 
another example. Is the putting of two union members on the 
board of Ford Motor Company in the United States the same act 
as when two such union members are put on a Volvo Company board 
in Sweden in compliance with that country's legislation of 
1972? 
From a functionalist standpoint there seems to be no reason 
why they should not be considered equivalents, especially if it 
could be shown that the functions they perform in their 
respective industrial relations systems are the saae(70). 
But sound as the logic may be, such a result would raise 
questions about the meaning of law; the role of the state; and 
circumstances when the latter invokes the instrument of law to 
realise public policy objectives. Having spent considerable 
time on Kaunda's statements of purpose, it is not necessary to 
digress into these issues. It is sufficiently clear from 
Kaunda's statements of purpose that he envisaged some radical 
changes in the way business companies were organised and 
governed in Zambia. So that when he said "our legislation must 
be such that it creates an atmosphere which will be conducive 
to the creation of a man-centred society"(71), he saw the role 
of law in that process as the agent of social change in the 
Seidmanian sense(72). That in, through the instrumentality of 
law, the state was the organ possessed with sufficient 
capacity, resources and legitimacy to undertake the structural 
changes in the governance of business companies seen then as 
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essential to the process of change he was calling for. Law then 
was to act as a "conveyor of new values..., a tool of education 
and reform"(73). In short, law was intended to provide both the 
substance of change and the climate legitimating social changes 
in industry. Kaunda admits to this interpretation of the role 
of law in industrial policies when he explains that, 
From the very onset (i. e of workers' participation in 
Zambia) we have been very conscious of the importance of 
law in the transformation of society. It is this commitment 
to law that led us as early as 1971, to enact the 
Industrial Relations Act, Cap. 517 of the Laws of 
Zambia(74). 
In view of what we have said in section 3 about the anomaly 
of the political origin of workers' participation in Zambia, it 
is useful to complete this part of the Chapter with one 
important note. This is that it is at the level of the 
Zambian view of law as an agent of change in the legal position 
of employees in decisions of companies that there are real 
resemblances with the European and Scandinavian approaches to 
workers' participation and industrial democracy. In Chapter 5 
we shall show that in these countries, as in Zambia, workers' 
participation laws were promoted as aspects of a political 
challenge to the liberal image of the law of companies. Thus, 
from a different background, and different definition of 
problems, Zambia found herself emulating the creative role of 
the state in Europe in formulating rules supporting workers in 
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the governance of business companies. 
To be sure, this was not just a case of emulation as one 
might want to imply from the discussions of Shimaponda. To the 
contrary, participation laws European style fitted very well 
with the Zambian governments' pronouncements on 'unacceptable 
capitalist laws and management philosophies'. The new laws, 
Kaunda promised, 
will for the first time abolish the hated system of master 
and servant. For the first time workers and managers will 
be equal partners in industry. This means that the coming 
of age of workers will at last be legally recognised(75). 
Despite this, it is the case that the nature of laws 
envisaged by the Zambian government in 1969 was a comprehensive 
system of laws known then only in West Germany and Austria. 
These were the two countries who had in 1969 legislation on 
works councils and board of directors affecting private 
enterprises similar to what Zambia was proposing. In the rest 
of Europe auch laws were still under discussion, materialising 
notably in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden in the 
early 1970s(76). 
The fact that Zambia was able to propose legislation of 
that quality in 1969 ahead of many developed countries may be a 
factor to be considered in its own right in the search for the 
political origin of workers' participation in Zambia. To be 
taken into account too is the nature of government communi- 
cation in 1969. When President Kaunda introduced the subject of 
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workers' participation, there was no suggestion to the labour 
market parties to consider the possibility of introducing 
schemes of workers' participation in management decisions. 
Rather, the information them was that the government had 
decided on both the adoption of a policy of workers' 
participation, and on legislation as the means by which to 
achieve the objectives of that policy. 
Ile suggest that such a unilateral approach to law on a 
matter of industrial relations significance is consistent with 
the perception of law as an instrument of social change towards 
goals defined by those who, in any system, have capacity, 
resources or legitimacy to bring about the desired changes. 
Here, we have argued, that the goal, under the auspices of the 
Philosophy of Humanism, was to bring economic and social power 
into the hands of Zambians through, in this particular case, 
the transformation of the law of decision making in industry. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The object of this, and the previous Chapter, was to study 
how it was that Zambia adopted laws and policies regarding 
workers' participation in management. Three principal questions 
have guided the discussion presented. 1) how did the idea of 
workers' participation arise in Zambia, 2) what purposes were 
to be served by workers' participation policies and 3) what was 
to be the role of law in the attainment of those objectives? 
Largely because workers' participation policies underpinned 
by laws are political in content, we believe that any attempt 
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to comprehend their development in Zambia must take as its 
starting point historical and political background to post- 
independence Zambia. It is a general proposition that colonial 
experience tends to guide the practice and conceptualisation of 
solutions to problems in newly independent states. At the same 
time, the attempt to delve into Zambia's history was an 
acknowledgement of the often encountered statement that each 
scheme of workers' participation in industry must be seen 
within the context of the historical, economic and social 
conditions of the country concerned. Our preliminary examina- 
tion of the different perspectives on the origins of workers' 
participation in Zambia confirmed the relevance of the 
approach. Humanism, Participatory democracy and state policies 
towards trade union all stressed the relevance of local 
political elements. 
Our underlying argument in the discussions has been that 
workers' participation policies were introduced in Zambia as 
part of measures to assure Zanbian control of the economy. In 
outlining in the previous Chapter colonial developments in 
important areas of political evolution; the development of 
modern economic structures; and labour relations, we 
highlighted the issues which galvanised and concentrated the 
minds of African political leaders in Northern Rhodesia. The 
evidence on subordination and narginalisation of both Africans 
and Northern Rhodesia within the double barrelled colonial 
machine of Northern Rhodesia seemed incontrovertible. [Neat 
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remained was to show the connection between generalised 
grievances and the specific development of workers' 
participation in Zambia. That was the starting point of the 
present Chapter. 
The main point here was that the industrial relations 
policy of workers' participation came along with Economic 
Policies announced by the Zambian government after the 
promulgation of the Philosophy of , Humanism in April 1967. 
Humanism, we stated, is best understood in terms of structural 
differences in social and economic power to which President 
Kaunda was addressing himself in defining goals for national 
reconstruction. Thus, the nationalisation and the specific form 
it assumed in Zambia was directed at redressing imbalances 
received from the colonial order. 
It has also been our argument that development of workers' 
participation in Zambia related to the specific instrumental 
aim of assuring indigenous participation in the national 
economy, and managerial decisions in particular. The striking 
factors were more than the sequence of events. A commitment to 
moral and philosophical principles as well as the unilateral 
manner with which the state intended to bring about workers' 
participation are all factors pointing that the Zambian state 
was in an area where popular support from the ensemble of 
different factions in the Zambian society in the 1960s was 
assumed. President Kaunda's statements of purpose constantly 
underlines the connection between workers' participation and 
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broader goals to assure Zambian control of the economy. 
Consistently too, we have understood the role of law in 
workers' participation policies as to assist in the trans- 
formation of the legal position of employees in the management 
of private companies. 
The above findings on the historical and political origin 
of the Zambian workers' participation policy are consistent, 
to a greater extent, with the hypothesis put forward by Paul 
Blumberg in 1968. Hypothesising the future of workers' 
management, he pointed out that the political dimension of 
capital would be one of the major forces to push workers' 
management on the political agenda of developing countries. "In 
many parts of the Third World today", he wrote, 
there is an analogous repudiation of economic elites. On a 
fairly wide scale there exists- an all pervasive anti- 
capitalist ideology, a partial consequence of the 
experience of these nations with Western imperialism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Capitalism has been 
widely repudiated simply because it is regarded as 
synonymous with hated imperialism, of which the peoples of 
the Third World were the chief victims(77). 
What we maintain is that the Zambian case fits the scenario 
described by Blumberg in which workers' participation are 
driven more by political economic policies than the factors of 
the levels of industrialisation and actual employment situa- 
tions. It does not follow from this argument however that the 
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political aim of assuring indigenous participation in the 
economy was the only relevant consideration in the development 
of workers' participation in Zambia. Such an exclusionary 
explanation would probably do injustice to many other Zambian 
statements on the origins of workers' participation, including 
the four propositions previously introduced. We should 
therefore be understood as having laid emphasis rather than 
excluding all other explanations. Workers' participation indeed 
is too much of an amorphous concept to be so restricted. 
For the purposes of making progress, what has emerged is 
that workers' participation was proclaimed as a national 
industrial relations policy in 1969. The hallmark of the policy 
lay in the nature of laws that were to be enacted after 1969. 
Before we come to these laws, we must ask what framework was 
built by the Zambian authorities to propel workers to 
participate in management decisions as was envisaged for them 
in 1969. In other words, it is necessary initially to examine 
the contextual setting of workers' participation because this 
will structure subsequent assessments of the laws that were 
introduced. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONTEXT OF WORKERS' PARTICIPATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter we came to a conclusion on how 
the state in Zambia began industrial relations policies of 
workers' participation. We may now proceed to examine the 
context in which the development of these policies was supposed 
to take place in the 1970s. After defining the meaning and 
relevance of 'context' in section 1, sections 2-5 discuss, in 
turn, each of the four contextual variables isolated for 
analysis in this study, namely political, economic, industrial 
relations and legal contexts. The sixth, and final section, 
provides the summary and concluding perspectives. 
1. The importance of Context in law and industrial relations 
It has been one of the main findings of cross-national 
empirical research that workers' participation policies are 
enhanced by the presence of certain underlying conditions in 
national systems. Among the important factors deemed essential 
to participation policies are the nature of the political and 
economic systems, the disposition and behaviour of employers, 
organisation and the attitudes of trade unions, the role of 
the state and legal systems, and the history of industrial 
relations(l). These can be summarised in two principal cate- 
gories: (A) favourable governmental and legislative measures, 
and (B) economic infrastructural factors. Altogether, the 
'external support systems' constitute the context of workers' 
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participation policies. They are the social and material forces 
which can determine whether or not participation policies 
become an enduring feature of industrial relations, and with 
what quality. However, the ways these underlying factors 
interact to influence outcomes on participation policies cannot 
be understood apart from the specific historical contexts of 
individual countries. 
In the instant, the social and economic history of Zambia 
sketched so far makes it almost self-evident that the develo- 
pment of workers' participation in the specific direction 
sought by the government could only proceed on the basis of 
certain post facto assumptions, the principal one being that 
the Zambian government would be able to create conditions to 
bring about Industrial Participatory Democracy. To be sure, the 
government promised to enact comprehensive legislation. But, we 
think that the introduction of arrangements to change root and 
branch of rules governing decision-making in companies, as was 
sought and indicated by government declarations in 1969, 
required more than intellectual and technical skills on the 
part of the state to enact appropriate and effective legisla- 
tion. There was need specifically for other 'infrastructural' 
conditions relevant especially for the operation of law and 
industrial relations. There are two considerations which lead 
us to this assertion: the lack of prior consultation by the 
state with other labour market parties, and limitations of law 
itself in industrial relations. 
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On the former, we know from our discussion in Chapter 3 
that although workers' participation was presented by President 
Kaunda as an Industrial Relations Policy, there had been a 
failure on the part of government to consult with employers and 
the trade unions prior to the announcement of this new policy. 
Uany European governments in the 1970s attempted, through 
Commissions of Inquiry and other discussion arenas, including a 
referendum in Switzerland in 1976, to secure a ninimum conse- 
nsus between shareholders, managers, unions and workers on the 
kind of system of workers' participation to adopt, its aims and 
objectives if at all. The Zambian government, on the other 
hand, sought to dispense with these elementary requirements of 
prior explanation and consultation on a major industrial 
relations policy initiative(2). The 1969 policy statement was 
conclusive on central issues of participation structures, and 
the aims and means of attaining there. What had remained was to 
enact the law, and the role of trade unions and employers was 
conceived of as working with the rules once they were in place. 
The argument is that while that political behaviour might 
have fitted the circumstances in which this particular indus- 
trial relations policy was developed in 1969, such an obvious 
contempt of the primary parties to industrial relations put a 
premium on the state to introduce conditions which would enable 
her to transform, on a longer term basis, the roles of owners, 
managers and workers in the industrial and commercial system of 
Zambia. At the minimum, the state needed to secure that the 
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owners of companies, managers, the workers and trade unions 
went along not only with the general tenor of participation 
policies, but also with the specifics of the root and branch 
approach to participation legislation. The resources and skills 
required to achieve even the barest consensus within these 
groups in the context of a developing country should not be 
underestinated(3). In a country still riddled with racial 
attitudes between the contending forces of industry, where 
poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and a generally doni- 
neering culture were the driving forces of government social 
policies, the question whether the state would be able to 
bring about a shared understanding about what was intended and 
what was sought to be achieved from corkers' participation has 
to be asked carefully. 
Secondly, even assuming that what was needed was only 
intellectual and technical resources to draft comprehensive 
and appropriate legislation, there is no reason to suppose that 
the operation of workers' participation laws in Zambia would 
not suffer from the limitations of legal rules. The idea is 
that both in legal and industrial relations spheres, issues of 
political and economic content, as workers' participation 
policies are, are often decided by factors other than the 
elegance of legal rules. This is so not because law is not 
important, but that such subjects are the very essence of 
social, political and economic expedience(4). The emergence of 
contextual syllabuses in law faculties like the ones offered at 
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TJarwick University in the United Kingdom testify generally to 
the importance of contextual factors in appreciating the value 
of legal rules and institutions(5). At another level, the story 
of the British Industrial Relations Act 1971 illustrates what 
can go wrong when laws are introduced with scanty regard to 
prevailing attitudes in the industrial relations systen, 
broadly defined(6). 
This suggests that in addition to enacting legislation 
approximating to declared policy objectives, the state actually 
needed to create, if they did not exist, conditions to support 
the development of the workers' participation policies annou- 
nced in 1969. Thus, in this Chapter we shall examine possible 
underlying factors which would have provided such support. lie 
do not seek a comprehensive explanation of the working of 
structural and institutional arrangements in Zambia, but rather 
to identify the most salient aspects of the Zambian system in 
the 1970s which can contribute to our understanding of the 
context in which participation policies were developed. Those 
factors actually focussed upon are: (1) the political process; 
(2) the economic structure; (3) industrial relations history 
and development; and (4) the legal system of company organisa- 
tion and decision-making. The meaning and relevance of these in 
the Zambian context will be clarified as each is considered in 
turn in sections 2-5. 
2. Political Process and Workers' Participation in Zambia 
2.1 The Meaning and Relevance of the Political Process to 
-142- 
Workers' Participation Policies: A general outline. 
The establishment and maintenance of the political process 
in any country belongs in the main to the realm of the state. 
The state, as a historical institutional system of social and 
political control, sanctions the basis on which power in 
society is acquired, distributed and exercised. But because 
the state is not just an abstract entity, but a social 
institution composed of human agents, these can use their 
superior access to the means of control in society to-alter the 
logic of existing arrangements either in line with their wishes 
or in response to pressures which are recognised and respected. 
In other words, state policies are inextricably linked with 
the subjective interests, the value orientations and the 
ideological convictions of the individuals who occupy the most 
important positions in the state system at a particular time in 
history(6a). In States and Societies, David Held et al also 
bring out materials which support the view that the concept of 
state is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, the nature of which 
varies across time and space"(7). Similar conclusions have been 
drawn too by those who have considered the nature and meaning 
of the 'Third World State', thought previously to have been a 
special breed because of its alleged late development(8). 
The intimacy between the concept of state and the way 
power is exercised in society means that we should not 
understand political process merely as the organisation of 
political parties contending for state power. Also relevant to 
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the political process are the ways and extent to which those 
parties and the individuals who win power in the state use it 
to intervene in matters of civil nature. These may concern 
industrial relations, company organisation and control or the 
exercise of citizenship rights(9). "Politics". Shivji has 
observed, 
is not simply the question of state power, that is to say 
(1) the relation of governance between the state and the 
citizen and (2) the division of power within and among 
the institutions of the state. Politics involves as well 
approaches, ideologies ` and relations in respect of 
differences and different interests within the civil 
society at various levels(10). 
The way states choose to use their power, and the degree 
to which they are seen to direct the affairs of individual 
citizens and groups have long attracted labels ranging from 
liberal to totalitarian. In between there have been variations 
of pluralism and corporatism. Normatively, both liberal and 
totalitarian states are seen as signifying extreme forms of 
state control, though for very opposite reasons. The liberal 
state offers little or no control over powerful social groups 
in society, while the latter becomes so overbearing on 
individuals and groups within society that she might negate at 
times the basic human rights, as declared for instance, in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
Thus, because there is in existence a general perception of 
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the 'proper' use of state powers, modern states strive to 
negotiate their political order within the variations of plura- 
lism and corporatism. 
According to Michael Poole, the types of state 
intervention common in the West take the form of (a) pluralism 
- understood as circumscribed state influence in a largely 
fragmented and decentralised political economy; (b) societal 
corporatism - where centralised or moderately centralised 
governments reach agreements with strongly organised and 
usually centralised interest groups, and (c) state corporatism 
- where strongly interventionist governments are unchecked by 
independent organisations(11). While the reasons why some 
states find themselves gravitating towards extremes on the 
liberal-totalitarian continuum are many, complex and contro- 
versial, it is generally understood that those states which 
permit political pluralism, in the sense of allowing organised 
competition to political power are democratic. The recent 
development of multi-party politics in the former One Party 
Socialist States of Eastern Europe, and which is about to be 
emulated in Black Africa(12), illustrates this proposition. 
Also, within the literature on workers' participation, it 
has long been understood that the beat chances of instituting 
enduring systems of workers' participation are in those 
countries whose political systems combine the virtues of 
democracy and active support for a new vision of the role of 
employees in the capitalist system of industrial production. 
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These perspectives come out more clearly from writers who have 
examined the origins and development of workers' participation 
systems in Sweden and Germany. The works of fleidner(13) and 
Riggins(14) on Sweden, of the German Trade Union Federation(15) 
and of Thomas Raiser(16) on Germany are particularly in point. 
Due to the similarity of arguments advanced, we shall present 
those of the German Trade Union Federation, not least because 
of the acknowledged authority of that union in the field of 
workers' participation policies(17). 
Already in 1967, the German Trade Union Federation argued 
that no justification for workers' participation can be adduced 
if new forms of dependence and constraint threaten individual 
rights of freedom. In their view, workers' participation could 
be consolidated only if workers, their delegates and 
representatives were assured that the form of society emerging 
in the political, economic, and social spheres was so ordered 
that it provided adequate guarantees for self-determination and 
joint responsiblity(18). 
such a system (which operates workers' participation) pre- 
supposes that every individual has a claim to accurate and 
adequate information on all questions affecting his 
freedom and his social responsibility. Further, it is 
essential that all grades of society shall be in a 
position to form a free and independent judgement on all 
important developments in the society in which they live. 
Moreover, every individual must be in a position, in 
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association with all others of his own persuasion, to 
ensure adequate consideration for his own ideas within the 
play of forces in a pluralist society(19). 
The Union also suggested that the general conception of 
workers' participation presupposes a system of free enterprise 
based on the principles of a free market economy. Here the 
union saliently illustrates the point: 
In all those instances in which the economy is subjected 
to central administration there can be no genuine form of 
workers' co-operation or codetermination at the various 
levels of the productive process. All really important 
decisions affecting the volume and type of production, as 
well as the forms of administration within the economic 
system, are made by the central authorities and the 
ministries, with the result that there is little or no 
room left for codetermination and joint responsibility at 
enterprise and workshop level. Any form of codetermination 
to be exercised inside the undertakings by those affected 
by the process of the economy, and particularly by the 
workers, is practically ruled out(20). 
It is essential before we go any further to grasp the 
argument being put forward. It is not that pluralist market 
economies bring about workers' participation policies. No 
evidence supports such a proposition. Rather it is that 
conditions of a pluralist market economy offer the minimum 
necessary political requirements for the extension of demo- 
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cratic programmes at places of work. In short, democracy and 
its prerequisites must exist in the broader society before it 
can be made to enter the factory(21). 
2.2 The Zanbian political Process in the 197ns 
Against the above criteria of political principles thought 
useful to operating a system of workers' participation in 
decisions of industry, how did Zambian developments in the 
1970s square up? Two tendencies can be identified for the 
purposes of indicating political developments in Zambia in the 
1970s. 
First, there is little doubt that the Zambian leadership 
in the 1960s aspired to a democratic order familiar in frame- 
work to that advocated by the German Trade Union Federation. 
Codetermination, indeed, was a term found in the Zambian 
worker's participation of President Kaunda(22). Iloreover, by 
making a strong case in the 1960s against the narrower base of 
colonial social and economic power, and by announcing economic 
reform policies to redress such inequalities, the Zambian state 
seemed for once consistent in her crusade for a democratic 
order in the Zambian society. 
But along with this there was another more pervasive 
tendency. Just after policies were taken to widen the base of 
economic democracy by bringing more Zambians in the active 
industrial and commercial sectors of the economy, there were 
plans to short circuit pluralist political democracy by moving 
to a One Party State political system. The inauguration of the 
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One Party State System in 1972 confirmed the existence of 
contradictory political ideals in Zambia. The more serious 
aspect of the One Party State for workers' participation 
policies was not the fact of its existence, but the way it was 
set out to operate in relation to other institutions and 
structures of administration in the country: 
The Party is supreme in our One Party Participatory 
Democracy. It is the source of national policy. The party 
will not only be interested in the working out of broad 
policies and objectives, it will be directly involved in 
the planning, organisation, control and management of the 
entire administrative machinery of our nation(23). 
Those prophetic words of President Kaunda defined for 
Zambia the doctrine of the supremacy of the Party, which in 
operation, as the arguments of the German Trade Union indicate, 
was the very opposite of the political infrastructure that 
was necessary to support policies of workers' participation in 
industry. The subordination of all other institutions and 
structures of power to the Party, not least trade union 
organisations and corporate managements in the ascending state 
run economy, ran against any meaningful conceptualisation of 
Industrial Participatory Democracy. It is these tendencies in 
the Zambian political process which have been partly 
responsible for the 'tangential' treatment of the subject of 
workers' participation in Zambia. Despite state efforts to push 
the subject into the public arena, few viewed workers' partici- 
-149- 
pation as a significant development to be studied in its own 
right given the broader political parameters of administrative 
decision-making in the country. 
Given that for most part of the period under study, there 
was continued scepticism about the Kaunda government's crede- 
ntials to democracy under a One Party State, the conclusion is 
inescapable that at the level of the political process, the 
state in Zambia hardly created conditions encouraging to the 
successful implementation of policies of workers' participation 
in management decisions. As Peter Suffern wrote, in a different 
context, "no egalitarian, rational and libertarian order can 
become a plausible and sustainable societal project, if from 
the start, civic freedoms, mass empowerment and accountability 
of power are not made the basis of the new social rela- 
tions"(24). We can add very little to that statement as a form 
of summary of the constraints put by the Zambian political 
system on the progress and development of workers' participa- 
tion policies in the 1970s. 
3. Economic Structure and Workers' participation Policies 
3.1 The Meaning and Description of Economic Structures 
Barber characterised the economies of Central Africa as 
'dual economies'(25). The idea serves to mark the distinction 
between traditional subsistence economies, and the modern 
industrial and commercial segment with which the former exists 
side by side in individual countries of Central Africa. It is 
obvious by now that we are concerned in this study with the 
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commercial and industrial segment of the Zambian economy. Wor- 
kers' participation policies find no meaning in that part of 
the economy without conventional employment relationships. lie 
therefore point out the obvious only to clarify better what we 
mean by Zambian economic structure in this section. 
In relation to the commercial and industrial sector of the 
Zambian economy, the concept of economic structure is used in 
this essay to denote broad patterns of business ownership. It 
defines the way in which ownership of industrial and commercial 
property is distributed, and by extension the concept signposts 
the different centres of authority over industrial and commer- 
cial property in Zambia. 
Principally, distribution of commercial and industrial 
property in Zambia can be differentiated along the public/ 
private dichotomy. Public ownership is understood as state 
entrepreneurship. Private connotes all other forms of indust- 
rial and commercial ownership, whether by corporate bodies, 
partnerships or individual proprietors. 
Further, the private sector may be broken into its local 
and foreign segments. The former involves businesses run by 
indigenous Zambians, the latter of businesses of non-Zambian 
residents, and subsidiaries of multinational companies. This 
classification of economic structures is sufficient for our 
purposes, but it must not be thought that these categories are 
peculiarly watertight in Zambia. Business relationships in any 
economy are a complex tapestry, but in their historical 
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development, and for the purposes of the exposition we are 
seeking to make, our classification is sufficient. 
In the years prior to Economic Reforms of 1968 to 1970, 
the structure of the Zambian economy differed very little from 
that which was introduced and consolidated by pioneers of 
Zambian capitalism in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. The structure of economic ownership, like politics, 
was dominated by private and foreign interests. The British 
South Africa Company, the Anglo-American Corporation, and the 
Roan Selection Trust formed the nucleus with their interests in 
the mines and railway industries. When these diversified into 
engineering, construction, breweries, and transport they met 
with that other giant of Central African economies, London and 
Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho). Lonrho's interests 
in agriculture, hotels and distribution businesses coalesced 
with those of the mining companies at the centre and Asian 
traders on the fringe. At the same time, Standard and Barclays 
Bank Groups wrapped up the mix of private, foreign interests 
at the centre of the inherited structure of the Zambian economy 
with which the independence government of President Kaunda 
wrestled. None of this is new. We have seen in Chapters 2 and 3 
that criticism of the structure of Zambian colonial economy 
provided the basis of both nationalist struggles, and the 
specific direction of independence policies. 
That said, it would be wrong to imply that even by 1968 
Zambians were still in the same position regarding ownership of 
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commercial and industrial property as was the case in the 1940s 
and 50s. By this date some strides had been made by individual 
Zambians to join the ranks of business ownership. This was 
noticeable in agriculture, retail and transport businesses(26). 
Even so, it was commented as late as 1973 that: 
the vast majority of the new indigenous owning class could 
best be regarded as petty bourgeois, owning small 
enterprises, most in commerce and utilising a large 
component of family labour(27). 
The logic of the Economic Reforms was to seek to break at 
a stroke into the centre of the active economy - indeed to cut 
at such irritating home truths like 'Lo Government yena ka 
wena, lo malt yena ka tins' (a patois, roughly: the governuent 
is yours, the money is mine)(28). 
Though Kaunda's speech of November 1970, 'This Completes 
the Zambian Revolution', was immortalised by his government's 
failure to nationalise the private banking system, it is 
generally agreed that the economic reform policies were the 
success story of the post-colonial government(29). By the 
middle of the 1970s, Zambia had a different economic structure 
from the one inherited from the colonial system and Which was 
substantially in operation when participation policies were 
announced. The addition of both the state and indigenous 
Zambian operators was the most spectacular aspect of these eco- 
nomic developments. 
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3.2 The New Economic Structures and Participation Policies 
tihat is critical for an understanding of the context of 
the Zambian policies is the extent to which the new economic 
structures enhanced the potential for the development of 
workers' participation in management decisions. To what extent 
could the new centres of Zambian industry be persuaded to 
accommodate the notion of employee participation in decisions 
of companies? In the next three sub-sections, we attempt to 
answer this question in relation to each of the three centres 
of entrepreneurial activity which emerged with government 
policy in the late 60s: the emergent indigenous sector; the 
non-Zambian resident and multinational subsidiary sector; and 
the nationalised public sector. 
3.2.1 The emergent indigenous sector 
The symbiosis between the economic policies of Zambian 
Humanism and the making of the indigenous business class is a 
dimension of post-colonial developments which will need more 
research and analysis than is currently available(30). Even so, 
it is one of the salient features of the Zambian Economic 
Reforms of the late 1960s that they received little local 
opposition, especially from Zambians. What is more, the kind of 
public acrimony known to have been caused by business interests 
in Europe in the 1970s over industrial relations policies of 
workers' participation was hardly evident in Zambia. Some 
innuendos of opposition to the way things were going can be 
detected from historical sources, but in no way did this amount 
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to an articulated class position against workers' participation 
or the wholesale socialisation of the means of production. 
This failure by Zambians to put state policies to a 
thorough examination lay at the heart of Mitcheley's irritation 
when the Industrial Relations Bill came before Parliament in 
1971. Mitcheley, as the Member of Parliament for Gwembe North, 
and one of the last Whites to sit in the Zambian Parliament in 
the 1970s, became agitated when he saw that the Bill, contai- 
ning the provisions on workers' participation, was passing 
through Parliament without serious questioning from his fellow 
Members. The MP stood up and said, inter alia, 
The Bill, as a whole, Mr. Speaker Sir, is an important one 
and it more than worries me that a piece of legislation 
which was fought over night and day for not less than six 
months in the United Kingdom Parliament is going to go 
through this Parliament in a matter of hours(31). 
Despite the seriousness of Mitcheley's observation, his 
point was lost, and he was accused instead, of still patro- 
nising Africans(32)1 How can we explain this behaviour of 
Zambians? 
Part of the answer must be that nationalisation policies 
and their accompaniments were acceptable in the climate of the 
1960s, described by Richard Hyman as "a time of radicalism and 
innovation in social sciences"(33). The other reasons are 
historically specific to Zambia. First, because of the racial 
structure of colonial social society, where indigenous Zambians 
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were restricted in terms of social mobility, changes such as 
were introduced by the Zambian government were seen as 
inevitable. How else could the situation for Africans be 
improved in a short space of time within the logic of inherited 
structures of colonial capitalism? This consideration, we 
think, weighed on the minds of Zambians who had access to 
policy-making irrespective of their political affiliation. But 
the same reasoning should have affected the thinking of foreign 
operators in the country. The best way in which expatriate 
businessmen could protect their interests in a changing Zambia, 
as we shall indicate below, was not to oppose public measures 
directly, but to use their resources, experience and contacts 
to influence ultimate outcomes of Government decisions. 
From a purely Zambian perspective, lack of opposition to 
government measures even by the Official Opposition, which- 
existed throughout the initial years of economic reform 
policies, is indicative of another important sociological 
dimension. Precisely the elements most able to challenge 
government measures in the Zambian society of the 1960s were, 
in fact, the weakest. Either they were implicated in the making 
of these policies or, most probably, they were the persons who 
stood to gain most from the self-interested policies of the 
state. No malice is implied in this argument. The point is that 
the educated, senior civil servants, professional politicians 
and the up-coming Zambian entrepreneurs were the real 
beneficiaries of the spoils resulting from the dismantling of 
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the colonial economic and social order. The 1960s and early 
1970s indeed, were a period of great transformation in the 
fortunes of individuals who had the barest of personal 
credentials. It was happening in the mines, forces, civil 
service, and of course business(34). In this context, we can 
understand one reason why President Kaunda moved to a one Party 
State political system in 1972. That reason lay in the need to 
contain the turbulence of the economic policies of the 
Philosophy of Humanism. As politicians crossed from party to 
party in search of beneficial alliances in the new economic 
order, Kaunda read these political developments as disruptive 
to internal state cohesion in the midst of a troubled political 
region. For President Kaunda, One Party State system offered at 
least a retrieve from that turbulence at the political 
level(35). Kaunda brought the point home when he declared 
prophetically: 
The era in which political supporters with mercenary 
motives have switched loyalties depending upon the winds 
of political fortune must be buried in the sands of 
history(36). 
An article by Carolyn Baylies also brings interesting 
perspectives on the state and the indigenous class. For her, 
Zambia's Economic Reforms and the specific form they took, 
was an outcome of pressures on the state by indigenous artisans 
and petty traders who associated under the banner of Zambia 
African Traders' Association. These African traders demanded 
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specific favours from the state as against big business orga- 
nised by Zambia Industry and Commercial Association (Zincom) 
and Zambia Federation of Employers (ZFB)(37). But the intrigues 
really lay in the interaction between levels of political 
involvement and entrepreneurial activities. The higher one was 
on the political scale, the better placed he was to acquire 
businesses. Baylies and Szeftel emphasise: 
The political importance of businessmen, however, is not 
to be measured or inferred' merely from their presence in 
Parliament. The issue is more complex and involves the 
high intimate relation of indigenous capital and the 
state, evident in the extent to which high position in the 
party or state has served as a point of entry into the 
ranks of indigenous ovners(38). 
Given this analysis, what can we make of the disposition 
of the indigenous entrepreneurial sector to workers' partici- 
pation in management decisions? Did their tacit silence at the 
time of reforms signal approval of the principle of workers' 
participation in management decisions? No comprehensive answer 
can be given at this stage until we have reviewed responses to 
the implementation of workers' participation laws in Chapter 6. 
Nonetheless, the picture one forms from these materials is 
that whatever Humanism meant to President Kaunda personally, 
the majority saw programmes under its auspices as an oppor- 
tunity to escape from the bottom of society at which Africans 
were supposed to have been by reason of their skin. In this 
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sense, any initial support which the government had on Indus- 
trial Participatory Democracy was highly tentative. This asy- 
mmetry on the goals of participation policies will be met once 
more in the context of the work of IPD in Chapter 7 
For the moment, it is reasonable to conclude with some 
sense of scepticism about the disposition of the Zambian 
entrepreneurial class towards workers' participation policies. 
The indigenous class was, after all, the most vulnerable group 
of investors. Compared to foreign operators and the state, 
these lacked money; experience; management skills and wider 
business contacts in the world. In their circumstances', they 
supported industrial Participatory Democracy, if at all, only 
for the value which its rhetoric served them. This was 
obviously not a sound basis on which shared objectives could 
be developed with employers on workers' participation in 
management decisions. 
3.2.2 The resident and multinational subsidiaries sector 
A peculiar feature of this group of the Zambian economic 
structure is that it was their practices during the colonial 
period and early years of independence that provided the motive 
force for Economic Reforms, and workers' participation in 
particular. Portrayed as beneficiaries of the colonial system, 
they were a target group against whom the state sought to 
direct her social and economic policies. The nationalisation of 
the 1968-70 period affected mainly this group of investors. 
Vulnerable, as they were in the face of a determined state 
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bureaucracy, their best protection was not to confront govern- 
ment measures directly, but to work for results that would 
reduce the effects of government decisions. Other factors 
counselled foreign operators into this posture. 
For instance, the nationalisation measures undertaken in 
Zambia were not that confiscatory as history and rhetoric might 
suggest. Zambia was, after all, the land of the African Huma- 
nist. All President Kaunda asked for was a 51 per cent stake in 
the companies nationalised. 'Full and fair compensation' was 
promised for those shares. Once the owners of the foreign 
companies affected had got over the initial shock of the scale 
of government decisions, it was clear that not all had been 
lost for foreign investment in Zambia. For some companies, 
state participation could only be a welcome development in the 
uncertainties of Third World economies(39). 
The other consideration in the 1960s related to the 
scarcity of trained Zambian managers. Because of this manpower 
constraint, nationalisation policies did not mean sudden 
ascendancy of Zambians into managerial positions, especially 
beyond the post of Personnel Manager. Training for Zambians was 
emphasized, but by definition, that required much more time. In 
the meantime, former owners and their managers could still 
exercise authority, though of course, with increased 
consultation with representatives of the state(40). 
The opportunities to continue profitable investments 
without loss of immediate control of companies, led to a pheno- 
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menon of 'casual acquiescing' in state policies by the non- 
Zambian group of businessmen. So long as actual operation of 
state policies did not impose serious constraints on their 
operations, expatriates were ready to allow Zambians to 
indulge in whatever policies pleased them politically. Evidence 
suggests that whenever vital interests were threatened, the 
historically dominant expatriate group did not delay in using 
its resources, influence, experience and contacts to channel 
state policies into safer alleyways. The soft terms on which 
nationalisation policies were based might be a pointer(41), but 
the successful resistance to nationalisation of private banks 
would be a more accurate case. The latter provides an example 
of cases where more serious and imminent threats to private 
investment were identified. The demise, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5, of the original idea to enact a root and branch form 
of participation legislation is yet another example. 
We understand that the Zambian Commercial Farmers' Bureau 
(ZCF) was one employer association that effectively lobbied 
for the watering down of the Zambian legislation(42). What we 
are not told is why of all employer associations, farmers 
should have lead the role in opposing workers' participation 
policies? The history of Zambian industrial relations hardly 
focuses on activities of the farming community. Whatever 
implications participation laws had for the farming employers, 
it hardly justifies their thrust to the front on industrial 
Participatory Democracy. 
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Our suggestion is that the ZCF, whatever its own inte- 
rests, was acting more as an outlet of expatriate business 
resistance to workers' participation policies. The other 
employers' association in commerce and industry whose activi- 
ties were at the centre of economic reforms had become too 
dependent on the goodwill of the state to mount a vociferous 
challenge to its policies. But since prevention of radical 
legislation was essential, the co-operation of the least 
vulnerable group of employers was needed to keep in check 
institutionalisation of radical state policies in the statutes. 
If this view of foreign operators is sustained, the 
conclusion on their disposition to workers' participation 
policies seems obvious. Besides, these investors were the 
very group against which participation policies were targeted 
in 1969. In their situation, to have involved workers in a 
meaningful way would have amounted to cutting at the centre of 
their own remaining security - the ability to make their own 
judgments about their investments in the emerging order. All 
this has to be understood as being above the singularly 
important factor that decision-making is an element to which 
foreign investors, especially the multinational corporation, 
attach great importance. On the latter point alone, students of 
multinational corporations have exposed the paradox that the 
more the domestic situation becomes volatile, the more control 
is ceded to the centre (Regional or iiorld Headquarters)(43). 
In the circumstances of Zambian developments, what chance 
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could there have been for this group of investors to be 
favourably disposed towards implementation of workers' partici- 
pation policies in Zambia? Once more it would seem that the 
basis for shared objectives with these employers was absent. 
3.2.3 The nationalised state sector 
It is possible to argue that even if both the indigenous 
and foreign sectors of the economy were not disposed to the 
ideas of workers' participation in industry, the state sector 
was sufficient to carry out government policies. One can point 
here to the fact that despite the populist way in which 
arguments for Zambianisation of industry were framed, it was, 
in essence, the omnipotent state which actually became the 
greatest beneficiary of Economic Reforms. Through creativity, 
acquisitions and nationalisation, the state sector grew fron 
one company in 1964 to a total of over one hundred and twenty 
companies in 1986(44). , That is more, the conglomerate through 
which state entrepreneurship was organised in 1970 advertises 
itself thus, 
With an annual turnover in the region of a thousand 
million Kwacha, Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation 
(ZIMICO) with its 120 subsidiary and associate companies is 
not only the major force in the national economy but also 
ranks high among the great companies of the world. Zinco 
is a group of extremely diverse enterprises active in a 
wide range of vital sectors of the national economy, from 
the great mines of the Copperbelt to small village stores 
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in rural areas of the republic(45). 
Given that the state, also the purveyor of workers' 
participation policies, had access to a vast array of 
commercial and industrial companies, what reasons have we got 
to suspect that there were insufficient background conditions 
for enactment and implementation of participation legislation 
in Zambia? 
The answer cannot be obvious until we first confront the 
basic objective of workers' participation in industry. This 
involves the employees having the opportunity to participate 
in the decision-making and the capability - the information, 
skills and confidence - to take advantage of that opportunity. 
It involves above all, the likelihood that employees will be 
able to put views that are influential in the making of 
decisions in individual companies. These aspects of partici- 
pation in industry serve to alert us both to the existence of 
formal structures of decision-making and the ways in which 
those who occupy formal positions of power actually exercise 
that in order to realise their goals. These two are different 
both analytically, and in their implications for participation 
policies in industry. 
As to the formal structure of state enterprises in Zambia, 
this is discernible from the description of Zimco given below: 
Zimco, all of whose shares are owned by the state through 
the Minister of Finance, is not a direct part of govern- 
ment machinery, but operates along it in the economic 
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field. Zimco itself is controlled by a Board of Directors, 
whose Chairman is the President of the Republic, His 
Execellency Dr KD Kaunda: the board consists of cabinet 
ministers whose portfolios include economic sectors, heads 
of government development agencies, trade union leaders, 
and representatives of the private sector. Zimco is under 
the management of a Director General, assisted by Group 
Executive Directors... The Corporation's sectorial depart- 
ments are: Agriculture, Communications, Energy, Finance, 
Hotels, Industry, lining, Construction and Real Estate, 
Trading and Transport. Zimco's direct subsidiaries have 
each their own management, as do their subsidiaries, some 
are wholly owned and many with minority shareholders held 
by outside investors(46). 
The picture of state enterprise organisation seen through 
Zimco is that of a rigidly hierarchical set up, containing at 
the top the highest men in the land. This is the situation 
that has existed in Zambia since Zimco's incorporation on 
March 31 1970. Given the hierarchical organisation of state 
enterprises, what could have been the quality of opportunities 
available to ordinary workers to actually influence decisions 
at the enterprise level? 
The more disturbing reality of decisions in the Zambian 
state sector is that hierarchies have not been understood as 
the main problem. Rather, the problem, attested to by several 
studies, is the refusal by those politically powerful in the 
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country to live by the routine of hierarchy(47). The studies by 
Chaput (1971), Simwinga (1977), Mushota (1979) and fiulwila 
(1980) are all very relevant in this context. These studies 
indeed turn on its head the Managerial Revolution thesis 
discussed in the West since The Modern Corporation(48). 
The managerial revolution thesis postulates that in modern 
business corporations, managers have become the real depository 
of corporate powers to the extent that it can be said that 
shareholders have lost control. Though the correctness of this 
view has been contested in some quarters in the West itself, 
notably by writers like Maurice Zeitlin(49), the managerial 
revolution thesis is presented by many other influential 
students of management, like Alfred Chandler(50) and Oliver 
Williamson(51), as the conventional wisdom of commercial 
corporate civilisation. What the Zambian studies of corporate 
governance in the state sector show is that either the 
managerial revolution thesis is wrong or wholly inapplicable to 
Zambian developments. In Zambia, it was the state corporation 
managers themselves who were shown in one study after another 
to complain about their lack of control over their companies. 
Instead, what is shown is that the State, as the shareholder, 
called on its forces in society (primarily, the Party] to 
influence and direct decisions in individual companies. In the 
newly found freedom of expression one long time General Iianager 
in the state sector has lamented the past thus: 
Parastatals were overwhelmingly flooded with appointees 
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who were not accountable to the people and were incapable 
of functioning effectively. Economic management measures 
were not designed to be accountable to the people. The 
economy of Zambia, under One Party, were dictated by 
external institutions. The One Party system is incapable 
of managing the economy. It is not participatory, it is 
exclusive(52). 
Even allowing for the fact that this particular former 
state manager is a multi-party advocate (as the new reformers 
are called), and, hence, an interested witness, the weight of 
his submissions together with those of previous studies, and 
the actual hierarchical manifestation of the ZIMCO conglo- 
merate, tell us that the state sector was not, after all, the 
favourable ground for workers' participation policies. This 
conclusion is reached even before traversing the more 
theoretical question of what value do workers' participation 
policies serve in the nationalised sector of the economy(53)? 
3.3 Summary on economic structures and participation 
We have examined in this section the disposition of the 
Zambian industrial structures to the ideas of workers' partici- 
pation in management. Industrial structures were defined and 
divided into three principal segments. The indigenous private 
sector, the resident non-Zambian and multinational subsidiary 
sector and the state sector. What the above discussion shows is 
that in the specific historical setting of the Zambian poli- 
cies, each of these sectors possessed peculiarities sufficient 
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to rule out meaningful development of workers' participation. 
Tue indigenous sector was in its infancy, grappling its 
way through a concentrated, powerful but vulnerable foreign 
dominated private sector and the new but increasingly dominant 
public sector. The resident non-Zambian and multinational 
subsidiary was an aggrieved group to whom new industrial 
relations programmes could only have been additional and 
unwanted inconveniences. On the other hand, the state sector's 
own ascendancy to primacy in the economy seemed to be the 
greatest constraint to workers' participation. This was 
because of the increasing overlap between economic management 
and operation of the political process. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that Zambia's economic structures, like the 
political process, provided bleak background conditions for a 
successful implementation of workers' participation policies. 
4. Industrial Relations History and Development 
4.1 Introduction 
The discussion so far has painted a negative picture of 
the disposition of Zambia's political and economic structures 
towards the encouragement of workers' participation in mana- 
gement decisions. The point addressed in this section is 
whether there was anything in the history of Zambia's 
industrial relations or in the way it was developing in the 
1970s(54,55), which could have given to the Zambian Government 
encouragement to implement workers' participation in management 
decisions. In other words, to what extent was Batstone's 
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assertion that "schemes which apparently develop 'industrial 
democracy' have often been less an extension of worker 
influence than a recognition of its existence and an attempt to 
channel it"(56), a valid proposition in the Zambian experience? 
To throw light on this interesting and relevant dimension, 
it is necessary to examine how historical developments fed 
into the changes of the 1970s, and how, in turn, such changes, 
if any, were helpful to the cause of workers' participation in 
management decisions. Thus, section 4.2 presents a brief 
outline of the Zambian industrial relations system as it 
emerged at independence(57), and a brief review of changes 
introduced by the Zambian government before and after the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971. Finally, section 4.3 discusses 
how that history and the changes encouraged by the Industrial 
Relations Act fitted the scenario of workers' participation 
policies. 
4.2 Industrial Relations in Zambia up to 1971 
4.2.1 Historical Perspectives 
The foundations of industrial relations in Zambia were 
laid in those years which saw the emergence of a new, urban, 
industrial wage-earning labour force centred on the mines and 
railways(58). The colonial Government's attempts to ignore the 
realities of the African working force in the 1930s were 
challenged by African protests against the conditions of 
poverty and the racial discrimination from which they suffered. 
The Copperbelt miners' protests of 1935 and 1940 are by far the 
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most well known, not least because of the fatalities Africans 
suffered at the hands of colonial police(59) and the publicity 
of the Government Commissions of Inquiry into these 
incidents(60). But similar protests, though perhaps of less 
significance, occurred in the 1940s at Zambezi Saw Hills in the 
South, Kabwe Zinc and Lead mine in the Central, and Rhodesia 
Railways along the breadth of the country(61). 
Beyond the specific grievances which these protests aired, 
they were as well a demonstration of the ability of Africans 
to organise themselves which colonial authorities could not 
ignore. The authorities responded in 1944 with the creation of 
a Labour Department to advise on employment affairs; in 1947 
with the appointment of a Scottish Trade Union Labour Officer 
({Uilliam Comrie) to assist with the organisation of African 
trade unions; in 1949 with the passing of the Trade Union and 
Trade Disputes, and Industrial Conciliation Ordinances. The 
former recognised the right of Africans to form trade unions, 
and the latter offered state voluntary conciliation and 
arbitration procedures(62). 
The continued growth of the mining industry in the 1940s 
and 50s; of the civil service and agriculture after world war 
2; new stabilisation policies; and better awareness of 
capitalist production relations and the political system that 
was supporting it in Northern Rhodesia combined to influence 
the growth of African trade unionism in the decade after 1949. 
By 1954, "some sixteen unions had appeared and there were few 
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industries in which workers had not made some attempt to 
organise themselves within a trade union"(63). There were 18 
such registered unions in 1961, and 29 at independence in 1964- 
(64). The key issues on which they organised throughout the 
colonial period were "increased wages, improved working 
conditions, African advancement and an end to the industrial 
colour bar"(65). 
On the other hand, the framework of industrial relations 
ushered in by the 1949 colonial legislation was premissed on 
the then British system of voluntarism. The essence of it being 
that the state permits labour market parties, within narrowly 
defined criminal and tortious liabilities, to use their powers 
to negotiate mutually agreeable collective agreements 
enforceable in honour only(66). The appointment of the Scottish 
Trade Union officer was, in context, intended to steer African 
trade unionism towards that responsible trade unionism. This 
was the view echoed by the Northern Rhodesia Labour Commi- 
ssioner at the time of the 1949 legislation, 
The basis of a sound and healthy development in industrial 
relations has been laid and, providing reason and 
understanding are shown by all concerned, there is every 
reason to hope that future problems will be settled by 
peaceful negotiations(67). 
However, in the colonies, unlike in Britain, strains with 
a liberal model of industrial relations were discovered almost 
universally as soon as liberal legislation was enacted(68). A 
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combination of factors was responsible(69). But the decisive 
one seems to have been the expectation that colonial subjects 
would accept the broader environment of colonialism within 
which industrial relations was practised. 
Rejection of such premises by colonial subjects has 
provided the basis for the colonial 'political trade unionism' 
thesis -a description of how unionists used their given rights 
to organise to support nationalist movements(70). The colonial 
authorities saw this development as an 'abuse' of privileges, 
and moved legislation to control the internal organisation of 
trade unions. In Zambia, amendments to the Trade Union and 
Trade Disputes Ordinance in 1956 and 58 made union registration 
compulsory, imposed government supervision over trade union 
finances and introduced mandatory secret strike ballots(71). 
Much of this voluntarist framework survived the colonial 
system. This was certainly the case in conciliation and 
arbitration procedures, whose legislation was not amended. It 
was also the case with the structures and organisation of trade 
unions. These remained up to independence a matter for 
individual trade unions and trade unionists. The existence of 
multiplicity of unions in a very narrowly based industrial 
economy confirmed the preservation of rights of association. A 
glance at the sort of unions that were formed in the 19409 and 
50s show that craft unions, general unions, industrial unions 
and single-organisation unions were all represented in the 
Zambian structures of trade unions(72). This state of affairs 
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during colonialism led later to perceptions of a strong and 
independent trade unionism in colonial Zambia, and the decrying 
of all that had happened after national independence. Who can 
complain? 
It is interesting to note, however, that there is a great 
deal known about trade unions in colonial Zambia, both about 
their organisation and their relations with political parties. 
Splinter groups have invariably been interpreted in terms of 
personality clashes and political affiliations(73). In 
contrast, very little or nothing is known about the employer 
contribution to the fragmentation of trade unions in colonial 
Zambia. Yet, the role of employers in shaping trade union 
organisation is close to an elementary principle in industrial 
relations studies(74). In the Zambian case, it would be a 
strange discovery if the African low wages, poor conditions of 
service, and the entrenchment of racist practices were in no 
way related to the state of development in African trade union 
organisation. Some lessons in this respect could be drawn at 
least from the Scandinavian school of trade union power which 
suggests that individual trade union action in the face of 
well organised employers has serious drawbacks(75). Juxtaposed 
in the context of a racially organised colonial society, the 
folly of small multiple unions becomes self-evident. 
4.2.2 Developments after independence 
Though tempered by the legislation of late 1950s, the 
received industrial relations system was voluntary, at least to 
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the extent that it was still up to employees and employers to 
organise their relations within the framework of permissive 
legislation. The expectation - according to political 
scientists writing on state and trade unions in Zambia(76) - 
was that the independent government would move to restore even 
greater freedom of organisation to workers and their trade 
unions. If that had happened, the colonial era would have 
provided the learning of collective bargaining, and the 
independence, the practising of a more mature pluralist system 
of industrial relations. 
Once in power, however, the African government saw things 
differently. To be sure, the Kaunda Government agreed to 
improve individual employment rights, if only to remove racial 
and discriminatory provisions and to provide minimum conditions 
of service and security of employment(77). On the trade unions 
however, the state identified the organisation of the trade 
unions as lying at the heart of the 'independence crisis' in 
industrial relations. Thus, the government responded with a 
policy of 'One` Industry, One Union'. This translated into a 
requirement for major reorganisation of all the trade unions. 
More controversially, the Government enacted legislation - the 
Trade Union and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act 1964, just two' 
months after independence, whose objective was "the closer 
regulation of both trade unions and trade union leaders"(78). 
The significant point here is that such changes as were 
undertaken by the Zambian Government in the structure and 
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organisation of trade unions were so during a critical time 
in their relations between African employees and their White 
employers. The reorganisation had implications for the ability 
of unions to organise and demonstrate their institutional 
capabilities as agents of change. As it happened, in fact, it 
was the Government itself through legislation and a series of 
Commissions of Inquiry that did so much of the unions' job of 
transforming labour practices from. their colonial setting(79). 
However laudable or otherwise such state action might have 
been, it questioned the effective lead, and cast doubt on the 
authority, and legitimacy, of the trade union officialdom. The 
matter was exasperated by the practice in -early years of 
independence to draw Labour Ministers from the ranks of former 
trade union leaders(80). The tutelage implied in the relation- 
ship added to the conflicts between the unions and the state 
because the latter came to be viewed increasingly as being very 
interventionist in affairs which hitherto had been the domain 
of trade unions(81). 
Three years after independence much of the trade union 
reorganisation had occurred, and in the direction demanded by 
the state. The colonial labour legislation had been revised. 
Hence, it seemed the time for restoring the initiative in 
industrial relations to the labour market parties. To this end, 
both employers and trade unions were urged by the President and 
Ministers to take their responsibilities seriously in the new 
Zambia. The Livingstone Labour Conference of April 1967 is 
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perhaps the most remembered government exercise in attempts to 
restore the conduct of industrial relations to the primary 
parties of the labour market. In Appendix B are lists of 
pledges to which both the trade unions and employer organi- 
sations committed themselves in accepting responsibility for a 
voluntarist conduct of workplace industrial relations. 
Yet, for all the solemnity of the trade union and employer 
pledges in 1967, all was to be thrown in jeopardy in April of 
the following year. Indeed, as was explained in Chapter 3, it 
was the same April of 1967, when employers, trade unions and 
government officials from the Ministry of Labour were working 
out a reconciliatory framework of industrial relations in 
Livingstone, that President Kaunda was himself putting forward 
his submissions on the Philosophy of Humanism. From then on, 
things were to be different. Subjects which had hitherto been 
glossed over in the interest of harmony, and perhaps appearing 
reasonable, were raised directly. Issues pertaining to the 
repatriation of profits, the lack of opportunities for Zambian 
entrepreneurship, the slow pace of Zambianisation in industry, 
the pitiful rural poverty and a host of other colonial misdeeds 
were laid on the political agenda to lend moral legitimacy to 
new and radical policy programmes. 
The aftermath, as we now know, was a transformation with 
great implications for industrial relations. old employers, if 
they survived, were placed under a veil of insecurity. New 
Zambian managers and employers were in the ascendancy, and 
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above all the state was emerging as the largest employer of 
industrial and commercial labour. All these changes in the 
employment situation, and for a variety of other reasons, 
necessitated a rethink of the industrial relations legal 
framework. Hence, the coming of the 1971 Act. 
4.2.3 Principles of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 
The main purpose of the Industrial Relations Act was to 
consolidate the legislation in the Trade Union and Trade 
Disputes and Industrial Conciliation Acts. However, in so 
doing, it took on a very creative role of its own. Apart from 
enacting for the right of the workers to belong to trade 
unions; the right not to be dismissed for, trade union acti- 
vities; the right to paid time off for trade union business; 
and the outlawing of certain discriminatory practices(82), the 
legislation created a new Industrial Relations Court and 
enacted the provisions which are the main subject of this 
study(83). 
At a theoretical level, the thrust of the Act was to 
transform the voluntary framework of previous legislation into 
what has been called the 'juridification' of industrial rela- 
tions. As used by Simitis(84), Clark(85) and others(86), 
'juridification' of industrial relations is understood as "the 
extent to which the behaviour of employers and trade unions in 
dealing with individual and collective employment issues is 
determined by reference to legal norms and procedures, rather 
than to voluntarily agreed norms and procedures or to 'custom 
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and practices'" (87). In other words, this is a system where 
interaction of employers, trade unions and state agencies are 
locked within the operation of previously announced legal 
provisions. The net effect of juridification being that the 
freedom of labour market parties to conduct their relations is 
constrained by a much more awareness of legal provisions and 
their operation in the industrial relations system. 
Translated, the new Zambian law assured all employees and 
employers the right of association and freedom of organisation, 
but at the same time recognised in each case only one peak 
organisation for trade unions and employer organisations. The 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zambia 
Federation of Employers (ZFE) were the respective peak 
organisations of which all registered trade unions and employer 
associations were deemed to have affiliated on registration 
with the Commissioner of labour(88). The law also mandated the 
formation of joint councils at industry level, and bargaining 
units at enterprise level for the purposes of collective 
bargaining(89). Furthermore, every employer 
employing twenty-five or more eligible employees... shall 
register himself with the Commissioner within a period of 
three months..., and not later than three months from that 
date, he shall enter into a recognition agreement(90). 
The net effect here was to compel collective bargaining at 
the largest scale. This requirement was made more stringent by 
the provisions demanding that both the collective and 
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recognition agreements should be subject to registration and 
the terms thereof approved by the Industrial Relations 
Court(91). Consistently too, the new law made conciliation 
procedures mandatory, and procedures for dispute settlement 
strictly laid down in law(92). The final results were that 
while the rights to strike and lock-out were acknowledged, 
formal procedures and provisions which declared decisions of 
the Industrial Relations Court final and binding(93) ruled out 
any legal recourse to self-help remedies in the new framework 
of industrial relations. 
4.2.4 Implications for workers' participation policies 
Against this background to industrial relations history 
and development, what can be said about susceptibility of the 
Zambian industrial relations system to the policies of 
workers' participation in management decisions? 
On the face of it, the description of Zambia's industrial 
relations history and development does not seem to cause 
particular problems. The industrial relations system had been 
subjected to a series of leaps over the years, and there is no 
reason to suggest it would be unable to absorb the shocks 
coming from the need to implement workers' participation. 
Therefore, providing workers' participation legislation took 
into account and accommodated the changes occurring elsewhere, 
the materials we have considered do not suggest necessary 
conflicts with the principles of workers' participation. After 
all, the countries of Western Europe where the concept of 
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juridification finds its origin are the ones renowned for the 
schemes of workers' participation in management decisions. 
The above judgement however needs to be placed in context. 
It is obvious from the scope of the Industrial Relations Act 
that juridification, if that is what it was, was pushing in too 
many compulsory institutional arrangements which required a lot 
of learning from both employers and employees. Thus, even 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was no 
opposition in principle to workers' participation by employers 
and the trade unions, the situation presented was open to 
prioritisation. In that event, experience would suggest that 
employers and employees would want to pay attention to the 
institutions of collective bargaining because these were the 
most known and best understood. In practice however, as we 
shall see in Chapter 6, it was the extra-legal institutions 
demanded by the Party at places of work that did so much to 
complicate an already fluid institutional development. 
Therefore, even from the point of view of industrial 
relations history and development, the question must be asked 
whether Zambia was prepared for workers' participation 
policies. The materials we have consulted point to a different 
picture which is unlikely to validate the dictum of Ratstone, 
at least in its explicit recognition of the role of the labour 
market actors in the evolution of participation policies. 
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5. The Legal Framework of Company Decision-Making 
Until 1969, the subject of workers' participation was 
relatively unknown in Zambia. The idea that workers might 
participate as of right in decisions of companies was entirely 
foreign to the Zambian legal order. In this section we examine 
in brief the nature of the legal system in which workers' 
participation laws were advocated. We also see what legal 
framework existed for decision making in business companies. 
The object is to highlight the existence of one important 
barrier and constraint to participation policies upon which the 
state was required to act in order to facilitate the devolution 
of responsibility and authority for decision making in 
companies to the workers. 
5.1 The Zambian Legal System 
The Zambian legal system belongs to the common law family 
of Western legal systems(94). Like other common law juris- 
dictions, the foundations of Zambian law are in the common law 
of England. The specific reasons for this connection of legal 
systems has to be found in the history of modern Zambia 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Hence, Chapter 4 of the Lawn of Zambia, 
which is the English Law (Extent of Application) Act, declares 
English law enforceable in Zambia as consisting of: 
(a) the common law; 
(b) the doctrines of equity; 
(c) statutes which were in force in England on 17 August 
1911; 
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(d) any statutes of later date than that mentioned in 
(c), applied to Northern Rhodesia or applied to 
Zambia thereafter by an Act passed by the Zambian 
Parliament. 
At the same time,, Chapter 5 of the Laws of Zambia, which 
is the British Acts Extension Act, provides for certain 
British statutes to be of direct application to Zambia. Some 
twelve such statutes appear in the schedule of the current 
publication of the Laws of Zambia(95). The practical effect of 
Chapter 5 is to import wholesale English law at a particular 
time in history. But there are still other Zambian statutes 
which purport to import English law as it continues to change 
in response to changing circumstances of the British people. 
The High Court Act, Chapter 54 is a good example. This gives 
the law and practice in probate and matrimonial causes, and the 
rules of procedure in the Zambian High Court (in default of 
local rules) as English law 'as it exists'(96) 
The result is that the Zambian legal system, even many 
years after national independence, still depends, to a 
considerable degree, on English legal rules and their 
underlying assumptions in the common law. The matter in point 
is particularly pertinent in the area of commercial law. In 
this area, the common law, principles of equity and old English 
statutes remain the dominant sources of Zambian commercial 
law(97). Since we are concerned in this thesis with decision- 
making in companies, the relevant branch of English law is 
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Company law whose statute in Zambia is the Companies Act, 
Chapter 686 of the Laws of Zambia. 
5.2 Company law and company decision-making. 
The foundation of Companies legislation in Zambia is 
Proclamation 18 of 1921. It is this which brought in Northern 
Rhodesia the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 
(98). Throughout the Colonial period that legislation remained 
the principal companies legislation, and was the one inherited 
for the organisation and administration of business companies 
at independence. So, when President Kaunda called for changes 
to Company law in 1969 in order to accommodate workers' 
participation policies, he was referring to a company law which 
in Zambia still dated to 1908. It is not really the antiquity 
of the legislation which matters to policies of workers' 
participation, but the organisation of decision-making in 
companies under the common law regime. 
Under the common law, company law provides a legal 
structure of decision making which operates in the main to 
protect interests of those who provide capital. In the words of 
Tom Hadden, "company law is about capitalism. It provides the 
formal legal structure necessary to the operation of the 
capitalist system"(99). Typically, a relatively independent 
board of directors is elected by shareholders and is given 
responsibility for pursuing corporate interests. The 
Shareholder General Meeting decides on matters specifically not 
delegated to the board. But on both counts, the liability of 
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the board of directors and the test for the validity of 
shareholder resolutions are generated through the perspective 
of company interests(100). 
In Zambia, the interests of the company have remained 
strictly the interests of the shareholders. This is because 
there has not been any major changes to the law since the Act 
of 1908(101). Thus, to the extent that workers' participation 
meant involvement of the employees in the formal structures of 
decision-making, the new Zambian industrial relations policy 
constituted a fundamental attack on the authority system then 
protected by company law. The English company law present in 
Zambia in 1969 was far from being receptive to notions of 
workers' participation in management decisions. Progress 
depended therefore on how well the Zambian authorities could 
address the barriers and constraints in the received company 
law structures. Whether or not the government would be able to 
disrupt the received system of decision-making in a substantial 
and material way depended ultimately on the legislation 
introduced in Parliament. lie review typologies of participation 
legislation, and discuss the scheme particularly enacted by the 
Zambian Parliament in 1971 in the next Chapter. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The object of this Chapter was to survey the context in 
which workers' participation policies were advocated by the 
Zambian Government in 1969. Context was defined in terms of 
the underlying structural and institutional arrangements 
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supportive of policies of workers' participation. Four 
contextual elements assumed fundamental to development of 
industrial relations policies of workers' participation were 
isolated for examination and analysis. 
The result of our discussion indicates that there was 
little in the political arrangements, economic structures, 
industrial relations history and developments or company law 
system in the 1970s which could have given encouragement to 
the Zambian Government to embark on its programme of Industrial 
Participatory Democracy. These findings on the actual 
contextual situation in Zambia are consistent with the views 
expressed in Chapter 3 that the programme of workers' 
participation was started not in response to pressures in 
industrial relations as was the case in Europe, but rather as 
an elitist construct drummed up by the state or those who 
represented it. The purpose, we have argued, was to pursue 
socio-political goals of Zambian participation in the ownership 
and control of active commercial and industrial segments of the 
national economy. 
In the remainder of this study, we shall suggest that it 
is through understanding these original ambiguities in which 
the Zambian industrial relations policy was born that we can 
explain the confusion, uncertainties and contradictions which 
have marked the progress of the Zambian participation policy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PARTICIPATION: THE 1971 LEGISLATION 
Introduction 
Legislation formed an important plank in the Zambian 
programme to implement workers' participation in industry. In 
1969, however, the details of the law in terms of the scope and 
nature of relations it was to create among the parties in 
industry were not specified. That object was accomplished by 
Part 7 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. The aim of this 
Chapter is to examine and analyse that legislation. By 
explaining the government's approach in 1971, and outlining 
both the procedural and substantive elements of the Act, this 
Chapter seeks to assess the significance of the Zambian 
legislation. What, if anything, did the legislation achieve to 
change the law of decision-making in Zambia? 
As previously stressed, Zambia had no experience in 
workers' participation laws prior to 1971. Despite this, no 
attempts had been made by the government to discuss the legi- 
slative proposals widely, for instance, creating tripartite/- 
specialist bodies to study more systematically the different 
approaches to participation policies and the associated actions 
aimed at bringing about the widespread application of Indus- 
trial Participatory Democracy. In the circumstances, and in 
order to provide a basis on which to examine and assess the 
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Zambian legislation, it seems useful to attempt initially a 
general survey of workers' participation laws. There are three 
aspects we want to emphasise in looking at the international 
context of participation legislation: (A) the general assump- 
tions underlying attempts at greater workers' participation or 
industrial democracy laws; (B) the divergences and their causes 
in national approaches to participation legislation; (C) the 
patterns or typologies of participation laws discernible. There 
is no intention, however, to describe in details the different 
approaches to workers' participation laws in this thesis(l). We 
are looking at the international materials to make two related 
points. First, that the position of law in participation 
policies reveals important differences between countries, which 
relate not only to national histories but also more peculiarly 
to the degrees of acceptance of participation practices under- 
pinned by legislation. Secondly, that a number of contentious 
questions are involved in framing participation legislation, 
not least what to do with ownership rights, the received 
structure of company law and the role and influence of the 
trade unions. We shall also emphasise that the combination of 
these factors, and the way they are resolved, often determine 
the characteristic features of national legislation. 
1. The International Context of Participation Legislation 
1.1 The Assumptions of Participation Laws 
The Zambian Government presented workers' participation 
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law as a means by which employees could be given rights and 
influence in decisions of companies. To what extent has this 
normative assumption been a feature of defining approaches to 
workers' participation laws in other countries? One way to 
approach the question is to search through the literature and 
ask whether there are any discernible views that stand out for 
isolation as the main underlying assumptions of workers' 
participation laws. The results of our survey may be summarised 
as follows: most of those who seek to define legal solutions to 
the question of workers' participation in industry start their 
definition of the problem from a criticism of the way authority 
and responsibility was historically distributed and sanctioned 
among the various elements involved in the capitalist system of 
production. The formal exclusion of workers in processes of 
company decisions is the starting point of the many political 
and academic views critical of the received structure of 
industrial governance. Thus, the assumption of the need to 
change the received structure of industrial governance is what 
appears to give workers' participation laws their historical 
validity, social, economic and political significance(2). 
Others may contest this as a partial definition of the 
assumptions of workers' participation laws(3), but it is one we 
find well represented among those who advocate greater workers' 
participation or industrial democracy laws. 
In a study of the development of the theory of Enterprise 
Law, Thomas Raiser sets the scene of this view of workers' 
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participation laws(4). In a finding which echoes the counsel of 
historian, Eric Hobsbawm(5), Raiser points out that the 
"organisational law of economic enterprises lies in the 
commercial and company law as this developed during the 19th 
century"(6). From this perspective, Raiser sketches histori- 
cally the influence of liberal conceptions of the economy on 
the development of commercial jurisprudence. The essence of his 
analysis shows that even with the rise of industrial production 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, the merchant of 
early capitalism remained the 'paradigmatic legal actor' in the 
minds of draftsmen of Company and Commercial Codes. This 
resulted in a situation in which general incorporation laws 
attributed the legal personality of corporations to the 
association of owners, with the further consequence that 
shareholders, like merchants and partners before them, were 
the only subjects of legal rights and duties arising from 
activities of industrial and commercial enterprises(7). 
It is suggested by the same learned author that the main 
reason for these developments in commercial law was to 
'represent and preserve' the classic theory of the market 
economy in the period where, 
The prototype is the sole trader, who carries on his 
business alone or with his family, personally handles the 
daily work, and is personally liable for business 
debts(8). 
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Raiser's argument is that the implication of that course 
of development in commercial jurisprudence was to marginalise 
the potential role of employees in decisions of companies. In 
the specific context of German developments, he has summarised 
the 19th century juridical position of employees in commercial 
law thus: 
Almost entirely outside the horizon of commercial and 
company law are the employees. The Commercial Code 
contains 25 paragraphs concerning the rights and duties of 
commercial employees and apprentices, but this is not a 
comprehensive regulation of the contract of employment. 
Labour law as a separate field has not emerged. Above all, 
the participation and codetermination rights of employees 
and unions, and their influence on entrepreneurial 
decisions are still unknown(9). 
The underlying social and economic policies under which 
employees came to be marginalised in company legislation are 
not the issues we are interested in presently(10). The 
essential point expressed by Raiser is that since those 
formative years of industrial and commercial capitalism, 
interests of shareholders or investors of capital in general 
have set the concrete legal standards in the design of internal 
structures of decision making in industrial and commercial 
companies(11). 
Against this background, workers' participation laws are 
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understood as deriving from the criticism of the historical 
legal model under which "only the entrepreneur and shareholder 
appear as subjects of the economic process occurring within the 
enterprise"(12). This thesis has relevance for much of the 
discussion of workers' participation laws that occurred in 
many countries in the 1960s and 70s. That is, the criticism of 
the received structure of corporate law is what galvanised 
intellectual and political support for corporate law reforms in 
the 1970s. The calls have been towards for a new framework 
allowing for the devolution of responsibility and authority for 
decision-making in companies to ordinary employees and their 
representatives. 
In Corporation_ Law As 
_If 
People Mattered, Christopher 
-------- --- ---- 
Axworthy concentrates on the need to change organising concepts 
of company law so that they acknowledge and reflect the role of 
employees in business companies. Writing from a Canadian pers- 
pective, Axworthy notes that, 
Despite the obviously critical role of employees in any 
corporate activity, employees hardly exist in the Canadian 
corporation law view of the world(13). 
From this perspective Axworthy urges "reform of corpora- 
tion law to ensure that employees have a say in the management 
of their corporations and that their interests are adequately 
considered by corporations"(14). 
In Britain, Bob Hepple expressed similar views when he 
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asked, "What About the Workers? "(15), in an angled criticism of 
the British law of company decisions. According to Hepple, 
"existing company law and labour law leave workers out in the 
cold, as voteless spectators in decisions which may vitally 
affect their lives"(16) 
From Sweden, Higgins explains that the pressures for 
workers' participation laws in that country in the 1970s were 
motivated by a desire to, 
narrow the bourgeois lead in power resources; generate 
higher ambitions and challenge bourgeois power on a 
broader front than that represented by the point of 
production(17). 
Another writer on Sweden, Meidner, elaborates on what it 
actually meant to bring about rights of consultation, increased 
influence for employees and trade union codetermination rights 
at plant level in the Swedish economy. According to Meidner, 
the process of bringing workers' participation laws meant: 
departing from the principle of the sole right of 
employers to make decisions at places of work. It meant an 
actual formal declaration of the nullity of the 
partnership Agreement of 1938. It meant the renunciation 
of the ideas of harmony which had dominated the Swedish 
labour market for more than three decades(18). 
From all these various authorities, it is reasonable to 
conclude that workers' participation laws appear, at their 
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core, to express a normative principle about the rights of 
workers to participate in decisions of companies. Viewed as a 
critique of the vestiges of classical liberalism still felt in 
much company legislation, participation laws import, on their 
part, a fundamental attack at the received authority structure 
of industrial enterprises. To this extent, and on this point, 
the assumptions of participation laws in the international 
context were in accord with the Zambian policy statements 
reported in this study. Like other advocates of industrial 
democracy, the Zambian government was strong at criticising the 
capitalist system of industrial governance. 
1.2 Dive r sen ces and causes in national state- legislation 
---- ------------------- 
Despite the commonality of ideas with which many advocates 
of greater workers' participation have approached their 
problem, the laws enacted in different countries, exhibit 
different institutional structures, techniques of empowerment 
and even underlying philosophies(19). The question to ask is 
what explains the divergences in national state legislation on 
participation laws? There are at least two broad views which 
explain the divergences in participation legislation across 
national systems. 
The first, relates to the plurality of purposes of 
workers' participation laws. Contrary to the impression crea- 
ted above, not all legislated schemes of workers' participation 
have been motivated by a desire on the part of policy makers 
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to effect changes in the historically derived structures of 
power in companies. In the literature on workers' partici- 
pation, there is found a considerable body of research 
suggesting that some workers' participation programmes in 
industry owe their ancestry to influences of different factors. 
These would include, for example, prescriptions of the Human 
Relations School of thought(20), results of Alienation and 
Motivation Experiments of Industrial Psychologists(21) and 
philosophical beliefs' of individual industrialists(22). The 
distinction is sometimes made that programmes of workers' 
participation following on these strands of influences are not 
underpinned by legislation(23). But the case for that view can 
never be made in clear cut terms because of the impossibility 
of ascertaining motives of individuals and groups participating 
in the legislative process. The possibility therefore exists 
that some legislated schemes of workers' participation might be 
informed by different arguments, or at least a mixture of them. 
In that case, such plurality of purposes of workers' 
participation laws may explain the divergences to theoretical 
and philosophical approaches to workers' participation laws. 
The second explanation for these divergences emphasises 
the inherent difficulties of common approach to institutions of 
workers' participation under different power constellations, 
bargaining processes and specificity of earlier state inter- 
vention in industrial relations. This point has been expressed 
more forcefully by Andt Sorge in his study of the long-term 
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evolution of institutions of workers' participation in the 
European Economic Community(24). Sorge stresses the unique role 
of contextual factors in shaping the form and content of 
workers' participation laws in different countries. According 
to his 'constellation of constraints to rationality' thesis, 
approaches to workers' participation laws across national 
systems have been bounded by factors such as the nature of 
legal systems, the value systems of trade union movements, the 
position and strength of employer and employee organisations. 
Sorge found too that the way the state has historically 
intervened in industrial relations was crucial to attitudes to 
participation legislation, and determined whether legislation 
was enacted, and with what quality. The differences between 
Britain, France and Germany were taken to establish a taxonomy 
of the influences of historical and contextual factors on 
participation laws. In essence, Sorge's arguments imply that 
even if the functional aims of workers' participation laws were 
to be the same in all countries (for instance, to distribute 
the authority to make decisions in companies more equitably 
between employers and employees), it would be unlikely that the 
same rules and same structures of participation could be 
followed because each country is constrained to recognise the 
limitations of historical circumstances, particularly the power 
of employers, the disposition of trade unions, and the extent 
and methods by which the state had previously intervened in 
industrial relations. 
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Similar arguments have been followed by David Marsden in 
his examination of the cases of Germany, France and Britain. 
Marsden studied how proposals for workers' participation laws 
were approached and treated by the Biedenkopf Commission in 
Germany, the Sudreau Commission in France and the Bullock 
Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy in Britain. He 
found that each of the above national commissions attempted to 
formulate solutions to the workers' participation question in 
accordance with the manner with which each state had previously 
regulated the 'frontiers of control'(25). 
What has been indicated so far is that there are objective 
reasons why workers' participation laws occur in different 
forms. Different motives are at times the reason, but 
differences in national circumstances explain more of the 
existing divergences in the form and content of participation 
legislation. Not surprisingly, these different approaches have 
entailed different increases in employee representation in 
decisions of companies. As is explained by both Sorge and 
Marsden, while some historical conjunctures have facilitated 
greater workers' participation laws, others have been a 
hindrance to this development. The political circumstances of 
Germany at the end of the two World Wars, according to Sorge, 
created conditions under which workers could be given 
'considerable elbow room by the state' in decisions of 
industry. On the other hand, in other European states, France 
included, the absence of favourable conjunctures meant that 
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state attempts at workers' participation "were too afraid of 
conflicts between employers and workers to prevent it, and too 
consciously steeped in integrative motivations to really 
achieve integration"(26). 
This analysis of the reasons for the divergences in 
participation legislation is significant too for the paradox it 
creates: unless historical conditions and circumstances favour 
a larger step forward, the risk is that attachment to social 
values in industrial relations of the status quo ante might be 
exacerbated. This point was also made by Hugh Clegg. Clegg 
denied that implementation of the systems of worker 
representation on boards of companies in the United Kingdom 
would have similar industrial relations effects they have had 
in Sweden and Germany. According to Clegg, "the excellent post 
war industrial relations records of Sweden and West Germany are 
due to other features of the industrial relations systems in 
those two countries, especially the works councils of Germany 
and the centralisation of power in the confederations of both 
unions and employers in Sweden"(27). What is emphasized is that 
changing only one element of the decision process may be 
insufficient if other considerations, including the attitudes 
of labour market parties, remain unaffected. 
In conclusion, what the above discussion establishes is 
that workers' participation laws exhibit different approaches, 
for different reasons and with varying consequences for the 
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central idea of workers' participation in management decisions. 
1.3. ordering the particiation law typologies 
To analyse the efficacy of specific national arrangements, 
such as were attempted by the Zambian Government in 1971, it 
is helpful to build, on the basis of international experience, 
a typology of workers' participation laws. A useful way is to 
attempt a crude ordering of participation laws according to 
different levels of acceptance of the idea of workers' 
participation underpinned by legislation. It is conceded that 
'different levels of acceptance' as measured by the schemes of 
law enacted in different countries is an imprecise measure of 
political consensus, but it is thought that the subjectivity 
involved goes beyond intuition. We would argue in fact that 
much of the political and academic debate surrounding workers' 
participation policies could be interpreted and understood more 
in terms of an orientation towards the acceptance of law as the 
means to promote participation policies(28). Granted this 
criterion, we can distinguish three different levels of 
acceptance of law in workers' participation policies. These may 
also be presented as an ascending spectrum of A) No law, B) 
Management Law and C) Worker Law. 
A) The No Law 1.12012 (. 29) 
One extreme view of the position of law in workers' 
participation policies accepts no more than the 'liberal 
settlement'(30). At times called the Oxford School of 
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industrial relations in its British context, this perspective 
holds that traditional arrangements in the administration of 
companies which involve trade union organisations are an 
adequate and sufficient expression of workers' participation in 
management decisions(31). In general, it is a perspective 
critical of workers' participation laws, holding that these 
would disrupt the equilibrium of the production system under 
which= 
contractual freedom and ownership define the procedure for 
human interaction and generate incentives for each 
individual to seek the most preferred solutions for 
himself, given other people's right to do like wise(32). 
When consideration has been given to schemes of workers' 
participation beyond established trade union structures, the 
primary purpose of participation arrangements has been to 
engender and reinforce a sense of community between employers 
and the employees. The methods preferred entail voluntary 
management initiatives tailored to the particular history and 
circumstances of individual companies. The North American 
experience of workers' participation policies exemplifies the 
No Law Typology, though a great deal of these attitudes can 
also be detected from much of the main common law juris- 
dictions(33). 
B) The Management Typology 
The second view of the position of law in workers' parti- 
-211- 
cipation accepts some measure of state intervention and 
generally joins in the criticism of the 'liberal settlement' 
in industrial relations. It is argued that the instrumentality 
of collective bargaining, especially in its traditional con- 
fines to wages and conditions of service, was a poor deal 
forced on weak unions by powerful employers and their landed 
political allies in the 19th century. Alternatively, the system 
of collective bargaining perpetuates a conflict model of 
industrial relations from which modern industrial relations 
practice ought to escape. On either view, it is accepted that 
new policies and practices should be tried in order to foster 
at least better communication and consultation between 
employers and employees over and above the mechanisms provided 
by trade union structures. Though legislation is not considered 
the ideal instrument, its advantages of compelling new prac- 
tices on a wider scale are acknowledged. 
The workers' participation laws which establish machinery 
for consultation and information dissemination between workers 
and management are understood to flow from this strand of 
ideas. Most works council legislation not accompanied by 
changes in company legislation would fall into the MANAGEMENT 
TYPOLOGY category. Specifically included are works councils 
composed of the management and employee representatives like 
the ones described for France, Belgium and Denmark(34). The 
reason is that these cooperation councils are the real 
management 'sounding boa rds' by design. These councils are 
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structured so that the initiative and final powers in 
decisions are left firmly, in law at least, in the hands of 
shareholders and their management representatives. 
Another set of participation laws which we could place 
into the MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY are the Employee Interest Legis- 
lation. As the name suggests, this is the legislation which 
requires recognised organs of company management to take into 
account the interests of employees when making company 
decisions with potential implications for employee welfare and 
job security. A typical example is provided by British 
legislation. 
Under section 309 of the Companies Act 1985, 
The matters to which the directors of a company are to 
have regard in the performance of their functions include 
the interests of the company's employees in general, as 
well as the interests of its members. 
Farrar points that this legislation "represents the first 
tentative steps towards recognising the employees' role in the 
enterprise"(35). There is another British legislation which 
requires directors of companies with more than 250 employees 
to state in their annual reports what they have done over the 
year to promote employee involvement arrangements(36). 
These pieces of British legislation, like the type of 
works councils mentioned above, indicate minimal attempts by 
the different state authorities to directly influence changes 
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in company decisions. The efforts, however, are still cons- 
trained, to a larger degree, by a certain understanding of the 
place of employees and the trade unions in market economies. 
Within the context of British debates on workers' participation 
laws, Dennis Lawrence has argued thus: 
In a free society, if trade unions want the rights of 
ownership (taken as valid criteria to rights of decision 
making), they cannot expect to get them as a free gift and 
call it industrial democracy. They will have to buy out 
the owners. And with the rights, they would get the 
obligations, too(37). 
It is such reservations of managerial and ownership rights 
which justify the terminology employed to describe the MANA- 
GEMENT TYPOLOGY. Decision making in industry is still regarded 
as the prerogative of managers and owners, though, to a limited 
extent, and for specified purposes, participation legislation 
is tolerated. 
C) The Worker Torpolo y 
The third and final strand of views on participation law 
may be presented as that which regards as anachronistic a legal 
model which places at the centre of company decision-making 
only the providers of capital and their representatives. 
Exponents of this view seek to create a new structure of 
rights and duties in the administration of companies. The more 
abstract of this seeks to recognise the enterprise as a social 
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system and an economic power requiring a new legal science 
that, 
Links and combines company law and labour law in order to 
clarify in detail the legal rights and duties of the 
representatives of employees and the negotiation processes 
of owners, employees, and managers(38). 
An example is the call by David Ellerman in the United 
States for constitutional decrees to reverse contractual 
relationships in capitalist corporations. For Ellerman, "any 
serious attempt to establish organisational democracy must 
challenge that direct control right which defines the employer- 
employee relationship"(39). At once we can see that there is an 
upward shift of the peg from ideas which make up the MANAGEMENT 
TYPOLOGY to those we identify as the WORKER TYPOLOGY. In the 
latter, there is a promise to institute fundamental changes in 
the authority structure of companies, similar in frame to how 
the Zambian Government presented its policies on participation. 
Among the laws we include in the WORKER TYPOLOGY are the 
different Works Councils in Austria and Germany. These councils 
are composed wholly of employees, and possess statutory rights 
to decide certain matters relevant to employees. The Austrian 
works council in particular, with its own Works Council Fund, 
is reckoned by one comparative study of European Employee 
councils to be a powerful institution of employee governance in 
Austrian companies(40). Compared with works councils which are 
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joint institutions of workers and the management, councils 
which are composed only of employees are an obvious conceptual 
improvement in underpinning workers' participation policies by 
legislation. This is because a specific place is created for 
employees to take their own role in the decision-making process 
of companies. 
There is also legislation in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Sweden which requires minority employee 
participation on company boards of directors. Though limited, 
and perhaps in practice ineffectual(41), these laws, none- 
theless, are symbolic of the extent to which governments of the 
states concerned have moved in the direction of formal 
acknowledgement of the rights of workers in decisions of 
companies. "The authority of management has not been questioned 
by this system of representation, but the basis of its 
legitimacy has changed", wrote Professor Furstenberg(42). 
Parity board representation furthered by the 
Codetermination Act of 1976 in Germany is, in context, an 
extension of the normative principle of the right of workers to 
be represented in decision structures of companies. The same 
can be said of the Act on Joint Regulation of Working Life in 
Sweden in 1977. Building on a tradition of centralised 
collective bargaining, the Act opened many aspects of 
management decisions to the influence of employees through the 
medium of negotiation. The declared intention of the Swedish 
law was to change the exclusive right of employers to direct 
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work supervision and company management(43). Thus, despite its 
very unique technique of not prescribing areas of joint 
regulation, the Swedish law fits our description of WORKER 
TYPOLOGY - legislation with a central aim of pushing employees 
to the centre of decision-making in industry. 
In comparison, the WORKER TYPOLOGY represents the most 
radical attempts to change the basis of the authority structure 
in companies. We should add, however, that we were aware of no 
jurisdiction that has operated with an overriding system of 
workers' participation in management decisions. None too has 
provided employee rights in company decisions in a single 
framework of participation legislation. The most renowned 
participation jurisdictions of Germany and Sweden have their 
laws contained in a multiplicity of sources, regulations and 
collective agreements between the unions and employers. All 
this points to the complexities of workers' participation laws, 
even in the most advanced systems. As we have stresed, many 
strands, social, economic and political in nature, are 
interwoven in the making of workers' participation laws. 
Summary 
This section has attempted a general survey of workers' 
participation laws. The review was justified as a necessary 
background to the study of the Zambian legislation. Three 
points are emphasised in the discussion. First, arguments for 
greater workers' participation laws focus on the need to 
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redefine the basis of decision-making in companies. This is a 
normative starting point very much consistent with the Zambian 
official pronouncements. The second point is that in practice, 
workers' participation laws have come in different forms. The 
reasons relate to different national histories, and the 
purposes for which workers' participation laws are enacted. Not 
all laws are guided by serious intentions to change the 
received structure of industrial governance. There are other 
social and economic reasons for schemes of participation. The 
third and final point concentrated on discernible charac- 
teristics of the participation laws. We found that political 
and academic views on participation laws relate peculiarly to 
the degrees to which law is accepted as the means to promote 
participation policies. On that criterion, three different 
levels were identified to form a spectrum ranging from the No 
Law, through MANAGEMENT to WORKER typology. Of these, the 
latter approximate attempts at the radical transformation of 
power relationships between the social forces of industry. The 
techniques used to achieve the more radical schemes observed in 
Europe and Scandinavia are a combination of interlocking 
institutions of collective bargaining, independent works 
councils and company board representation. But fusing these 
into functional structures with recognisable results have been 
many extra-legal contextual factors of industrial relations, 
politics and social history. 
How does all this relate to Zambia? The above observations 
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are useful because they enable us to ask relevant questions 
about Zambia and her legislation. First, to the extent that 
contextual factors, mainly of a historical type, are important 
variables in the design of more effective institutions of 
workers' participation, to what extent could a developing and 
former colonial state bring about a major transformation in the 
roles of owners, managers and workers in industry? Secondly, 
given the very complicated nature of participation laws even in 
the context of relatively stable and prosperous systems of 
Europe how could the political, economic and industrial 
relations changes introduced by the Zambian Government in the 
early 1970s assist the drafting of effective workers' partici- 
pation laws in the country? If these questions and dicussion 
have helped us to concentrate on the dynamics of participation 
laws, we can now turn to study the Zambian legislation. 
2. The Ghanainn Context of the Zambian Participation Laws 
In 1969, the Zambian Government had insisted on funda- 
mental changes in the inherited system of industrial governance 
both to realise the normative principle of the right of 
workers to participate in decisions of companies and to 
buttress higher principles of a Humanist society for which the 
country was striving. In this section we examine the extent to 
which that radical context was changing in 1971. It appears 
from the immediate background of the 1971 legislation that by 
this date the confidence of the Zambian Government to introduce 
fundamental changes in the law of industry had begun to wear 
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out. This occurred at a time when important decisions about the 
details of the law and how it was to affect relations of the 
parties in industry were supposed to be put together. The 
evidence of the Government's overall stifled resolve to intro- 
duce changes of the nature previously announced can be adduced 
from A) the official scepticism of original plans, B) the 
shifting of the objectives of participation laws, C) the 
appending of participation legislation into another statute, D) 
the limited industrial coverage of the law, and E) the creation 
of loopholes in the operation of the law. These factors may 
not be so remarkable individually, but taken together they show 
the extent to which the Zambian government was reconsidering 
her previously announced root and branch approach to workers' 
participation laws. 
A. Official Scepticism of original plans 
The first indicator of the extent to which the Zambian 
government had come under pressure to reconsider her scheme of 
participation legislation is in the personality of the Minister 
upon whom President Kaunda relied to see the Industrial Rela- 
tions Act through Parliament. The job of introducing workers' 
participation legislation to Parliament in October 1971 fell on 
a new Cabinet Minister, brought in by a Government reshuffle of 
4 June 1971(44). The Minister, Wilson Chakulya, had been the 
Secretary General of Zambia Congress of Trade Unions in 1969 
and had remained a unionist until his ministerial appointment 
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in 1971. 
Chakulya' s appointment as a Cabinet Minister might well 
have been due primarily to his membership and support of the 
Party in power(45)9 but as a trade union bureaucrat he was 
well placed to help the Government gloss over the rough edges 
stemming from the Government and President Kaunda's radical 
presentation of workers' participation policies. In his 
capacity as Secretary General of Zambia Congress of Trade 
Unions, Chakulya came across what was said about industrial 
participation policies in 'dark corner meetings'(46). once in 
his position, he was quick to reassure Parliament and the 
nation that there was no attempt at all in Government policies 
on workers' participation to sweep away the traditional 
structure of Zambian industry: 
Some people have gone to the extent of labelling the idea 
Communist-inspired. I do not accept this line of thinking 
which is so obviously based on a misunderstanding. We are 
not establishing workers' councils, but works 
councils... there is no intention to punish anyone, there 
is no intention to grab power of management and place it 
in the hands of workers(47). 
In his attempts to calm the political heat generated by 
Government pronouncements up to now, the Minister was, in 
effect, dishonouring all that other Government officials and 
President Kaunda in particular, had been saying since December 
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1969. From our perspective, that was not a promising signal to 
a legislation billed to bring fundamental changes in the 
administration of industry. Rather, these remarks evidenced 
elements of official scepticism of the reform plans in 
industrial relations that had been presented to the public up 
until now. 
B. Shifting the objectives of participation law 
The initial objectives of the Zambian law as presented in 
1969 and restated on subsequent occasions were purely normative 
and doctrinal. They were intended to transform the legal 
position of employees in the inherited system of industrial 
governance. These objectives however were to change in the 
framework of legislation that was eventually introduced to 
Parliament. 
First, as against the company and works council law 
promised in 1969, only works council structures were provided 
for in the Industrial Relations Act. Second, in place of the 
libertarian vocabulary which previously accompanied statements 
of the objectives of workers' participation law, the 
legislation stated the aims of works councils in two simple 
statements: 
a) to promote and maintain the effective participation 
of workers in the affairs of the undertaking for 
which such council is established. 
b) to secure the mutual co-operation of workers, 
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management of the undertaking and the trade union in 
the interests of industrial peace, improved working 
conditions, greater efficiency and productivity(48). 
The law indeed achieved more than simplification of the 
stated objectives of workers' participation law. Within the 
letter of the law the promise of effective workers' partici- 
pation in management decisions was now held to the twin object 
of promoting co-operation, efficiency and productivity. Thus, 
Zambian law was pushing strongly towards the MANAGEMENT 
TYPOLOGY in its underlying philosophy, a fact consistent with 
the official scepticism of original plans already noted. 
C. Appending of legislation in another Act 
When the industrial relations policy of workers' 
participation was announced, optimism was expressed by the 
government that a new era of labour management relations was 
being ushered in. What was expected was a new piece of 
legislation that was to express Industrial Participatory 
Democracy in the Zambian industrial relations system. In the 
event, the legislation for workers' participation came appended 
as Part 7 of the Industrial Relations Act. The other 9 parts of 
that Act dealt with trade union and collective bargaining 
affairs, issues that were far removed from the social and 
political objectives of workers' participation in Zambia. 
It is curious here that the law upon which the Government 
put so much emphasis should come as an ancillary to other, 
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different, legislation. It is possible, however, that the 
Zambian government found the principle of consolidation 
attractive. It was certainly convenient to have all major 
statutes relating to industrial relations in one volume. There 
is, however, another view: that is it was politically easier to 
append workers' participation provisions in the Industrial 
Relations Act. A consolidating Act, by definition, raised far 
fewer new problems and could therefore be better assured of 
success in Parliament. In other words, workers' participation 
law looked more harmless appended to a larger industrial 
relations legislation, a strategy which was helpful to a 
government selling a policy which was not very attractive. 
D. Limited industrial coverage of the law 
The main objective of workers' participation policies was 
to promote the participation of employees in decisions of 
companies. From this, it would have made sense if as many 
enterprises as possible were contemplated to be covered by the 
legislation. This was the only way Industrial Participatory 
Democracy could be presented as an national industrial 
relations policy. The figure upon which a Zambian company was 
obliged to create participation structures was put at 100 
'eligible employees'(49). This was a high number in a country 
which made political capital out of complaints of colonial 
deprivation of the industrial infrastructure. A casual compa- 
rison with European figures in the 1970s shows that the Zambian 
eligibility figure was far higher than the European average, 
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despite the fact that developed countries possessed higher 
numbers of enterprises employing equally greater numbers of 
employees. In Austria and Germany, employers were obliged to 
form works councils if they had a minimum of 5 permanent 
employees. Other figures reported were: France 10, Luxembourg 
15, Denmark and the Netherlands 50, and Belgium 150 (50). 
Unless one assumes that the Zambian figure was intended to 
be a trial experiment, the conclusion is that that figure was 
deliberately set high in order to leave out as many plants and 
enterprises as possible from the operation of the workers' 
participation law(51). Such a decision could have only served 
the purpose of mitigating political opposition to the policies 
of the government. 
F. Creation of other loopholes in the law 
--- -------- -------- 
The requirement of 100 'eligible employees' in order to 
trigger formation of institutions of workers' participation in 
companies already seemed to exclude a lot of Zambian employees 
from the rights to participate in decisions of industry which 
the government was advocating. In addition however, the 
legislation began in section 54 with a declaration of the power 
of the President "to exempt by Statutory Instrument any 
undertaking or class or classes of undertakings from the 
operation of all or any of the provisions of Part 7 of the 
Industrial Relations Act". There are two aspects to the law 
under section 54: the mention of the President himself, and the 
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prefacing of works council law with his powers to exempt 
companies from its requirements. Both of these are remarkable 
for their peculiarity within the machinery of the Industrial 
Relations Act. 
First, the rest of the Industrial Relations Act refers to 
the Minister of Labour as the final administrative authority to 
whom all appeals should lie. In this respect the position of 
the President of the Republic in works council legislation is 
an odd occurrence in the machinery of the Industrial Relations 
Act. Secondly, the Industrial Relations Act, (SsllO-112), had 
imposed for the first time an obligation on every employer of 
25 employees the duty to register for the purposes of collec- 
tive bargaining. The law however did not exempt any companies 
or classes of employees from compulsory collective bargaining. 
Thus, the provision to exempt some companies from the operation 
of works council law has to be seen in a different light. 
In our view, section 54 should be seen as another attempt' 
by the Government to 'sweeten' workers' participation law. 
Though neither the criteria nor the procedures for exemption 
from works council law were laid down under Part 7, it was, 
nonetheless, reassuring to investors that the possibility 
existed for some companies to seek exemption from the Zambian 
workers' participation law. 
Summary 
The general outline of the Zambian workers' participation 
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law, as we have presented it, suggests that by 1971 the 
government was coming to the view that it was perhaps not 
possible to force through the changes that seemed possible in 
1969. This inference comes across from the incidences discussed 
above. In the following two sections, we analyse the extent to 
which the government's weakening position was actually 
reflected in the procedural and substantive aspects of the law. 
3. Procedural Elements of Participation Legislation 
The main procedural elements of workers' participation law 
relate to A) the formation of the institutions of workers' 
participation; B) the composition of these institutions; and 
the C) modes of interaction between the, workers, trade unions, 
management and the councils. 
A. Formation of works councils 
The fundamental requirement of the Zambian law, in section 
55, called for the formation of works councils in every 
undertaking employing not less than 100 eligible employees. An 
'undertaking' was defined in section 3 to include: 
any company, firm, business, industry, or any kind of 
enterprise, any statutory board or corporation or any 
local or public authority or any branch or autonomous 
division thereof. 
In other words, any employer of industrial and commercial 
labour who satisfied the minimum number of one hundred eligible 
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employees was compelled under the law to form a works council. 
An eligible employee was defined in section 3 to mean: 
any employee other than an employee serving a trial period 
of probationary employment, a casual employee, an employee 
specifically engaged on a temporary basis for work of an 
intermittent or seasonal nature, or a member of the 
management of an undertaking. 
This definition of eligible employee is understood not 
just as a bench mark upon which a company could form a works 
council, but also as creating a status regime of workers' 
participation law, in the sense that only eligible employees 
enjoy the benefits of the law. Employees classified as casual 
or temporary cannot participate in the affairs of institutions 
of workers' participation(52). In Maybin Nkwanisha _V 
National 
Agricultural 
_ 
Marketin Board(53), the Industrial Relations 
Court wrote that: 
As we see it the prime duty of a Works council which has 
been elected by the the eligible employees is to look 
after the interests of eligible employees(54). 
In the instant case the Court denied application of the 
workers' participation law to a member of the management. On 
the basis of this authority, it would seem also to be the law 
that a casual or temporary worker, not being an eligible 
employee, is not entitled to enjoy the benefits brought by 
workers' participation law. 
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This interpretation extends -the category of workers 
excluded from workers' participation law beyond that imposed 
by the 100 figure mark under section 55. This diminution of the 
number of persons directly affected by the law should also have 
implications for the meaning and quality of the Zambian 
workers' participation policies. 
The second point we want to develop in relation to the 
formation of the institutions of workers' participation in 
Zambia relates to the extent to which the law actually 
compelled the relevant parties in industry to participate in 
the formation of works councils. Section 55(1), read together 
with sections 56(1)(5), places the primary obligation to form 
a works council on the employer of 100 eligible employees. On 
the other hand, the actual mechanics of getting a works council 
started contemplates cooperation of the trade union represented 
in the undertaking or of individual employees. Under sections 
56(1)(5) four representatives from both sides are required to 
constitute a Working Party. This is an ad hoc committee with 
initial responsibilities for supervising the formation of works 
councils in individual companies. Among its specific responsi- 
bilities are to determine the sizes of works councils and to 
arrange the elections of employee members to works councils. 
Where a company's eligible employees are represented by a 
union, the law states under section 56(1) that "the management 
of every undertaking and the trade union of which eligible 
employees are members, shall jointly form a working party". In 
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the absence of a union (a very unlikely scenario in the Zambian 
law), section 56(5) provides that "the management of such 
undertaking shall call upon the employees to appoint represe- 
ntatives who shall jointly with the management form a working 
party" 
The issue which arises here is whether trade unions or 
individual employees could be compelled to participate in the 
formation of works councils? If trade unions in particular 
could be so compelled, what then is the relationship between 
institutions of workers' participation and the trade unions? 
Is one the subordinate of the other or are they distinct, but 
complementary institutions? In Claudius Sakala and Others v. 
Zambia Electricity__ Supply__ Corooration(55), the Industrial 
------------------- 
Relations Court expressed the view that the union was the 
'mother body' of the works council. On this view of the 
relationship, the Court sanctioned the dismissal of employee 
councillors who had protested against the decision of manage- 
ment, in agreement with the union, to impose a different 
structure of works councils in the electricity corporation. 
Yet, if this is the true relationship between unions and the 
works councils, where is the procedural autonomy and 
distinctiveness of the works council as a structure of decision 
making in industry? 
In sum, we have noted the limitations of the definition of 
eligible employee. We have also highlighted the ambiguity in 
the relationship between the trade unions and the works 
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councils. 
B. Composition of works councils 
--- ------------------------- 
In this section we seek to show that the composition of 
the Zambian works councils was flawed within the adversarial 
system of the common law, in the sense that this rendered 
councils ill-equipped to handle the rights and duties 
attributed to them by the Industrial Relations Act. Our 
assumption is that the efficacy of a structure of decision- 
making lies in the extent to which it can be made to act with a 
common interest. If the structure of decision-making is so 
designed that it can not possibly approach its functions with a 
common interest, then its efficacy is practically impaired, 
especially in the industrial relations systems underpinned by 
the common law. Here, the 'win or lose' adjudication processes 
of the common law reinforce the adversarial tendencies of the 
labour-management relationship. The object presently will be to 
explain the heterogeneity of the composition of works councils 
in Zambia. The extent to which the structures imposed by the 
law have affected the operation of works councils will be 
reviewed more fully in Chapter 6. 
The composition of the works councils is governed by 
section 57: 
Every council shall consist of not less than three nor 
more than fifteen members, of whom two-thirds shall 
consist of the members elected by the eligible employees 
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and one third appointed by the management of an 
undertaking. 
There are at least three aspects of council heterogeneity 
involved in its composition. First, the council is composed of 
members from the two sides of industry in the ratio of two 
thirds employee representatives and one third management 
appointees. Second, the members come to the works council 
through different processes. The worker members are elected. 
Management members are appointed. Thus, the provisions 
contained in sections 58 to 60 on elections to the council 
apply exclusively to the two thirds employee members of the 
works council. These guarantee the right of every eligible 
employee to participate in the affairs of the works council at 
the election level. The trade union represented in the 
enterprise is given powers to scrutinise and approve employee 
candidates for works council office(56). But neither workers 
nor the trade unions have any say in the nomination of those 
who come to represent the management. This is so despite the 
view encountered above that the union is the 'mother body' of 
the works council. 
The third dimension of heterogeneity comes with the 
retirement of councillors. Under section 61, employee coun- 
cillors are subject to recall at the completion of two years of 
office. Management appointees, on the other hand, can be 
retained and recalled as the management wishes because there is 
no specific provision governing appointees of the management. 
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All this points to the lack of homogeneity in the works council 
system in Zambia, the consequences of which will be presented 
below. 
C. Modes of works council interaction 
----------------------------------- 
The way institutions of workers' participation are able to 
interact with workers, trade union organisations and management 
is an important element in establishing their role as useful 
instruments in industrial relations. The composition, as well 
as the rules of procedure applicable, are essential elements 
in marking out the role of works councils in relation to other 
institutions involved in decisions of companies. 
The Zambian law contains vague elements in the procedures 
prescribed for interactions with other institutions. First, 
despite the fact that works councils are composed of both 
workers and management, the Act fails to decide, whether 
majority rule operates in the deliberations of the councils. 
Such important ground rules are left by section 62 to the 
council to "draw up its own rules and shall elect a chairman 
from among its members". There is no position of Secretary 
established by the Act, yet, section 68 provides "at every 
meeting of a council a record shall be made of all decisions, 
recommendations and resolutions passed by the council". The 
practical effect of these gaps in the procedures is to allow 
managers and workers to play power politics in the committees. 
It cannot be guaranteed that the strength of the employees 
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representatives on the works council alone is decisive. In 
fact, the way managers position themselves on the structure of 
works councils may well be the important factor deciding who 
has influence on these councils(57). 
But even assuming that majority rule determines the issues 
before the works council, the Zambian law is still more 
complicated in its assumptions on how works councils are 
expected to interact effectively with workers, trade unions and 
management. In some of the provisions it comes out as though 
the legislator was oblivious to the fact that there were repre- 
sentatives of management on the works councils. For instance, 
under section 64 the council has a duty to "lay before a 
general meeting of eligible employees a report of its activi- 
ties during the preceding twelve months". No corresponding duty 
was placed on the works council to report council decisions and 
their effects on the company as a whole to senior managers and 
the shareholders. This does not seem to create any incentives 
on management representatives on the councils to support the 
preparation and presentation of annual reports to the 
employees(58). 
The most serious weakness in procedures providing for 
council interaction with other institutions comes with section 
74. This section speaks of the 'watch dog' functions of the 
Zambian works councils. It states in section 74(1): 
If a council has reason to believe that the management has 
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done or omitted to do any act in contravention of the 
provisions of this Act or any other written law, or in 
infringement of any provisions of a collective agreement, 
works agreement or works rules, affecting employees in 
such undertaking, the council shall forthwith inform the 
management of the alleged contravention or infringement. 
In effect, the law purports to give the works council the 
right to watch over management compliance with laws, works 
rules and collective agreements. If management are in breach or 
contravention of any of these, the council is under the duty, 
enforceable perhaps under pain of fine or imprisonment on the 
part of individual councillors under section 77, to report such 
contravention to the management. Where a General Manager or 
Managing Director in the company is a member of a works council 
as is very possible under section 57 and, in fact, is felt 
desirable by employee councillors in Zambia(59), the pontential 
efficacy of section 74(1) is almost lost because it does not 
make sense that the council should report violations of law to 
a person who is their member. 
If the remedy given the works council in the face of an 
intransigent management under section 74 is considered, the 
superficiality of the law becomes very explicit. Under section 
74(2), 
if in the opinion of the council, the contravention or the 
infringement is not remedied, it shall bring it to the 
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notice of the trade union; and the trade union shall 
thereupon, negotiate an agreement as to the measures to be 
taken for remedying the contravention or the infringement. 
What is required is that the works council as a body 
should complain to a trade union in the event of management 
failure to comply with laws, work rules or collective 
agreements. A third of the members of works councils in Zambia 
is made of the management representatives. These are usually 
persons who are members of the management and therefore without 
self interest in the protection and benefits conferred by the 
works council law. Given this fact, was it the expectation in 
section 74(2) that managers on the council would knock at the 
offices of shop stewards to complain about the company's 
failure to carry out statutory duties? Such a result would have 
the effect of elevating the trade union as a structure of 
corporate governance to a level not sufficiently recognised in 
the law. 
Summary 
We have examined and analysed the procedures prescribed by 
the Industrial Relations Act pertaining to formation of works 
councils, their composition and modes of interaction with other 
institutions. On either point we find that the Zambian law was 
so diluted that Government pretensions to a radical transfor- 
mation of the employee position in the work place can be 
discounted. The law indeed does not come out as having been a 
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result of serious logical discussions, suggesting perhaps the 
weakened position of the government by the time of drafting the 
legislation. There are other ways which could have improved the 
efficacy of the procedures. For example, it is an employee body 
which could properly report to a general meeting of workers; 
which could complain to a trade union organisation; and which 
might have a vested interest in management observance of 
collective agreements and work rules in the interest of 
employees. Thus, by creating unitary institutions of workers' 
participation more effective procedures might have been 
created(60). 
4. The substantive aspects of works council law 
The stated reason for workers' participation policies in 
Zambia was to allow employee participation in management 
decisions of business companies. Consequently, the rights given 
employees in the decisions of management were supposed to be 
the centre piece of Zambian workers' participation law. The 
three sections of the Industrial Relations Act devoted to the 
rights of workers in decisions of management are presented 
below. We shall show that, in the event, no real power was 
given employees to influence the decisions of companies. The 
law was weak, inconsistent and in some areas added little to 
what workers already possessed through trade unions and 
collective bargaining. 
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A. Weak Participation Rights 
------------ ----- 
The first substantive right of workers to participate in 
decisions of management came under section 70(1). 
Every council shall be entitled to be consulted upon and 
to participate fully and effectively in all the schemes 
and programmes relating to the health and welfare of 
eligible employees in the undertaking. 
Section 70(2) elaborates these schemes and programmes as 
including medical facilities, housing, pension, recreational, 
canteens and any other category of amenities which an employer 
may opt for the welfare of his employees. 
No decision of the Industrial Relations Court has been 
rendered to show what section 70 entails, but a firm of Zambian 
Management Consultants has advised that 
being consulted and participating fully does not mean 
management must abide by or follow decisions and recomme- 
ndations of the works council. Nor does it mean that the 
works council can veto a management decision. What is 
meant is that management will consult the works council 
and will be availed to its decisions and recommendations 
on the subject at hand(61). 
The alternative would be to hold that no decisions of the 
management in health and welfare areas could be valid without 
agreement of the works council. As the law stands such a result 
would lead to an impossible situation in the event of deadlock 
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between the management and works council. This is precisely 
because section 70 does not provide a conflict resolution 
procedure similar to the one provided in respect of section 72 
below. 
The net result of the law is a very weak scheme. The whole 
of section 70 should now be understood as a right to mere 
consultation, and the formulation "and to participate fully and 
effectively" as something of no precise technical content. 
B. Inconsistent Participation Rights 
-------------------- ------- --- 
Under section 71 the works council has rights of informa- 
tion. The law provides that 
Every council shall be entitled to be informed forthwith 
in writing of all decisions taken by the board of 
directors, the proprietors or the management of the 
undertaking, as the case may be, in relation to the 
investment policy, financial control, distribution of 
profits, economic planning, job evaluation, wages policy, 
and the appointment of senior management executives in the 
undertaking. 
The Act does not define the economic terms used. If we 
were to assume, as the legislator did, that employers and 
councillors would understand the full import of the law, then 
we had in section 71 a pure right of councillors to information 
on specified managerial subjects. 
However, the value of that right to the works council as a 
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body and to individual councillors should be placed in the 
context of section 76. This section prohibits disclosure of any 
"information relating to the financial affairs of any 
undertaking or any manufacturing or commercial secrets or 
working processes thereof" acquired in the works council 
eexcept in court proceedings or when diclosure is required by 
the authorities for the administration of the Act. Section 76 
does not require an employer to specify which information is 
secret and, curiously, does not even contemplate disputes over 
interpretations about what constitutes secret information. Yet, 
almost all the areas in which councillors have a right to 
information relate in one way or another to the 'financial 
affairs' of companies. Since criminal proceedings are 
contemplated for the breach of section 76, the information 
given in section 71 may be used, if at all, very conserva- 
tively. Certainly, it can not be made the subject of campaigns 
in workers' groups. The inconsistency built to this aspect of 
workers participation law is thus apparent. 
C. Participation Rinhts without substance 
Perhaps the greatest powers of the works council as a body 
for decision making were supposed to come with the right to 
consent to certain decisions of management specified in section 
72. 
According to section 72(1), 
a decision by the management on a matter of policy in the 
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field of personnel management and industrial relations 
shall be of no effect unless it is approved by the council 
established in that undertaking, which approval shall not 
be unreasonably withheld. 
Section 72(2) specifies some of the areas contemplated by 
the law. They are: 
a) recruitment of employees in the undertaking and 
assessment of their salaries, 
b) transfer of employees from one undertaking to another 
owned by the same employer, 
c) rules as to discipline applicable to the employees in 
the undertaking, 
d) redundancy of employees, 
e) bonuses and incentives payable to the employees and the 
modes of payment, and 
f) safety of the employees subject to the provisions of 
any other written law. 
To avoid any doubts, it should be stated that the term 
'employee' under section 72 refers to eligible employees - 
employees who are not casual, temporary, nor part of the 
management under section 3. As was also confirmed in Works 
Council v. Mana&eet- Luanshya Division of RCM Ltd(62), the 
----------------- -m--n-- --------------------------- 
works council has no power to object to the management 
personnel and industrial relations policies affecting non- 
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eligible employees, including the deployment or dismissal of 
senior managers. The only group of managers over which the 
works council has some control both on appointment and 
dismissal are those who, under section 75(1) are "specifically 
entrusted with the duties relating to personnel management and 
industrial relations in an undertaking" (S75(1)). Such officers 
"shall not be appointed or removed from office without prior 
consultation with the council"(63). 
Notwithstanding the qualification to section 72, the law 
still leaves some resemblance of power in the hands of works 
councils. Because under section 72 works councils are given 
what appear to be formal powers to block management decisions 
in matters which are potentially controversial between 
employers and employees, there is an elaborate mechanism 
provided to resolve differences between the council and the 
management. 
First, it is made explicitly clear in section 72(1) that 
the council should not withhold approval unreasonably. Second, 
according to section 72(3), if the council is inclined to with- 
hold its approval, it should afford the management opportunity 
to explain the basis of their decision before exercising the 
right to veto decisions. Third, section 73(1) provides that if 
after a meeting with management the council still wants to 
refuse to consent, it must inform management forthwith in 
writing of its decision to refuse. Fourth, if management is 
aggrieved by the works council's refusal to approve their 
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decisions, management are obliged to refer the matter to a 
board of review constituted between the works council and 
themselves(64). Finally, under section 73(4), an appeal by 
either party can be made to the Industrial Relations Court from 
the Board of review and the Court's decision once rendered is 
final and binding on the parties. 
There are two points to make here. The first relates-to 
the efficacy of the procedure; the second, to the substance of 
section 72. Each however, is concerned with the relative 
hollowness of the Zambian workers' participation law. 
The powers of the works council to challenge management 
would seem to depend crucially on who is on the council, as 
previously analysed in the context of the composition of works 
councils, and their modes of interaction. It is obvious that 
managers on the works council could not entertain elaborate 
quarrels with their General Manager or Managing Directors in 
the way envisaged by the procedures of section 72(3). In the 
event of the Chief Executive being a member of the council, 
there will just be no one else for the council to quarrel with 
because the Act does not provide a channel to the General 
Meeting of Shareholders. Thus, in the absence of councillors 
who were willing to be 'martyrs' for the workers' participation 
policy, there. would be no one on the councils with sufficient 
incentives to fight cases through all the procedures to the 
Industrial Relations Court(65). The partiality with which the 
law restricted works council powers to industrial relations and 
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personnel policies affecting only eligible employees in the 
company means in addition that the scope of the procedure was 
limited. 
The second point is that the areas in which works councils 
were given a measure of power were the ones in which trade 
unions were most likely to be interested. It should be 
remembered that every company which qualified to form a works 
council, qualified beforehand to register for collective 
bargaining with a registered trade union organisation under 
sections 110-112 of the Industrial Relations Act. In addition, 
under section 4 employees were guaranteed the right to form 
and operate unions at places of work. Indeed, the employer was 
placed under an obligation to facilitate trade union activities 
by allowing time off with full pay to employees involved in 
union organisation. 
The missing link in the trade union law was that the 
functions of trade unions were not statutorily defined. The 
assumption we can make for this omission is that such functions 
of trade unions were supposed to be generally known. Yet, if 
the collective employee matters enumerated for works councils 
in section 72 were not for trade unions, what else could have 
justified the existence of unions at places of work? 
Summary_ of the worker-power 
. 
provisions 
We have examined and analysed in this section the 
substantive rights which the Industrial Relations Act gave to 
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works councils as institutions of workers' participation in 
Zambia. We have found that the right to 'full and effective 
participation' under section 70 was no more than a scheme of 
mere consultation between employees and the management. The 
right to information in section 71 was contradicted by the 
unmitigated scope of duties of secrecy under section 76. The 
more promising right of councillors to block management powers 
in personnel and industrial relations was frustrated in effect 
by both the procedures involved and the concurrent rights of 
the trade unions. 
The finding that the centre of the Zambian workers' 
legislation was weak, inconsistent and in some places devoid of 
substance is in line with the conclusions drawn on the 
procedures instituted to form and operate works councils, and 
with the way the government qualified her radical approach to 
the legislation as a whole. 
5. Overall Summary and Conclusions 
-------------- 
The object in this chapter was mainly to examine and 
analyse the Zambian participation legislation enacted in 1971. 
In approaching that Act, we reviewed workers' participation 
laws in their international context. This was to enable us to 
place the Zambian legislation in a proper perspective. 
Apart from perspectives which reject law in participation 
policies, two other strands were examined. The main one was 
the more normative and doctrinal perspective which attempts to 
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redefine the authority structure in industry to give workers 
formal rights in the decisions of companies. Proponents of this 
view would like to see improvements in the way decisions in 
companies are regulated so that the rights of employees could 
be considered and accommodated more formerly. The laws which 
follow on this line of thought were called the WORKER TYPOLOGY. 
In reality, however, the laws are far less radical than 
academic outlines suggest. Nonetheless, on balance, the WORKER 
TYPOLOGY schemes reflect a certain degree of innovation in the 
search for greater workers' participation in companies. 
Examples of this type of laws were drawn from the different and 
interlocking schemes of laws adopted in Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. The influence of historical and 
contextual factors in the design and operation of these laws 
were stressed. 
The second perspective pointed to ideas in participation 
laws which have affinities with management desires to harness 
cooperation, enhance productivity and reduce employee aliena- 
tion in industry. The laws flowing from these ideas were 
called the MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY because these are not always 
intended to challenge the received structure of power in 
companies, but merely to establish procedures for regular 
consultation between employers and employees. Examples were 
the works councils composed of workers and the management in 
France and Belgium. British legislation on participation was 
also reasoned to belong to the MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY. 
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Against this broad introduction to workers' participation 
laws, we sought to evaluate the Zambian legislation of 1971. 
The main interest was the extent to which the Act actually 
achieved fundamental changes in the law. To help answer this 
question, we described and analysed three variables. First, 
the context of government approach to the legislation in -1971. 
Second, the procedural framework adopted to build institutions 
of workers' participation. Third, the substantive rights- given 
the workers in the decisions of Zambian companies. 
Contrary to government promises to enact fundamental 
changes in the law of decisions, our finding was that the 
Industrial Relations Act did not offer such a fundamental 
change in the law. In fact, what is revealed in the analysis 
is a deliberate and systematic shifting of the legal framework 
from WORKER to a even weaker MANAGEMENT TYPOLOGY. 
The Zambian government's subsequent attempts to recapture 
the momentum on workers' participation laws, as we shall show 
below, support this reading of her law. There was little in the 
1971 legislation to support a meaningful programme of Indus- 
trial Participatory Democracy. The question that remains is 
why did the government fail to enact a better legislation given 
her commitment to fundamental changes in the inherited system 
of industrial order? We address this and related issues in 
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIENCE OF THE 1971 LEGISLATION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter focussed its analysis on the scheme 
of legislation enacted in 1971 to implement workers' 
participation in Zambia. The weakness of the legislative 
scheme and the government's apparent withdrawal from commit- 
ment to institute fundamental reforms in the law of management 
decisions were stressed. The main object of the present 
chapter is to account for the implementation of that law and 
to review its experience during the period under study. The 
chapter will concentrate its analysis on materials which help 
to explain the behaviour and conduct of the Zambian state in 
her determination to use law to bring about Industrial 
Participatory Democracy. 
In section 1 we set the background to the decision to 
implement participation legislation in 1976. The official 
reasons for delaying the legislation are considered and 
contrasted with our own explanation. We shall explain the role 
played by A) the originating thesis for participation policies 
and B) the combination of structural factors, in determining 
both that delay and the subsequent attitudes of the state to 
the 1971 law. 
Section 2 turns to the actual experience of the 1971 
legislation. We shall analyse and explain the opportunities 
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offered and problems presented by that legislation as seen 
through the experience of managers, trade unionists, counci- 
llors and more particularly, the Industrial Relations Court. 
1. Background to implementation of the 1971 legislation 
The 1971 workers' participation legislation came into 
force on May 1 1976(1). This was five years after the legis- 
lation was enacted, and some seven years after workers' 
participation was accepted as a national industrial relations 
policy. In this section, we consider and explain why there was 
this delay in implementing the participation law. 
1.1 Official reasons for late implementation of the 1971 law 
The official reason why legislation had to wait until 
1976 is simple to state. Workers' participation in management 
decisions was a new form of labour-management relations in the 
country: as such it was necessary to allow a transitional 
period so that all parties could learn the new system of 
labour relations. Thus, 
The Party and Government see the Industrial Relations Act 
(1971) as a great stride forward towards industrial 
participatory democracy, in keeping with our Humanist 
Philosophy. When I introduced the idea of the Act in my 
speech at the 1969 Kitwe Convention, I stressed the need 
for a period of preparation and of education for both 
workers and managers(2). 
What is suggested is that new knowledge, understanding and 
appropriate attitudes were required to be developed on all 
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sides before workers' participation law could be implemented- 
(3). 
This account is reason enough in theory to have caused the 
delay in implementing the 1971 legislation by even as much as 
five years. Transitional arrangements of that sort are a 
common feature of the interaction between the legislative and 
executive arm of government. In context, however, the 
explanation does not stand up to examination. 
There are three main reasons why we can doubt the veracity 
of the official explanation for having delayed implementation 
of the 1971 workers' participation law until 1976. These 
reasons are based on A) modesty of the 1971 law; B) comparison 
with other concurrent developments involving Zambian workers; 
C) empirical findings on the quality of knowledge possessed by 
Zambian workers on the subject of workers' participation after 
1976. 
A. Modesty of the 1971 law 
In order to accept the official view that considerations 
of education and training held up the legislation on the 
statute book, one has to set the time it had taken to bring 
the law in force against the actual scope of the law enacted 
in 1971. In substance, the Zambian law required management to 
nominate one of their members to form a committee with two 
others elected by workers [or a greater number in that ratio] 
through which discussions on health and welfare schemes could 
take place. The committee could receive some information from 
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management and through it matters already covered by 
collective agreements could receive further attention. The 
law made it plain in section 69 that all this would be done 
in order to promote cooperation, higher productivity and 
industrial peace in individual companies. In a country where 
employers and employer organisations together with trade 
unions had previously pledged solemnly to encourage such 
committees in their own interests(4), what was there in the 
law to be learned for five years? The scope of the law did not 
warranty a protracted period of transitional arrangements 
because the legislated practice did not differ very much from 
voluntary schemes already known in the country in 1971(5) 
B. Comparison with other concurrent developments 
The official explanation is also weakened if other 
developments in Zambia affecting the public in general or 
workers in particular are considered. One example was the 
introduction of the One Party State system in 1972. The idea 
of this was formally tabled for discussion and adoption at the 
National Council in March 1972. The Commission on the One 
Party State conducted its inquiry throughout the country from 
about that date to June, and on 15 October it submitted its 
recommendations to the government. On 17 November the 
government published its White Paper, and on 13 December 1972 
the Second Republic was declared having passed the necessary 
legislation in the meantime(6). Given the declared importance 
of Industrial Participatory Democracy to economic and 
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industrial policies of Humanism, could a system which worked 
with that level of efficiency in other areas have failed to 
provide basic training on a simple structure of participation 
law in a period shorter than five years? 
Secondly, and even more appropriately, in 1974 President 
Kaunda directed that Party Connittees be instituted at all 
places of work. These were to cone into operation with 
iuuediate effect. Yet, the functions of Party Committees at 
places of work were not, and are not, less onerous than those 
of the works councils(7). In January 1983, too, the President 
directed companies in the state sector to appoint trade union 
leaders on their boards of directors. Apart from the 
qualification of Party membership, union officials were to 
proceed on company boards without any requirements of training 
or orientation(A). Finally, though some arrangements had been 
made for the training of workers involved in the Self- 
fanagement legislation of 1968, very little time was allocated 
for training despite the level of responsibilities theoreti- 
cally called for by the system of self-nanagenent(9). 
Therefore, though the need for transitional arrangements 
could have explained the delay in i©plenenting the 1971 law, 
in the particular circumstances of the Zambian legislation, 
that reason is not convincing. The record of the Zambian 
government does not seem to support such inclination to the 
management of transitional arrangements. 
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C. Empirical findings on the quality of workers' knowledge 
The explanatory value of a commitment to education and 
training might well have been justified if later investiga- 
tions into the Zambian workers' knowledge of participation law 
revealed otherwise. To the contrary, the Memorandum of an ILO 
expert on works councils invited by the Zambian Government a 
few years after the decision to implement the law is damning 
on the quality of knowledge discovered among Zambian workers. 
Professor Weiss writes in part of his Memorandum: 
The main and by far the most important reason for the 
shortcomings observed in the practical functioning of the 
works council is the lack of adequate information and 
education on the role the works council has to play and 
on the substance of the complex issues the council is 
supposed to deal with. This is especially true for elected 
members. But is sometimes, at least to a certain extent, 
is also true for nominated members of management(l0). 
The Memorandum continues: 
.... new members are hardly equipped with a precise 
knowledge of the duties of a works council. Sometimes they 
do not know the Industrial Relations Act and do not even 
receive a copy of it. In some other cases the mere text of 
the Act is their only source of information... Training of 
the new comers is done in most cases by the senior members 
of the council, i. e. those who are serving the second term 
of office. But the expert could observe that even the 
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knowledge of those senior nenbers often does not correspond to 
the minimum required(11). 
An expert from West Germany right expect much higher 
intellectual and functional standards in a works council 
machinery than the Zambian infrastructure could probably 
produce. However, the observations are so basic as to cast 
doubt on claims that five years had been used to provide 
general education on the new system of labour-management 
relations. The only other explanation could be that the wrong 
education was given at a general level, with the consequence 
that the specifics of the 1971 law suffered(12). 
For all the above reasons, it is submitted that the real 
reasons for delaying the 1971 law and for the other 
inconsistencies already observed in Chapter 5 should be found 
elsewhere. This is what we attempt to explain in the next 
section. 
1.2 Alternative reasons for delaying participation legislation 
In this section we show that the main reasons for 
delaying implementation of the 1971 workers' participation 
law lay in factors outside the needs for education and 
training as suggested by official outlines of workers' parti- 
cipation law developments. We suggest that the real reasons 
related to factors of the lack of political support for 
wholesale industrial participation policies in the country. We 
explain that that lack of support was founded in the decline 
of the social and economic value of the reasons which under- 
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pinned the Zambian participation policies in 1969. We also 
suggest that these negative attitudes to participation 
policies in the 1970s were reinforced by the failure of 
government in a One Party State to actually demonstrate the 
practicality of a participatory philosophy. This was so in 
relation to the key area of the management of state corpo- 
rations. 
1.2.1 Political support and the decline of social and 
economic value of theoriginating thesis 
The industrial relations policy of workers' participation 
was explained in Chapters 2 and 3 as having been one among 
several parallel policies taken by the Zambian government to 
redress grievances which had their origin in the colonial 
system. We understood there that the political dimension of 
colonial capital was a principal factor responsible for the 
adoption of participation policies in Zambia where, otherwise, 
the very limited existence of formal employment relationships 
would have excluded those policies from serious attention in 
the 19609. What we argue here is that success of other 
elements of government policy in the 1970s reduced the value 
of industrial relations policies of workers' participation. In 
other words, as the social and economic basis on which 
participation policies were announced in 1969 began to change 
with the rise of indigenous elements in ownership and 
managerial responsibilities, the political legitimacy of 
workers' participation policies weakened. Consequently, the 
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necessity of the law to implement industrial participation 
policies came to be viewed increasingly as superfluous. 
The Zambian government's lack of firmness and subsequent 
dilution of the 1971 legislation indicates, to some extent, 
the pressures under which she was to abandon wholesale 
participation policies. However, the main breakdown in the 
fragile political consensus that had accompanied the 1968-70 
Economic Reforms among the powerful elements in the Zambian 
society came after the legislation had been enacted. Evidence 
of the internal struggle in the 1970s can be traced to'-how 
President Kaunda's rhetoric against capitalism in the domestic 
sphere changed in emphasis from condemnation of the foreign 
and expatriate managers to the indigenous forces, greatly 
assisted to emerge by his own post-colonial development 
policies. 
The date of President Kaunda's turning point in his 
relations with the local bourgeoisie can be pinpointed to his 
Nation of Equals Address of December 1 1972 (13). After 
reference to the point that Economic Reforms, together with 
supporting economic and financial policies, had increased and 
widened the scope of participation in the control of economic 
power by the indigenous people, President Kaunda vent on to 
challenge the local bourgeoisie: 
... There is too much talking, even by businessmen, instead 
of concentrating their efforts, time and money on 
improving their competence in running the industrial and 
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commercial sector. Incompetence, laziness and sheer 
irresponsibility are costing the Zambian entrepreneur so 
much money. Lack of knowledge in the running of 
enterprises and the spirit of get-rich quick have 
destroyed the prospects of a number of them. Some of them 
indulge in unnecessary extravagance. They have been too 
quick to buy expensive cars and property before their 
businesses are off the ground. I warn again. Conspicuous 
consumption is a path to error(14). 
The rest of the speech shows that this was not fatherly 
advice. Underneath it was political irritation with those 
whose circumstances had changed and who no longer prescribed, 
if ever they did, to egalitarian principles of Humanism and 
its economic and industrial policies. This became much clearer 
the following day when the President addressed himself 
specifically to national leaders, who formed the majority of 
indigenous businessmen any way: 
Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates: In the life of every 
nation, as in the life of every man, there are moments of 
decision - decision to be or not to be. One of the moments 
for Zambian leaders is now... We are in an era of great 
change and great decisions which will have far reaching 
effects on the lives of the people of this country for 
many years to come(15). 
The message to these people, whom he was telling yesterday 
to run their businesses efficiently, was that they should now 
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sell their enterprises or turn then into cooperatives; that 
they should not own commercial farms any longer; or any houses 
for rent(16). By this date of course, the U. N. I. P leadership 
had voted for the One Party State political system, 'and it was 
just two weeks from official inauguration(17). 
The greatest irony of the matter, at least seen with 
hindsight, is that leading local investors were being 
persuaded to surrender their investments when the economic 
problems from which Zambia has yet to recover were looming on 
the horizon. An it turned out, low copper prices, closure of 
the border with Ian Smith's Rhodesia, the Middle East oil 
crisis and the general state of the world economy in the 1970s 
caused in Zambia, almost immediately, domestic problems of 
shortages of foreign exchange, of basic consumer goods, raw 
materials for industry, and increased unemployment and 
redundancies(18). In respect of the latter two, the Government 
was forced, in September 1975, to rush through the Employment 
(Special Provisions) Act(19), which attempted to stop indis- 
criminate dismissals of employees on account of the economic 
problems. This law obliged employers to filter dismissals of 
employees through district labour offices. 
The point being argued is that such a coincidence of local 
problems served to reinforce the questioning of the value of 
industrial relations policies of workers' participation in the 
country by strengthening the hand of those inside and outside 
government who now openly challenged the purpose of Indus- 
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trial Participatory Democracy. It was reasoned that the new 
Zambian managers pushed in by Zambianisation policies be given 
the chance to grow in their jobs, acquire experience, and be 
able to take decisions that would produce results for the 
economic good of the country as a whole(20). This analysis 
demonstrates that the value of participation policies were 
questioned and challenged more emphatically after the legis- 
lation had been enacted. 
1.2.2 Constellation of structural Factors 
Reinforcing negative attitudes towards workers' partici- 
pation was the failure of government in a One Party State to 
translate the philosophy of participation in the overall 
political-administrative system. As it was observed in Chapter 
4, the creation of the One Party State in Zambia in 1972 
brought serious doubts on the scope and quality of workers' 
participation that could be achieved in the country. The 
doctrine of Supremacy of the Party to which UNIP subscribed 
entailed that there would be no meaningful institutional 
independence because all other power institutions in the 
country were obliged in law and practice to accept subordina- 
tion to the Party, and by extension the decisions of the 
dominant personalities of the government. The irony of the 
Zambian developments was in the fact state intervention was 
prevalent in the public sector. After the nationalisation 
programme the state sector became the largest employer of 
industrial and commercial labour. This was therefore an area 
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where the state could have demonstrated her beliefs in the 
participatory democracy by allowing maximum interplay between 
managers and workers in the decisions of companies. The 
reality was far fron that. As we indicated in Chapter 4, since 
the creation of the parastatal system in Zambia there has 
existed a fundamental grievance against the manner of state 
intervention in decisions of individual companies. 
Formally, most companies in the state sector of the 
economy were registered under the Companies Act(21). But, 
unlike private companies, their boards of directors and 
managements did not take the important decisions which formal 
authority implied. This was because such important decisions 
were subject to general Party and government policies as well 
as specific directives. Ben Turok states the common practices: 
Government prescribed projects and programmes, insisted on 
selecting locations, appointed and dismissed personnel, 
laid down conditions of service and set pricing policies 
and levels. They advocated freedom for the corporations in 
the choice of means in the persuit of government 
identified ends(22) 
Later the same author asserts, 
Even in the much more streamlined structure adopted in 
1978 the basic contradictions remain: the state controls 
the ZIMCO board, and government imposes certain policies 
so that there is no pure autonomy at enterprise level. 
Calls for greater autonomy are repeatedly made by local 
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settler entrepreneurs and private businessmen generally 
and the government periodically agrees but, in actuality, 
nothing changes(23). 
What caused so much offence in the state sector was the 
unpredictable and opportunistic manner of political interve- 
ntion in the affairs of individual companies. This resulted 
mainly from the fact that the Party, in particular, never 
maintained a disciplined machinery of involvement in company 
affairs. Thus, in the absence of coherent structures of 
accountability, the Party usually intervened on the basis of 
speculation and rumours about mismanagement and misappro- 
priation in companies. Such allegations and the intervention 
they gave rise to caused offence to managers and perpetrated 
mistrust between these and workers, especially the more vocal 
ones suspected of being informers to the Party hierarchy(24). 
In the face of unregulated political power, even courts 
appeared helpless in giving firm guidance as to how 
responsibility had to be shared in state companies(25). In 
context, the talk about implementing the law of workers' 
participation in management decisions sounded far removed 
from the Zambian political and social reality of the 19708. 
At stake, in fact, was the overall system of decision- 
making in the country as the institutions and values of the 
One Party State coalesced with the liberal traditions 
bequeathed by the colonial system. The American based 
publication, Africa Contemporary Records, puts the point for 
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the year 1976 thus: 
The major controversial issues in 1976 were the role of 
the Central Committee of United National Independence 
Party in relation to the Cabinet; the role of the 
parastatala (i. e state companies) and the place of private 
enterprise; the revolutionary changes in education 
contained in the report on Education for Reform; the 
policy of workers' participation(26); and the state of 
student opinion at the University of Zambia(27). 
Elsewhere, but in the same year, the publication adds, 
The modernising elite of highly trained Zambians engaged 
in running the commanding heights of the economy - the 
parastatal corporations- or in private enterprises were 
irked by what they felt to be unnecessary constraints 
imposed by the President and the Party in their pursuit of 
Socialist and Egalitarian principles. The Party militants 
on the other hand felt that the 'conspicuous consumption' 
and other inequalities in the Zambian system required 
tougher action than the President was prepared to 
take(28). 
In summary, we can see here what appear to have been the 
factors which held the Zambian workers' participation law on 
the statute book. There was little political support for 
wholesale participation policies in the 1970s. This was 
basically because any social and economic value which these 
policies held in the 1960s, had lost content in the different 
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circumstances of the 1970s. The failure of the new structural 
changes to satisfactorily address the distribution of power in 
the broader society also worked against -implementation of the 
1971 workers' participation law. Two developments could be 
linked directly to these oppositional forces to the speedy 
implementation of workers' participation laws. 
One was the decision in 1974 to separate and bring into 
operation the rest of the Industrial Relations Act minus the 
workers' participation law in Part 7. The decision to separate 
workers' participation provisions was not controlled by 
considerations of education and training for the new labour- 
management system, but precisely because any political support 
which the government had to enact that law in 1971 had 
dwindled away for the purposes of implementing it after 1972. 
Thus, it was necessary to separate the more controversial part 
in order to implement the rest of the Act. 
The other consequence was that once the state decided in 
1976 to go ahead with participation laws, it did so against 
the good wishes of managers, trade unions and a significant 
portion of government officials. The net result of this 
strategy was to push even further the industrial relations 
policy of workers' participation into the realm of the state 
and the Party. The details of this line of development and the 
results gained by state and Party control of participation 
policies after 1976 will be introduced and assessed properly 
in Chapter 7. 
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1.3 Reasons for Implementing Participation Law 
Against the background we have outlined, why was the law 
of 1971 implemented at all? The basic reason, as was the very 
beginning of the Zambian participation policies, lay in 
political expedience. To appreciate this point we need to 
consider the reasons and sequence of events which kept Zambian 
participation policies high on the political agenda beyond the 
1970s. There are three main reasons: President Kaunda's 
personal interests; the discovery of new political rationales 
under the One Party system; and the' coincidence of favourable 
international developments. 
A. Kaunda's personal interests in participation projects 
President Kaunda has had personal interest in amalgams of 
schemes which involve workers in industry. His corpus of 
writings and speeches are full of praise for schemes as varied 
as the Scott Bader and John Lewis Partnership in Britain, 
Codetermination in Germany, Self-management in Yugoslavia and 
others in France, Ireland, Switzerland, India and China(29). 
His inability to select and recommend one scheme may have been 
part of the problem at public policy level. But, perhaps, his 
real interests in social innovation in the employment sphere 
cannot be questioned. It would be surprising that such a 
strong personal interest from a dominant leader would not have 
helped to give life to the 1971 law and participation policies 
in general. 
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B. Discovery of new political rationales under One Party 
In 1974 President Kaunda published a sequel to his 
Humanism in Zambia pamphlet of 1967. We saw in Chapter three 
that in Humanism and a Guide to its Implementation Part 2, 
President Kaunda moved from the simplicity of the village 
model to a more ideological stance advocating seizure of 
industries by 'progressive managers and workers'. This point 
was obscure then but now it is clear that the context was in 
reference to the struggle with the 'modernising elites'. The 
explanation is as follows. Political differences on the 
consequences and direction of economic policies left open 
areas of policy, such as workers' participation, where 
consensus was assumed but not politically tested when they 
were first introduced. These differences however did not 
have a humbling effect, instead, they provoked political and 
economic radicalism among the elements in effective 
constitutional control. In- the ensuing struggle, workers' 
participation and its institutions are translated into 
potential weapons to be used against capitalist tendencies in 
the domestic sphere. 
These wholly new bases for workers' participation policy 
legitimacy, we argue, gave added impetus to the government in 
a One Party State to forge ahead with wholesale participation 
policies. The One Party state discovered for itself new 
political rationales for continuing workers' participation 
policies. This explains why the decision to implement the 
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1971 legislation was preceded by a renewed search for a more 
radical legal framework of participation. The creation of IPD 
in August 1975 was a logical outcome of these changes in 
official thinking. The law on the statute book in 1974 was not 
up to the tasks required for 'industrial seizure', hence, 
the search for a different legal framework through the agency 
of institutions more amenable to Party control. 
C. Coincidence in international developments. 
By the middle of the 1970s, the Zambian workers' parti- 
cipation programme also received a favourable push forward 
from international developments(30). As the whirlwind of 
Industrial and Economic Democracy swept Europe, from about 
1974 to 78, the Zambian leaders could not be more delighted 
than to shame domestic critics of Industrial Participatory 
Democracy. For instance, after reciting worldwide develop- 
ments, a Senior Economist at the new IPD wrote: 
We are today living in an era in which the dream of 
equality and fair play in economic and socio-political 
life has fired peoples' imaginations throughout the 
world ... If we continue to resist this wind of change for 
too long, we may soon find the very economic power 
structures we are trying to preserve being hurriedly 
dismantled. We should not allow that to happen to our 
children(31). 
The benefits from international developments were more 
than providing moral and political support for the Zambian 
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leadership. The same international discussions, especially 
those organised by the International Labour Organisation to 
which Zambia had access, were concluding a worldwide 'general 
disenchantment with the functions of works councils'. In 
particular, the Oslo symposium of 1974 at which Zambia was 
represented, wrote in its summing that, 
Many examples were given from various parts of the world 
to show that the works council as a concept is not, 
perhaps, an ideal solution to enterprise-level employer- 
employee relations. The discussion has shown that there 
are important reasons for this. One of them seems to be 
the purely advisory and consultative function of a works 
council without any real decision-making power. While some 
participants expressed surprise about the lack of workers' 
interest in the operation of works councils, others made 
the point that a purely advisory arrangement under which 
people receive information and may express an opinion, but 
have no influence on whether this opinion is taken into 
account or not is not likely to create interest or 
enthusiasm(32). 
Such conclusions no doubt were informed by"intereat in the 
possibility of forcing changes in corporate structures which 
were already happening in some countries of Northern Europe, 
where the ILO placed the venue of the Conference. For 
Zambians, there were other sombre lessons too. By delaying 
their own law, they were now going out to international fora 
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only to learn about the failures of a workers' participation 
system awaiting them on the statute book. 
The main point in all this is that despite the decline of 
the original rationales for participation policies and the 
opposition encountered, many other factors favoured a 
continuation of the industrial relations policy of workers' 
participation started in the different circumstances of 1969. 
More interestingly too, the new pressures in the 1970s 
encouraged the examination of the 1971 law. 
This in a nutshell is the background against which the 
1971 law was implemented in May 1976. Though the operative 
Statutory Instrument was meant to coincide with the May Day 
Celebrations of 1976, it actually gave a grace period of six 
months within which companies affected by the legislation 
were obliged to form works councils. This meant that the law 
did not become technically binding until November 1976. By 
this date, it should be emphasised, the terrain of the Zambian 
participation policies had changed dramatically. The search 
for better laws under new policy rationales was well under way 
even before the 1971 legislation had been tested. 
The contradictions and uncertainties which surrounded 
implementation of participation legislation left in their wake 
two developments which have characterised Zambian participa- 
tion policies since 1976: on the one hand, state officials, at 
times with consultation with labour market parties, kept 
searching for new workers' participation schemes; on the 
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other, labour market parties, with encouragement of state 
officials, kept attempting to implement a legislation whose 
fate-seemed politically decided. The next section examines 
the actual experience of the 1971 law in the context of such 
ambiguous relationships between the state and other industrial 
relations parties in-connection with this law and partici- 
pation policies in general. 
2. Practical Experience With The 1971 Law 
2.1 Introduction 
The object in this section is to analyse and explain the 
opportunities and problems presented by the 1971 legislation. 
In particular,. we shall highlight and reinforce some of the 
conclusions which have been reached about the operation of 
-'nrkers' participation law in Zambia. By 1984, many of the 
practical problems and opportunities presented by the 1971 
legislation had become familiar to trade unions, managers and 
the Industrial Relations Court. We have examined the 
documented materials in this respect, but we have also added 
on the results of our own investigations. We begin by looking 
at the opportunities which the legislation presented, then we 
shall examine the more general problems of the law. The final 
part will consider the specific legal issues which experience 
with the law has presented for the Zambian industrial 
relations system. 
Before we describe these experiences, some general comment 
may be helpful. Anyone exploring the benefits of a workers' 
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participation legislation or any other participation scheme 
quickly encounters difficulties of assessment. The impact of 
workers' participation upon management decisions is not 
something that can be measured in any precise and quantitative 
fashion. Moreover, because management could have formed 
committees for consultation and information with employees on 
their own volition if they thought it would have helped with 
industrial relations, it is very difficult to isolate and 
account for the specific contribution of law to the quality 
and quantity of processes of information and consultation in 
industry. 
These general points are exacerbated in the Zambian 
context owing to the lack of extra information about the 
processes of consultation and information in industry. What is 
known about information and consultation in Zambian industries 
comes predominantly from companies which fall under part 7 of 
the Industrial Relations Act. There is virtually no 
'-formation about the industrial relations situation in the 
majority of enterprises which employ less than 100 eligible 
employees(33). This dearth of information deprives us of 
important variables which could have enabled us assess more 
usefully the contribution of law to processes of information 
and consultation in the Zambian industry. No attempt was made 
in this study to correct this anomalous position, but the 
dangers of exaggerating or understating the law's contribution 
to workers' participation need to be stressed. In this case, 
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we have chosen to rely on our own conclusions drawn from 
discussions conducted at the fieldwork stage(34). 
2.2 Opportunities offered by the 1971 law 
There are three main benefits which were cited as flowing 
from implementation of workers' participation legislation in 
Zambian industry: - the encouragement of positive industrial 
relations attitudes; increased general education for workers; 
and the provision of added channels of communication between 
workers and employers. 
A. THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF POSITIVE ATTITUDES 
It is reported that workers' participation law has 
fostered positive attitudes to industrial relations and more 
particularly to the idea of workers' Involvement in the 
affairs of companies. We encountered this view generally and 
specifically. 
At Specialty Foods Ltd, we were told by the Personnel 
31anager how management were eager to reconstitute a works 
council after the previous one had fallen through following a 
fire at the factory in 1986. The Manager, Kenny Banda, 
explained that the company encouraged consultation in order 
to improve industrial relations and to-seek useful ideas from 
the workforce. To explain his point, he stated that in Africa 
when the spirit of cooperation is encouraged by law, it finds 
a natural ground in the cultural temperament of the people. 
For him, "processes of consultation were not alien to the 
African mental thought"(35). 
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These favourable views were confirmed in a separate 
interview with the Chairman of the works council at the same 
company. The Chairman, Moses Mwenya, reported employee 
satisfaction with the way the management of Specialty Foods 
had encouraged workers to make suggestions to help some of the 
problems of the company. He cited in particular the way 
employees had come up with the idea of distributing peanut 
seeds to local farmers in the Copperbelt region in order to 
forestall shortages of peanuts from the traditional supply 
source in the Eastern Province(36). 
At a different company, Medwich Clothing Limited, we were 
shown some charts by the Personnel Manager, Lamford Mukumbo, 
which the General Manager, Murray Sanderson, uses to convey 
information to employees in pictorial form. These demonstrate 
to employees how company money is spent on dividends, on 
purchase of supplies, salaries and other heads of business 
expenditure. We were not in a position to assess the quality 
of information distributed and in the absence of the General 
Manager at the time of our visit, the Personnel Manager felt 
unable to give us a copy for detailed study. However, it is 
fair to mention that Medwich has also been running a profit 
sharing scheme for all employees confirmed in their positions 
since 1972. This may explain the company's liberal policies 
towards the distribution of company information, though not 
necessarily the quality and quantity of information given to 
employees. 
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The case for positive attitudes by managers is 
collaborated too by statements from the Zambia Federation of 
Employers who have encouraged retention of the 1971 scheme 
of works councils(37). The extent to which factors such as 
self interest, the country's economic problems or fear of 
imposition of radical schemes have contributed to employer 
assessments of consultation and information could not be 
verified, but they cannot be ruled out in any assessment of 
the Zambian experience with the participation legislation(38). 
B. INCREASED WORKERS' EDUCATION 
A second benefit said to have been brought by the law on 
works councils in Zambia are the opportunities for increased 
workers' education about industrial and commercial affairs. It 
is argued that with industrial workers composed mainly of 
people drifting from rural peasantry environments the 
opportunity to sit on a management committee and listen to how 
managers frame problems of industry has proved to be a source 
of learning about industrial life for worker councillors and 
those employees who attend training workshops and seminars. 
The educational value of participation law was parti- 
cularly expressed by Kabwe Kasase, the Director of Education 
at the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and C. P. A. Banda, Human 
Resources Manager at Scaw Foundries Ltd and formerly Training 
Manager at Zambia Federation of Employers(39). The views of 
these men, who by occupation are inclined to emphasise educa- 
tional elements, were supplemented by complaints from worker 
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councillors and Personnel Managers who felt that the IPA was 
not doing enough in the field of education to make workers 
know more about-their rights and problems of. industries(40). 
The actual importance of works councils as training 
grounds was illustrated by a discovery which struck us 
incidentally when we attempted to put the fieldwork notes 
together. The Personnel Managers at Specialty Foods and 
liedwich Clothing and the Industrial, Relations officer at 
Zambia National Breweries were previous works councillors in 
their respective companies(41). Also, an Assistant Zianager at 
one of the companies told us that their current chairman of 
the works council was not 'a happy man'. Apparently, when his 
predecessor was elevated to a senior position, this chairman 
led a campaign for his colleague's removal from chairmanship 
of the works council on grounds that 'ba mu shita' [he has 
been bought]. Next time when management had an opportunity for 
promotion in the department where he worked, the management 
respected his principles and passed him over. This was the 
reason why he was reportedly unhappy(42). 
We would require a large sample to draw a general pattern 
out of these coincidences. Nonetheless, it in reasonable to 
conclude that the educational role of the works council system 
is widely recognised. But as the examples of personnel 
officers show, the learning is not necessarily always in the 
interest of employees. Employers have used the works council 
system to promote their interests in maintaining company 
-280- 
values and authority. 
C. ADDED CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION 
The other opportunity which works council law has 
presented is that of an added channel of communication between 
workers and employers. Communication exists between employers 
and trade unions, but the works council law provide an even 
more systematized line of communication between managers and 
employees. Yorum Chibwe, Deputy Secretary-General [Admini- 
stration] of the National Union of Commercial and Industrial 
Workers (NUCIW) told us that where works councils have 
'effective' worker representatives, works councils are an 
added source of pressure on management to adopt policies that 
are agreed to by the bulk of employees. 
In general, however, Chibve, whose union represents most 
of the employees whose companies are affected by workers' 
participation law(43), was critical of the value of the second 
channel of communication to management. He explained that it 
Was his experience that works councils become a source of 
'confusion' in the reading and interpretation of collective 
agreements. He cited cases at NIEC Agencies Limited in Lusaka 
and Nitrogen Chemicals in Kafue where the union leadership 
attended to sort out problems brought by "unnecessary 
laws"(44). This however, must be read more as a criticism of 
the law itself than of the avenues which the works council 
system presents to employees and managers. 
For instance, Moses Mvenya, at Specialty Foods Limited 
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told us how the works council there 'convinced' the management 
to arrange for a private Medical Doctor to attend the company 
First Aid clinic on a regular basis and how, on behalf of the 
works council, he had appealed to the Managing Director to 
reduce food prices in the company canteen(45). 
To be sure, there are mixed perceptions about the value 
of a second channel of communication to the management, but 
it was our impression that the works council system offered 
opportunities to workers to bring some of their problems to 
the attention of employers, even though these might have been 
handled through the established trade union channels. 
Summary 
In the introduction to this section we pointed to the 
problem of how to assess the benefits of workers' partici- 
pation law. Attention was drawn to the absence of control 
materials in Zambia which might have enabled us to reach more 
firm conclusions about the contribution of the 1971 law to the 
processes of consultation in Zambian industries. From what we 
have been able to do, there is justification for the view that 
works councils have had some positive effects on the 
industrial relations of companies operating the works council 
system in the country. []hat is more difficult to assess is the 
actual contribution of the law to these industrial relations 
effects. It would seem that the general benefits reported owe 
more to the fact of the existence of councils in these 
companies than to what the law mandates. There is sufficient 
-282- 
evidence in literature elsewhere establishing the same posi- 
tive correlation between information and consultation schemes 
and employee and employer assessments of the processes of 
industrial relations. In fact, the evidence is strongest in 
industrial relations systems where there is no works council 
legislation at all(46). One reason is that the assessments of 
consultative schemes must necessarily begin from the widely 
acknowledged prior rights of employers to unilateral control 
in work relations. Anything done to mitigate the effects of 
unilateral control rights, however small, is likely to yield 
favourable responses from all those who would want to 
encourage innovation in employment relations, Where employers 
and employees are compelled to stay in committees by law, 
subjective assessments of the benefits come almost naturally 
as all parties attempt to rationalise their factual situation. 
Therefore, what we conclude is that the general benefits 
reported to have been produced by workers' participation law 
in Zambia should be attributed more to the fact of , the 
existence of employer-employee councils than to the effects of 
the legislation itself. That is to say, the same results might 
have been reported even if there was no legislation requiring 
such committees in Zambia(47). This view of the Zambian works 
council system is helpful in reconciling what is claimed for 
the 1971 law with the severity of criticisms of that law, to 
which we now turn. 
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2.3 Practical Problems Presented by the Law of 1971 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In seminars and workshops since 1975, the problems of Part 
7 of the Industrial Relations Act for the Zambian legal and 
industrial relations systems have been thrashed out, so much 
so that in 1983, Manfred Weiss, hired by the Zambian 
government to give a specialist view, conceded that, 
In view of the fact that a number of weaknesses have 
become evident, initiatives aimed at strengthening and 
adjusting the system can be undertaken without further 
research(48). 
As Weiss himself emphasised again(49), many of the 
problems cited about the 1971 law are not legal as such, in 
the sense that they raised complex technical rules. Instead, 
the problems of the Zambian law have involved policy decisions 
which the Zambian -Government has either been unable or 
unwilling to take in order to improve and extend the 1971 
legal framework of workers' participation(50). The fact that 
the law was flawed in its selection of conceptual and 
legislative structure was discussed at some length in Chapter 
5. In this section we first indicate in brief the nature of 
problems of the law cited by practitioners. We shall then go 
on to substantiate the analysis in Chapter 5 by reference to 
the experience of works councils in the Industrial Relations 
Court. 
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2.3.2 Nature of the problems presented by the law 
The practical problems presented by the 1971 law cannot 
be broken into any useful analytical categories because the 
criticism cuts across the whole legislation, as it must if its 
structural concepts were flawed. The fundamental complaint of 
trade unions is that the threshold of 100 eligible employees 
required to trigger the formation of works councils operates 
to exclude a large number of employees from the workers' 
participation law(51). For those to whom the law applies, 
there are some specific problems too: the lack of minimum 
educational standards for worker councillors; the lack of time 
for councillors to report to workers; the short term of office 
of councillors; and inadequate penalties for violation of the 
legislation by companies(52). 
Other problems cited about this law involve structural 
arrangements. Examples relate to assertions that works 
councils have no power; the overlapping functions of unions 
and works councils; and rivalry between different committees 
at places of work(53). 
While perhaps some of the irritations with the law could 
be removed by simple amendments, for instance, increasing the 
term of office from 2 to 4 years, and increasing the frequency 
of meetings between the works council and employees, others 
would require a fundamental review of the industrial relations 
system and political apparatuses. That would be the way to 
deal with problems of trade unions and works councils on one 
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hand, and between these and Party Co®sitteea on the other. 
The Weiss Memorandum to the Zambian Government reminded it 
where the initiative to improve the works council system lay. 
Professor Weiss wrote emphatically, 
Firm recommendations on how to develop the works council 
system can only be made after clear decisions have been 
taken on the aims to be pursued through this system. It is 
obvious that such decisions can only be taken by the 
Zambians themselves(54). 
By the end of 1989, no firm decisions had been taken on 
the 1971 law. Three draft statutes(55) were known to have been 
drawn in an attempt to redress some of the operational 
problems which practitioners had identified, but these had not 
come to fruition due mainly to government ambivalence with the 
works council system(56). 
3. Works council law in the Industrial Relations Court 
One of the main allegations made in Chapter 5 was that the 
juridical composition of Zambian works councils made these 
ill-equipped to enforce the rights and privileges granted by 
the legislation. The analytical reason advanced was that the 
works council law lacked properties suitable to the 
adversarial adjudication process of the common law followed in 
Zambia. In particular, the law lacked properties of precision 
in the allocation of rights and duties, as well as sufficient 
incentives for individual councillors to take up the risks 
posed by the adversarial system. What we can demonstrate in 
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our assessment of the experience of works council law is that 
because of these problems of the 1971 legislation, works 
councils have been unable to take up the advantages offered 
by the Industrial Relations Court to coerce management to 
comply even with those limited rights which the councils were 
given. After a brief examination of the position of the 
industrial relations court in Zambia, we shall signify the 
exceptional absence of works councils in the machinery of the 
court. From there we shall explain why the composition of 
councils is the more likely factor for the absence of works 
councils in the adjudication processes of the labour court. We 
argue this point by showing that the reluctance of councils to 
pursue the management in the labour court is not because A) 
there are no cases of violation, B) the industrial relations 
court has not favoured intervention in management decisions or 
C) it has not imposed deterrent penalties on the management. 
3.1 The position of the Industrial Relations Court 
The Industrial Relations Court occupies a central role in 
the Zambian industrial relations system(57). It is both the 
court of first instance and of appeal in industrial relations 
matters. Its jurisdiction and powers are widely defined to 
include adjudication over all disputes arising from rights, 
obligations, privileges and immunities given workers as 
individuals or as a group by the Industrial Relations Act, 
1971. This means the works council law falls squarely within 
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Court, composed 
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of a legally qualified Chairman and two specialist members who 
may not be necessarily lawyers. 
3.2 The exceptional absence of councils in the labour Court 
To make a successful case that the composition of works 
councils is a problem in the Zambian legal system, we need to 
show in the first place that indeed the works councils do 
not fight cases in the Industrial Relations Court. The 
evidence for this is provided by the number of cases in which 
works councils have been party to proceedings challenging 
management decisions. Such cases are very few and exceptional. 
Our own research into cases decided by the Industrial 
Relations Court in the period 1976 to 1986 has yielded only 
two instances: 
The first one is Works Council RCM LTdLuanshya Division 
v. Management (Luanshya Division RCM Ltd)(58). The works 
council there petitioned for a declaration that the transfer 
of a Mr. Hugh Campbell Arthur from Chibuluma Division of RCM 
to Luanshya be of no effect because the transfer did not have 
the approval of the works council as required by section 72 
(2)b of the Industrial Relations Act. Management, however, had 
complied with section 71 by informing the works council of the 
appointment of Mr. Arthur as Manager in charge of Engineering 
at the Respondent's Luanshya Division. On the facts, the Court 
held that prior approval was not necessary because the rights 
of the works council under s. 72 were restricted to decisions 
affecting eligible employees. The council had no rights in 
-288- 
the deployment of managerial personnel beyond mere rights of 
information. 
The report of this case does not indicate the reasons why 
the works council was able to bring the case in 1976(59). 
The second case is Kafue Textiles Works Council v. Kafue 
Textiles Zambia Ltd(60). An Industrial Relations Officer was 
dismissed without approval of the works council as required by 
975. On the application of the works council, it was held that 
the dismissal, -even for an officer still on probation, was a 
contravention of the law and consequently the respondents were 
found guilty and fined. -It transpires in N. II. T. A. W (D. Ndhovu)_ 
v. Commercial Motors Ltd(61) that the Industrial Relations 
Officer in the Kafue case was himself the management represe- 
ntative on the works council. In the circumstances, the 
application by Kafue Textiles Works Council should be regarded 
as a case of self interest, in the sense that the council 
invoked its powers under pressure to preserve a colleague's 
job. 
We have found no other evidence of cases in which the 
works council has been party to proceedings against the 
management. The companies we visited during fieldwork all 
denied knowledge of a works council taking its management to 
court. Thus, there are solid grounds for questioning why 
the works council council is almost absent in the machinery of 
the Industrial Relations Court. 
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3.3 The Unlikely reasons for the councils' absence 
A. Violations of works council law 
It cannot be supposed that works councils are absent 
before the Industrial Relations Court because there are no 
incidences of violation of works council law. The number of 
court cases indeed always underestimate the reality of legal 
violation(62). Even then, there is sufficient evidence of 
works council law being violated. Much of this comes from the 
few cases that manage to filter through the adjudication 
machinery of the Industrial Relations Court. Three problem 
areas can be distinguished among the cases that come before 
the court: 
1. 'Thorn in the flesh' cases (s66) 
Section 66 of works council legislation provides that, 
No employee shall be discriminated against or made to 
suffer any penalty or disadvantage by reason of his 
membership of the works council. 
Cases of councillors falling foul of work place rules have 
come before the Industrial Relations Court alleging that their 
selection for dismissal was purely because they were outspoken 
council members or, as it were, a 'thorn in the flesh' of 
management. Examples are Paul Gwese v Roan Consolidated Mines 
Ltd (Ndola Copper Refinery)(63); Jetty James Banda v Zambia 
Pork Products Ltd(64); and Aran Mwansa v. ROP (1975) Ltd(65). 
In the Mwansa case, the applicant was successful in instancing 
how he stood up to management on salary assessments, training 
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and investment policies. He also told the court how the works 
council of which he was Secretary caused dismissal of four 
'top management' perpetrating fraud on the company. This case, 
and those similarly situated, indicate, to some extent, the 
level of management violation of works council law. 
Yet, all these allegations only come to light when an 
individual is fighting for his job. The councils have not been 
shown to use the elaborate grievance procedures in sections 
72-3, let alone to fight cases through to the Court. In Maybin 
Nkwanisha v. National Agricultural Marketing Board(66), the 
applicant was advised at his first visit to the Industrial 
Relations Court to report his grievance with the management 
to the works council in his company. When he did so, the court 
records, "the works council were dragging their feet. In March 
1981, he was told they could not handle his case as their term 
of office had come to the end"(67). Why, it may be asked, was 
the council shirking its responsibility under the law? 
2. Redundancy cases. -(s72__(2)d) 
According to the above law, any declaration of redundancy 
of an eligible employee without the approval of the works 
council is null and void [vide C. A. Jere v. ZAMHORT681. It was 
also held in the case of N. II. T. A. N (D. Ndhovu) v. Commercial 
Motors Ltd(69) that, 
Any employer who does not follow the procedures laid down 
in part 7 of the Act is committing an offence under 
section 77, but at the same time the contract of employ- 
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ment is not terminated and as such the aggrieved party is 
entitled to reinstatement if on the balance of probability 
he proves this(70). 
However, the Industrial Relations Court having held in 
another case, Henry Mulando vs. National Agricultural Marke- 
ting Board(71), that an individual has no locus standi to 
complain about management breach of section 72(2), individuals 
whose rights were violated under works council law were putin 
legal quandary in instances where works councils were helpless 
in taking matters to the court. 
Thus, it remained again to the Industrial Relations Court 
to open a window of opportunity in the law by allowing 
individuals to bypass what could only be the functional 
_: 1passe of the works councils. This came in Mporokoso and 
Himoonde v. Zambia Cattle Farming Company Ltd(72). The 
applicants were declared redundant without the consent of the 
works council. As part of their evidence they brought the 
employee Chairman of the works council as a witness. It was 
held that because the testimony of the works council Chairman 
proved a breach of legislation on part of the management, 
the court could evoke rule 55 of the Industrial Relations 
Court (Rules) 1974, to enjoin the works council as an' 
applicant. Rule 55 states that, 
Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or 
otherwise affect the power of the Court to make such order 
as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent 
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abuse of the process of the court(73). 
In effect, the court was prepared to use its discretion 
under rule 55 to force works councils to bring matters to the 
court where management breaches caused individual injuries 
under workers' participation law. Since this procedure calls 
for councillors willing to be witnesses and/or reliance on 
the powers of the court to summon members of the works 
councils, it is inherently unsatisfactory as there would 
always be pressure on an individual to consider not to 
Jeopardize his colleagues' relations with the management. This 
is in fact the experience borne out by the next group of 
cases. 
3. Watch Dog Function Cases (s74) 
The implications of section 74 were commented upon in 
Chapter 5. It is symptomatic of the unreality to require 
works councils as composed in Zambia to admonish management 
for breaches of law, work rules and collective agreements that 
no examples of cases to that effect can be found before the 
industrial relations court. 
Indeed, while strict compliance with the procedure under 
section 74 (2)(3) would have required the union to wait until 
the works council hands its cases over to the union, in 
practice, unions have taken on cases involving violations of 
law, work rules or collective agreements without reference to 
the prior rights of works councils under the law. As our 
analysis of section 72 rights in Chapter 5 indicated, part of 
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the explanation is that trade unions have concurrent rights 
in the subjects covered by section 72. The other reason is 
that the Industrial Relations Court itself has shown no 
inclination to require evidence of the works council failure 
to resolve breaches of the law with the management before 
union rights could be invoked under section 74. 
In fact, the Court seems to have encouraged the process by 
proclaiming the principle that, 
in cases where the individual has no locus standi, a 
claimant or applicant can under the umbrella of the union 
ask the court for a specific remedy as provided for under 
any particular section of the Industrial Relations 
Act(74). 
This rule is consistent with the court's rather 
'unsophisticated' view in Claudius Sakala and others v. Zambia 
Electricity Supply Corporation(75), that the union is 'the 
mother body' of the works council. But even assuming that that 
is the correct relationship, it is still confirmation of the 
assessment that the trade union is better able to act as a 
body than the works council. 
Summary 
The object of the foregoing analysis was to demonstrate 
that works councils were absent in the adjudication process 
of the Industrial Relations court not because there were no 
issues to bring before the court. The evidence points the 
other way. The ability of individual employees and trade 
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unions to engage the Industrial Relations court in the very 
areas in which councils were supposed to be active suggests 
that there may be factors either internal or external to works 
councils which distroyed the incentive for councils to 
stretch the legal process. 
In the next two sections we seek to show that whatever the 
reasons, these could not possibly have included the attitudes 
of the Industrial Relations Court to managerial power. 
B. The Industrial Relations Court and Management 
Prerogatives 
The position of the Industrial Relations Court in matters 
affecting decisions of the management can be observed at two 
levels. There are those industrial relations cases in which 
decisions are overtly influenced by political intervention in 
management decisions. The others are the more normal exercise 
of management prerogatives which may still cause injury to 
individual employees and therefore open to legal challenge on 
grounds of fairness. The Court's willingness to derogate from 
strict enforcement of management prerogatives has depended, 
to some extent, on the balance of forces behind a given 
managerial decision complained of. 
1. Cases under direct influence of political power 
In the cases where the management has pleaded political 
'force majeure'(76), the industrial Relations Court, and the 
High Court too, have had to do a difficult balancing act 
between upholding the rights of individuals at work, which the 
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Philosophy of Humanism proclaimed,. and turning a blind eye to 
the predicament caused by managements' political parameters. 
In this group of cases, the management have often indicated 
in defence to complaints that non-compliance with the law was 
a result of pressure from the government of the Republic of 
Zambia. Redundancy cases are an example in the public sector, 
where Government directed company reorganisations and closures 
[vide Maybin Nkwanisha v. National Agricultural Marketing 
Board(77)1 C. A Jere v ZAMHORT(78)]. In the High Court case of 
Mumba v Zambia Fisheries and Fish Marketing Company Ltd(79), a 
reduction in a Company Secretary's remuneration package as a 
result of Government directives was at issue. While in 
Tresphous Kuseya v Zambia Engineering and Contracting Company 
Ltd(80), the Industrial Relations Court was confronted with a 
4ismissal of an employee induced by direct appeals to 
management by the Provincial and District Party hierarchy of 
Lusaka. 
The pattern of resolving these disputes is interesting to 
our analysis. In Mumba and Jere, where political intervention 
was held to be common cause, the High Court and the Industrial 
Relations Court respectively upheld management pleas based on 
the doctrine of frustration(81). In Nkwaniaha, correspondence 
between the Cabinet office (ie the Government Secretariat) and 
the General Manager revealed that he was told to go ahead and 
"start negotiations with the union". The court took this as 
evidence that the redundancy exercise was meant to be done 
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with full compliance with the law and thus held that the 
management's failure to comply was a breach. on the other 
hand, in' Kuseya, the court flatly refused to accept manage- 
ment's timidity in the face of political pressure. 
In that case the applicant had marked 'NO' against the 
Eagle (symbol of the ruling Party) on a sample ballot paper 
displayed on the board on company premises in the run up to 
Presidential Elections in 1978. A Party Committee Member who 
saw Kuseya do this reported to the Party Regional Office, 'who 
interpreted the complained action as 'campaigning against the 
President openly'. Through a series of memoranda, the 
management of the company -came under political pressure to 
dismiss the applicant from his job with the company. One of 
these read: 
I am totally astonished by the lack of firm action taken 
by the management of ZECCO against Mr. Tresphous Kuseya 
who boldly campaigned against the President. The lack of 
intervention in the matter to me is an expression of the 
management's support for Tresphous' ill actions. In 
addition to firing him let him also be handed over to the 
police who will deal with him accordingly as provided for 
in the electoral laws of the country(82)" 
The applicant was dismissed on these threats. The Court 
refused to accept these grounds and ruled that marking 'NO' 
against the eagle did not disclose any offence against the 
employer and therefore ordered reinstatement of the employee 
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with arrears of salary. 
2. Cases without evidence of overt political influence 
In cases where the tide of political power has not been in 
sight, the Zambian Industrial Relations Court seems to have 
been more willing to take on managerial prerogatives on behalf 
of aggrieved employees. 
In Ethel Sepiao Npambev. Zambia State Insurance Corpo- 
ration(83) and Monica Mbao v Workmen's Compensation Fund 
Boýard_(84), the husbands of the two applicants had been -trans- 
ferred by their different employers. The applicants asked 
their respective employers to find vacancies within their 
organisations in the towns where the husbands had moved to. In 
each case, the employer said attempts were made to help, but 
there were no openings. The Court, nonetheless, ordered on 
both occasions that the employer should transfer the applicant 
to join the husband. The argument advanced was, 
Wives in any community have a marital obligation to live 
with their husbands wherever the husband is. To allow 
otherwise could be tantamount to sanctioning desertion by 
wives(85). 
Since an employer will never know where other employers 
will transfer their employees, and when, such a decision was 
very sweeping and could have serious implications on 
management's ability to decide who works where and when. 
Another case which may illustrate 
Industrial Relations Court iä Zambia 
the willingness of the 
to take on management 
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prerogatives is Mukuka and Others v. Zambia National Provident 
Fund 86). The material facts are that the applicants were 
employed as accountants in the Fund. Later, a comprehensive 
job evaluation exercise was ordered into the Fund. One of its 
recommendations was to move the pay scale of accountants one 
notch up from pay scale grade 8 to 7. This was in order to 
attract and retain accountants in the Fund. At its first 
sitting after receiving the report, the Board of Directors of 
the Fund accepted the Report of the Job Evaluation team, 
including the recommendation on the pay scale of accountants. 
Subsequently, the Board looked again at the recommendation on 
accountants and decided that only professionally qualified 
accountants should be allowed to move to scale 7 which 
provided better pay. This was decided on the policy grounds 
of encouraging the 'unqualified' accountants also to strive 
for professional attainment and recognition. 
The applicants, who were not qualified, contested the new 
distinction put on the Report by the Board of Directors. They 
applied to the Industrial Relations Court under section 98(g), 
which gives the Zambian labour court jurisdiction, 
generally to inquire into and adjudicate upon any matter 
affecting the rights, obligations and privileges of 
employees, employers and representative organisations 
thereof. 
On the facts, the court ordered that the Fund should 
regrade the applicants from pay scale 8 to 7 as recommended by 
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the Job Evaluation Report and pay arrears of salary from the 
date the Board first decided to adopt the report. The ratio 
decidendi of the decision turned on the first Board decision 
to accept the report and recommendations without discrimina- 
tion, which was held functus officio against the Board in 
respect of serving employees at the time the board first 
considered and accepted the report. 
This decision was viewed by Fund managers as imposing 
unacceptable limits on their rights to decide. Since under 
section 101(3) decisions of the Industrial Relations Court 
are final and binding, the Fund lawyers sought to circumvent 
the absence of appeal procedures with a request for a writ of 
Certiorari directed against the Industrial Relations Court in 
the High Court [vide Zambia National Provident Fund Board v. 
Attorney_ General and Others(87)]. The High Court declined to 
order the writ prayed for on grounds of want of jurisdiction, 
but it is interesting to note that its critical comments on 
the powers and status of the Industrial Relations Court, in 
the Zambian judicature added weight to suggestions to change 
the law so that decisions of the Industrial Relations Court 
could be appealed against to the Supreme Court of Zambia(88). 
The point to establish is that even in the wake of 
political intervention in management decisions, the Industrial 
Relations Court in Zambia has shown a willingness to take on 
management prerogatives. The works councils, however, are not 
seen to have taken up this opportunity in any great number . 
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C. Industrial Relations Court and Penalties on the 
Management 
The reputation of the Industrial Relations Court in Zambia 
goes beyond its readiness to intervene and impose decisions on 
the management. In addition, the labour court has demonstrated 
a capability, and willingness too to follow up its orders in 
order to ensure compliance from the management. 
In National Union of Building, Engineering and General 
Workers (Mrs. Hlabangana) v. Hoechst (Zambia) Ltd(89), the 
court-had ruled initially that the applicant's member had been 
discriminated against on account of her Zimbabwean nationality 
contrary to section 114 (2) of the Industrial Relations Act. 
Reinstatement and arrears of salary were then ordered. The 
respondent company paid Mrs iilabangana her arrears of salary 
and subsequent monthly payments but refused to give her a job 
to do, in the hope perhaps that she would eventually despair 
and disappear. 
Instead, she returned to the Industrial Relations Court. 
The court's decision was framed in the following words: 
The court in the circumstances has decided that effective 
from Monday 30th November, 1981, Mrs Hlabangana should be 
physically reinstated in her former job (secretary) at the 
offices of Hoechst (Zambia) Limited. For every passing day 
that Hoechst (Zambia) Limited does not comply with this 
order, the court's order is that Hoechst will be fined 
K1,000 every passing day(90). 
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One thousand Kvacha was well over a Permanent Secretary's 
monthly salary in 1981. That is roughly the measure of how 
coercive the order was. The company simply faced financial 
ruin if it refused to comply. 
A rather different punishment was meted in Maynard Boy 
Chabala v. Zambia Clay Industries Ltd(91). There the 
respondent's General Manager was sent to one week's jail term 
after the company was found to have disobeyed orders of the 
court to reinstate their unlawfully dismissed works councillor 
employee. An option of 30 days in jail for the Chief Executive 
was opened should the company still fail to reinstate the 
same applicant. 
These were the sort of decisions of the Industrial 
Relations Court which not only bothered the legal 
establishment but also spread fear into the managerial power 
structure of the Zambian state economy(92). Powers, we argue, 
which went almost unnoticed by the works council system. 
Summary 
We have argued in this section that the inactivity of 
Zambian works councils in the legal process could not possibly 
be accounted for by lack of violations or futility of taking 
cases to the Industrial Relations Court. The potential of the 
Industrial Relations Court in furthering employee interests in 
other employment law areas is evident. Individuals and trade 
unions with functional autonomy within the adversarial legal 
process of Zambia have been able to take advantage of the 
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powers of Industrial Relations Court in a way that seem to 
have been impossible for the works councils. This functional 
incapacity, apart from the lack of extensive substantive 
powers, explain the passivity of the Zambian works councils in 
the legal process. As argued in Chapter 5, the 1971 law was 
so diluted that it could, not be a basis for a meaningful 
programme of Industrial Participatory Democracy. The foregoing 
analyses substantiate that analysis. Given the benefits which 
workers and managers saw in the works council system, the 
question has to be asked why the Zambian government did not 
act to remedy obvious loopholes in the law in order to 
reinforce her passionate case for workers' participation in 
management decisions? 
4. Conclusions 
The object of this chapter was to account for the 
implementation and experience of the 1971 workers' 
participation law in Zambia. We have examined the background 
leading to the decision to implement the law in 1976. Ile have 
reviewed opportunities and problems presented by that 
legislation to industrial relations practitioners. Previous 
arguments about the composition of the works council in the 
Zambian legal system have further been considered by 
contrasting the absence of works councils in the Industrial 
Relations Court machinery with a demonstrated willingness and 
ability on part of the Zambian labour court to take serious 
interest in complaints of workers against managerial power. 
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This discussion of the experience of workers' partici- 
pation law lead to conclusions that are now familiar in our 
account of the development of workers' participation in 
Zambia. The interest and enthusiasm of the government in these 
policies stand in sharp contrast to the Zambian state's 
ability to bring about the desired changes. The influence of 
structural factors in the paralysis remains a dominant running 
thread. Political considerations of colonial economic factors 
first raised and pushed workers' participation policies to a 
national industrial relations policy in 1969. The changes 
that followed economic reform policies nearly caused the 1971 
legislation to be condemned to obsolescence on the statute 
book. Yet, it was due to the success of the new One Party 
structures to find different political rationales for 
participation policies that the Zambian programme of workers' 
participation survived. Not surprising too, the search for 
different laws under IPD overshadowed the implementation of 
the 1971 legislation and undermined whatever effects this had 
on industrial relations. «hat remains for us now is to examine 
and evaluate the results of government attempts to change and 
improve on the legal framework for workers's participation 
introduced in 1971. We turn to this and related points in 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WORKERS' PARTICIPATION LAWS: AN EXPANDED PERSPECTIVE? 
Introduction 
The enactment of the Self-Management Enterprises Act, 
1988(1) was one of the most important single developments in 
the area of participation laws since the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971 and the creation of IPD in 1975. According to the 
Director of IPD, the project of Self-management "was initiated 
within the framework of the Party and its Government's policy 
of industrial participatory democracy or workers' partici- 
pation in the decision-making'process"(2). In this extent, the 
1988 legislation is understood as a carrying forward of 
government policies started in 1969. The object of this 
chapter is to examine and analyse this legislation and some 
other attempts made by the Zambian government to carry 
forward and improve the rights of workers to participate in 
decisions of industry. 
In order to evaluate these attempts and the Self- 
Management legislation, in particular, the organisation and 
objectives of the IPD' department need to be presented. This 
department has been at the centre of government initiatives on 
workers' participation policies since August 1975. An 
understanding of the scope created for it and the way it was 
actually organised to spearhead workers' participation 
policies provides a basis for our analysis of the Zambian 
policy developments after 1975. 
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1. The Development, Role and Structure of IPD 
1.1 The institutional development of the department 
As long as the overall thrust of government policy 
remained within the framework developed in 1969, there was no 
need to create special institutions to supervise industrial 
relations policies of workers' participation in management. 
Thus, up until 1975 the elaboration of workers' participation 
policies was the work of President Kaunda and Ministers, such 
as the Minister of Labour, whose brief encompassed labour- 
management relations. However, once the context of post- 
independence policies shifted, the novelty and complexity of 
wholesale participation policies became more apparent. 
President Kaunda's personal crusade and moralising over the 
right of workers to participate in decisions of management 
became an insufficient basis for implementing the workers' 
participation in management decisions. Then'the need for more 
intellectual and organisational resources around the workers' 
participation policy became more obvious than could have been 
realised during the policy euphoria of 1968-70. But it is the 
case, too, that in the middle of the 1970s the objects of the 
workers' participation policy in Zambia became even more 
mixed. That is, after the publication of Humanism and its 
Implementation Part 2 in 1974, the government of President 
Kaunda was no longer merely asserting the normative principle 
of the right of workers to participate in decisions of 
companies, as the policy had been presented in the beginning. 
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Equally important in the 1970s were the ideological prescri- 
ptions of UNIP to build Humanism through Socialism. This 
entailed policies aimed at ridding the country of capitalist 
production relations(3). 
These strains in the Zambian policies in the 1970s are 
reflected both in the actual- role and purpose for which IPD 
was created, and in the functional structure put in place to 
supervise participation policies. To preserve continuity of 
policy, the institution to spearhead industrial relations 
policies of workers' participation was to remain a government 
department. But in order to ensure that Party policies took 
precedence in government thinking, the supervision of the 
department was left to Party officials. We elaborate on these 
points below. 
1.2 The role and purpose of IPD 
IPD was created to undertake the following tasks: 
a) to draw and work on a programme which will lead to 
active participation of workers in the running of 
industries or indeed any other type of economic units in 
accordance with the spirit and letter of the decision of 
the Partyas seen through the Philosophy of Humanism; 
b) to select a few firms on experimental basis and carry 
out research on the economics of participatory democracy 
in such firms; 
c) to undertake study tours which should involve careful 
study of economic concerns which run on the lines of 
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industrial participatory democracy' in other parts of the 
world; 
d) to study and analyse what has been examined above and 
make recommendations to the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister; 
e) to provide a layman's draft legislation to change the 
current law which is based on capitalism, from what it is 
today to socialism in so far as the subject of industrial 
participatory democracy is concerned; and 
f) to use the information contained in the Philosophy of 
Humanism Parts 1 and 2 to see that Zambia begins to move 
in a practical way instead of ending in theories. 
On this basis it could be supposed that the purpose of 
the department was to act as a 'think tank' of government on 
workers' participation policies. The first Director of the 
department, Basil, Kabwe, was in no doubt as to what the role 
of his department was. He told the First National Symposium on 
Industrial Participatory Democracy in 1976 that, 
It must be clearly understood that it is not the function 
of my department to propose and, at the same time, 
legislate, for workers' participation or industrial 
democracy. Our job is merely to recommend proposals to 
those in authority(4). 
However, it is clear too from the remit of the department 
that whatever was to be recommended on the direction of 
participation policies had to define and incorporate the 
ideological imperatives of Humanism in the 1970s. These 
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requirements complicated an already difficult assignment for 
the infant department. The economy was already in deep trouble 
in 1975, and the inefficiency of the state sector was all too 
well understood to cause hostility to any measures that 
implied further lessening of individual responsibility in the 
running of the economy(5). In those circumstances, the 
thought that the new department should work to promote 
Industrial Participatory Democracy on the lines approved by 
the Party imposed limitations as to what it could really 
achieve given the impasse of previous years on the works 
councils. 
The experience of IPD over the years should be appreciated 
in relation to the remit that was prescribed for it. From the 
start, it was put in a difficult, if not impossible, situation 
of promoting workers' participation in a particular, yet ill- 
defined specification. The result in that the department has 
not been able to function as an institution engaged in the 
search of objective information to promote public policies. 
The department, in fact, came to be viewed by those outside 
government as just an antagonistic force at the disposal of 
the Party against those in industry not sympathetic to 
government economic policies in general and the workers' 
participation, in particular. A key factor in IPD's inability 
to extricate itself from the Party and to hold itself out as 
an industrial relations research establishment [broadly 
justified by its terms of reference], was the structure of its 
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organisation. I 
1.3 The organisation and structure of IPD 
According to the Profile of the Ministry of Labour, Social 
Development and Culture(6), IPD has the following 
establishment: 
Provincial Political-Secretaries 2 
District Governors 8 
Secretaries 10 
Administrative Staff 13 
Professionals 4 
The research activity of the department centres around the 
four professional posts. The ideal situation at the department 
envisages the appointment of an industrial economist, indus- 
trial relations officer, industrial psychologist and a legal 
officer. 
The experience is that the department rarely fills all the 
posts of the research unit at the same time due to staff turn 
over. When we visited the department in December 1989, Mr. 
C. X. Malunga was both the Assistant Director and 'legal 
officer'. To be fair, problems of staffing professional ranks 
are wide spread in- Zambian government departments(7). What is 
unique about IPD is the imbalance between professionals on the 
establishment and Party functionaries. At' issue is not just 
the ratio of -District Governors and Provincial Political 
Secretaries to the civil service professionals, but also that 
the other Zambian government departments do not have Party 
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functionaries on their establishments. Employees of government 
departments are supposed to be civil servants, which Party 
officials like Provincial Political Secretaries and District 
Governors are not(8). In that context, the formal mixture of 
personnel witnessed at IPD has been unusual in the formal 
relations between Party and Government in-Zambia. 
Other elements in the organisation of the department also 
need to be highlighted. Until 1986, IPD had no particular 
parent Ministry. When it was created in 1975, it was placed 
under the office of the Prime Minister, the effective number, 
three after the President and the Party Secretary General 
under the 1973 Republican Constitution(9). In 1984, IPD was 
moved to the Office of the President, where it remained until 
1986. Under the office of the Prime Minister, there had been 
at various times a Cabinet Minister, a Member of the Central 
Committee or both given charge of IPD in addition to a 
politically appointed Administrative Director(10). 
This kind of fusion between Party and Government 
structures, the duplication of appointments, and the special 
treatment that was accorded IPD in relation to the Office of 
the President led to derogatory allegations against the 
department. The main one was that it was an unconstitutional 
body(11). Attempts by the Department in 1981 to give itself 
statutory legitimacy under the Industrial Democracy Bill came 
to naught(12). It was partly to solve the image and 
credibility problem of the department that a decision was 
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taken to transfer it from the Office of the President to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Development in 1986(13). 
The transfer, however, did not entail integration of IPD 
within existing structures of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Development, for-instance, by placing the functions of 
the department within the office of the Assistant Labour 
Commissioner, Industrial Relations, which was administratively 
responsible for the rest of the Industrial Relations Act, 
1971. Instead, the Department retained its structures and took 
along its special status on workers' participation policies 
into the Ministry of Labour and Social Development(14). There 
the functions of the department have been described thus: 
The Department enforces Part 7 of the Industrial Relations 
Act and the Self-Management Enterprises Act 1988 of the 
Laws of Zambia, and implements the ideological- and 
philosophical policies on industrial Democracy as 
contained in Chapter thirteen of Humanism and a Guide to 
its Implementation Part 2(15). 
The above description shows that the position of the 
institution created to clarify and carry forward the Zambian 
participation policies was unsettled for much of the time 
covered by this study. From the point of view of the 
professional staff at the department, there have been two 
pressures responsible for its being maligned. 
One was the sustained scepticism among influential voices 
in the country about the role and purpose of workers' 
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participation policies. One Director of the department once 
retorted, in relation to prominent Zambians of the 1968-70 
era: 
While I can understand the fears of both workers and the 
capital owners, I cannot, however, understand the fears of 
some of those people who helped in shaping up the policy 
of Industrial Participatory Democracy. Some actions by 
these people in relation to the programme of IPD are not 
only paradoxical but extremely discouraging to those 
charged with the responsibility of working out practical 
proposals for the consideration of the Party and 
Government(16). 
The other was the ruling Party's insistence that its 
ideological prescriptions to attain Humanism through Socialism 
should be achieved partly through the industrial relations 
policy of workers' participation. Party functionaries within 
IPD underlined this aspect of the strain on the flexibility of 
the department. But the need to get in place what was 
ideologically acceptable to the Party effectively limited 
alternatives to the works council model. This was because 
what was ideologically acceptable was not necessarily 
agreeable to by private employers, state managers and the 
trade union leadership. Caught in this situation, IPD could 
not offer anything original, thereby reinforcing the 
perception that the department was an instrument of the Party 
attempting to force through impossible and unrealistic 
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industrial policies. 
In summary, the picture being painted is that IPD was from 
the beginning a captive of the structural and policy struggles 
already under way at the time of its creation in 1975. These 
strains are evident both in the department's terms of 
reference and in the structures through which it was to 
operate. Viewed from this perspective, IPD was nowhere 
similar to the independent or tripartite research bodies on 
industrial democracy created in Europe in the 1970s. The 
Zambian body was not for assisting firms and their employees 
to work out the precise forms by which labour could 
participate in the decisions of the management. This, however-, 
was not out of want of trying by successive officials at IPD. 
Whatever they attempted, as we shall show, simply stuck in 
the muddles of the overall political, legal and economic 
system, as was perhaps inevitable. 
2. Schemes Considered in Zambia after 1975 
2.1 Internally generated schemes 
The ideas for workers' participation schemes considered 
in Zambia after 1975 were first generated at the First 
National Symposium on Industrial Democracy held at the 
President's Citizenship College, Kabwe, from 12 to 22 July 
1976 (17). 
At the end of the two weeks deliberations, the symposium 
drew up fifteen resolutions. Among these were the following 
eight: 
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1. Company law: The present Companies Act, Cap. 686, 
should be amended and if necessary repealed and replaced 
by a law whose provisions can facilitate the introduction 
of Industrial Participatory Democracy in the country's 
economic enterprises (recommendation 1). 
2. Forms of Participation: That the selection of the forms 
of participation should be flexible and all parties 
concerned should be consulted fully on all aspects of 
Industrial Participatory Democracy (recommendation 12). 
3. Universality of the right of participation: Workers' 
participation in decision making should be introduced in 
all economic enterprises, -ranging from parastatals in 
which the state has 100 per cent shareholding to private 
companies (recommendation 2). 
4. Rights of Labour: Employees shall have the right to 
participate in decision-making in an enterprise solely on 
the strength of their labour (recommendation 5). 
5. Share Ownership: The collective accumulation or 
purchase of workers' shares should be financed from 
profits accruing to the enterprise or bonuses paid out to 
individual employees. No individual worker should be 
allowed to own shares in an enterprise (recommendation 6). 
6. Company Board Structures: The ultimate authority in 
each enterprise should be vested in a Joint Representative 
Board composed of equal numbers of representatives of 
interested parties, namely, providers of capital and 
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workers (recommendation 7). 
7. Appointment of Management: Management representatives 
on the joint representative board should be nominated by 
the management of an enterprise. This is an interim 
measure. The ultimate objective should aim at the election 
of management representatives by the entire workforce in 
an enterprise, where management and workers will vote 
together on the basis of one man, one vote (recommendation 
10) 
8 Shop Floor Participation: Democratic participation in 
each enterprise should be introduced at the work-floor 
level, i. e. department level, where employees should be 
accorded powers to elect their own supervisors and line 
managers (recommendation 8). 
We have created heads for the recommendations that were 
drawn by the Kabwe Symposium and subsequently submitted to the 
National Council of the ruling Party in order to highlight how 
elementary and multifarious the Zambian discussion had become 
by 1976. From an external perspective, it is hard to believe 
that these submissions were coming from a country with 
participation legislation on the statute book. What is obvious 
is that even by 1976 many issues had not received systematic 
treatment, let alone the prioritisation of approaches to be 
followed. How could it have been possible, for instance, to 
legislate for all the contradictory recommendations? 
Yet, one has to explain why IPD did not adopt the practice 
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of using the media of symposia, workshops and seminars in 
order to generate information for the subsequent preparation 
of position papers for submission to the Party, government 
and others interested in the participation policy. Instead, we 
find that it- has been the strategy of the Department 
throughout its history to compile contradictory positions of 
different parties to the workers' participation debate 
[conveniently called resolutions) which are then tendered to 
the government for action. We suspect that, to some extent, 
this strategy also exacerbated the polarisation in the 
national discussion by allowing the same issues to be dis- 
cussed over and over, without anyone making sense of the 
direction of government policy(18). 
In the instant case, the ninth UNIP national council of 
1976 rejected many of the proposals coming from the Kabwe 
meeting. The council observed and resolved that, 
a) Forms of Participation: That the participation of 
workers in decisions of management is the preferred form 
of participation at this stage. 
b) Appointment of Managers: The appointment of managers 
should be left at present into the hands of a Board of 
Directors or the Head of State, as the case may be. 
c) Works Councils: The labour movement and the managements 
should be given time to establish effective works councils 
which directive was given to them in May, 1976, under the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971. 
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d) Education for Participation: That greater emphasis must 
be laid not only on political education, but also on 
intensified familiarisation and teaching of both the 
workers and management officials on responsibilities that 
are attendant to increased worker participation. 
e) Companies Act, Cap 686: That appropriate amendments be 
made to the Companies Act, Cap. 686 of the laws of Zambia, 
to facilitate the implementation of workers' 
participation. 
f) Equity Participation: That given the importance of 
proper planning for possible workers' participation in 
equity, a Special Commission consisting of representatives 
of the Party and Government, the management, and the 
labour movement should be constituted to formulate a 
comprehensive programme for consideration by all parties 
concerned(19). 
1976 was the year President Kaunda presented ideas on a 
new society based on the principles of 'COHMUNOCRACY', a 
peoples' economy. Generally, it has been understood that the 
ninth UNIP national council was one of the most acrimonious 
Party meetings to take place in the 1970s as the capitalist 
and socialist elements of the ruling Party clashed openly on 
industrial policies(20). After this Council meeting, the scope 
of what could be done by IPD on workers' participation 
policies was narrowed. Apart from going back to the now 
discredited works council scheme, the only other options 
-328- 
remaining on the table were the Company law and Equity 
Participation projects. 
Of the two, only the Company law project survived to the 
1980s. The work of the Special. Commission on Equity 
Participation ran against the grain of Party policy not to 
breed individual capitalists, as is well understood from 
both the Kabwe resolutions on share ownership and the decision 
of UNIP national council on forms of participation. Thus, the 
project on Equity Participation, presumably proposed origi- 
nally by UNIP 'moderates', died a natural death and was 
virtually forgotten by the middle of the 1980x(21). 
Efforts to change company law under the National Working 
Party on the Companies Act, formed jointly by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Law Development Commission, 
persisted until at least July 1987. From the records of 
proceedings it would seem that the Company law project 
eventually stalled too because IPD and UNIP failed to advise 
on the legal formula through which government participation 
policies could have been accommodated in the company law 
model. 
There is evidence of letters written to the Party 
Secretary General by the Chairman of the Committee, Professor 
Patrick Mvunga, but no replies are on file. On the other hand, 
Dr Chambo, a Provincial Political Secretary, who represented 
IPD on the committee managed merely to emphasise the primacy 
of government policy to have company law changed in order to 
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carry forward participation policies. But he furnished no 
suggestion as to how the exercise could-be done in the legal, 
political and economic realities of Zambia in the 1980s(22). 
Finally, the prospects of participation policies in Zambia 
through the medium of company law were virtually closed by 
memorandum referenced LDC/101/2/44 dated 22 July 1987 from the 
Law Development Commission to the Director of IPD. Written by 
the Ugandan Commissioner Francis Kermitt, it argued esse- 
ntially that since it was not Government policy to deny 
private enterprise and its system of control, it was not 
possible to implement participation policies under the Zambian 
company law legislation. The letter made it plain that such 
legislative decisions were technically difficult and worse, 
harmful to the country because of the potential to hinder 
private and foreign investment. `Instead, the Commission 
advised that participation policies should be pursued in a 
different legislation whose concepts and manner of imple- 
mentation could be harmonised with social and economic ideas 
of workers' involvement in decisions of companies(23). 
The decision of the Law Development Commission in 1987 
should be viewed in the light of President Kaunda's directive 
in January 1983. Then President Kaunda directed that trade 
unions should be represented on all boards of directors of 
state companies. One reason why that decision was taken was 
that the President anticipated the direction of changes to 
company law predicated on the work of the National Working 
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Party on Company Law(24). What it means now is that there will 
be no law to enforce the scheme of trade union representation 
on state companies. Despite the complaints about 'instititu- 
tional legitimacy' from the trade unions, the practice of 
trade union representation on boards of state companies was 
still followed in 1989(25). Very little, however, can be said 
favourably about the Zambian trade union board representation 
system. From the workers' point of view, the scheme merely 
augments the status of trade union officials from headquarters 
who dominate interlocking directorships in the state compa- 
nies. More generally, the scheme does little to alter 
President Kaunda's practice of appointing board members to 
state companies from different institutional backgrounds. The 
criterion he has insisted on is that board members should be 
members of his ruling Party or at least be supporters of his 
policies. It was one of Kaunda's conditions that the trade 
union board members should be members of IINIP. This is the 
criterion which really mattered because this alone perfected 
the command structure of the political and economic system 
built in Zambia since the 1970s. Therefore, any gains of board 
membership by employee representatives has to be evaluated 
within the structures of the political-administrative system. 
In the final analysis, all the recommendations of the 1976 
national symposium and other subsequent discussions aimed at 
moving the framework-of participation policies beyond the 1971 
legislation can be seen as having come to nothing. The 
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government, in fact, had realised the difficulties on its 
policies far earlier. In 1982, they sought the assistance of 
the ILO under its Regular Budget for Technical Cooperation. 
2.2 The ILO Missions. 
Reference was made in Chapter 6 to the work of Manfred 
Weiss. Professor Weiss' mission in Zambia was closely linked 
with, and took place at the same time as, another ILO mission 
by Professor Stanslav Grozdanic(26). While the Weiss mission 
was to advise on the functioning of the works council system 
introduced by the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, Grozdanic 
aimed to study and submit detailed proposals for experimenting 
the introduction of workers' self-management. 
As might be expected, Professor Weiss' mission was centred 
in an area which had already caused anguish to the Zambian 
government. Seven years after creating IPD, there was little 
to show for this government infrastructure. Any hopes that 
might have been placed on the ILO mission on works councils 
evaporated with the weight of Professor Weiss's submissions. 
After studying the "various tendencies of the present 
discussion on works council system in Zambia"(27), Weiss told 
the Zambian Government, in substance, to make her own choices 
among the competing paradigms of workers' participation 
schemes before they could receive useful advice from 
outsiders on that and other allied institutions of industrial 
relations. To be sure, Weiss was not as blunt as that but it 
would be difficult to put a different interpretation on his 
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overall assessment: 
The expert would like to repeat once again that the 
discussion on the possible changes of the law as indicated 
above cannot be limited to the works councils but has to 
take into account the interdependence between the works 
council system and collective bargaining on the one hand 
and the interdependence between works council system and 
worker representation on boards on the other. Inconsis- 
tencies within the overall system of participation and 
industrial relations, which could hamper the decision- 
making process, should be avoided(28). 
Professor Grozdanic's mission did not encounter the 
domestic policy problems which greeted Weiss in the country. 
Self-management had no precedents in Zambia, and as soon as it 
was clearly understood that Grozdanic's experiments would be 
confined to few selected pilot state companies, his field of 
operation was saved from political passions evoked by 
policies intended to cover the whole industrial relations 
system. The relative ease with which self-management 
legislation followed in 1988 confirmed both the extent to 
which self-management ideas struck accord with Party policies 
in IPD and the success, this time, of government strategies to 
circumvent political opposition to participation policies(29). 
Since the Self-Management Act of 1988 has been the only 
significant piece of legislation to appear in the aftermath of 
the creation of IPD in 1975, it is appropriate that we should 
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focus on this legislation. We should examine and evaluate how 
the 1988 law carries forward and improves the rights of, 
workers to participate in decisions of the management. 
3. The Self-Management Enterprises Legislation, 1988 
3.1 Introduction: Theoretical perspectives on self-management 
Politically, the arrival of the Self-Management Act in 
Zambia was supposed to fulfil a long standing objective of the 
Zambian government, and of President Kaunda, to "bestow upon 
every worker the right to fully participate in the control and 
management of the enterprise in which he works and on which he 
depends for his livelihood"(30). According to Professor 
Stanislav Grozdanic' himself, the essence of workers' self- 
management is "the creation of a system of relations in which 
individual workers, in association with their fellows, 
directly manage the means, conditions and results of their 
labour and achieve control over the totality of social 
relations in the community"(31). Under the theory of self- 
management enterprise system, "the means of production are no 
longer independent economic forces beyond the control of those 
who work with them; management is no longer separate from 
execution; and the disposal of the products of labour is no 
longer separated from direct participation in their 
production"(32). 
By these definitions, it is supposed that the fundamental 
criterion for the attainment of a self-management enterprise 
system is the degree to which control of decisions is the 
-334- 
responsibility of employees. This perspective of company 
decisions and company law differs materially from the common 
law set up of company decisions followed almost exclusively in 
Zambia prior to the legislation in 1988. 
The common law model of economic enterprises puts the 
shareholder as the conceptual centre piece of company 
decisions and company management. The self-management system 
on the other hand, places the employee as the foundation of 
company decisions and company management. Therefore, what was 
attempted by the Zambian government in the self-management 
legislation was theoretically the most radical of any 
paradigms of workers' participation legislation known in the 
world(33). The latter was certainly intended to go beyond the 
original works council law under the Industrial Relations Act. 
Though the 1971 law brought some changes which entitled 
Zambian employees to rights to information, consultation and, 
in limited respects, to veto management decisions(34), the 
inherited company legislation still provided the basic 
organising principles. Under the common law scheme, the 
shareholders' General Meeting, the Board of directors and 
company officers form the principal organs of decision 
making(35). Weaknesses in the works council law of 1971 
ensured that traditional structures of industrial management 
persisted in the country, despite the programme of workers' 
participatory in the country since 1969. 
The question we want to ask of the new legislation is how 
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far does it actually alter the hierarchical system of decision 
making already known and practised in Zambia. Indeed, to what 
extent does the Zambian legislation achieve theoretical and 
philosophical aspirations of systems of workers' self- 
management? 
To answer these questions, we shall first outline the 
purpose and structure of the Self-Management Enterprises Act. 
Second, we sketch the constitutional organs of decision- 
making provided under the legislation. Third, we explore the 
composition and powers of the various organs of decision 
making provided for self-management companies. Fourth, we 
discuss what all the provisions granting powers to different 
organs entail for the rights of workers in the Zambian scheme. 
In the final section we assess the contribution of the 1988 
legislation to-the furtherance of Zambia's workers' partici- 
pation policies. 
3.2 The Self-Management Enterprises Act Outlined 
3.2.1 Objects of the Self-Management Law 
According to the preamble to the legislation, the object 
of the self-management law is to regulate self-management 
enterprises in the country, and in particular to: 
a) empower the President to declare any state enterprise 
to be a self-management enterprise 
b) define the functions and powers of self-management 
enterprises; 
c) provide for the management and administration of self- 
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management enterprises; 
d) provide for the exemption of any state enterprise or 
self-management enterprise from the provisions of any 
written law; and; 
e) provide for matters connected with or incidental to the 
foregoing. 
3.2.2 Structure of the Self-Management legislation 
The Self-Management Act has 34 sections, divided into five 
parts. Part 1 contains the citation and definition sections. 
Part 2 provides the mechanism through which the state can 
establish self-management enterprises; it defines the 
corporate status of these enterprises and outlines some of the 
constitutional organs. Part 3 is concerned with the general 
administration of self-management companies. It provides for 
the formation of the Management Committee, Sub-committees of 
the Management Committee, and creates the offices of the 
Managing Director and Secretary. Part 4 identifies the sources 
of funds for self-management enterprises, and outlines the 
procedures for accountability of finances in individual self- 
management companies. Finally, Part 5 deals with the 
miscellanies of the legislation, regulating such matters as 
names; the dissolution of SMEs; the powers of issuing further 
regulations; and the exemption of these enterprises from the 
operation of both the Companies and Industrial Relations laws 
of Zambia(36). 
To be read together with the parent Act are the Self- 
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Management Enterprises Regulations of 1988. These regulations, 
identical for all companies, were issued under powers 
conferred on the President under section 34(1)(37), and form 
an important part of the structure of. the self-management 
laws. 
3.3. The constitutional organs of a self-management enterprise 
The Constitutional organs of a company are defined to 
include the offices or structures of governance which a 
company is obliged to create, together with any other 
external agencies- with a direct bearing on the decision 
making process of the company under the enabling law. Under 
this definition, there are nine constitutional organs sharing 
the decision making function in the Zambian SHE. These are 
the Employees Conference; the Standing Committee of the 
Employees Conference; the Employees Board of Directors; the 
Management Committee; the 7 Sub-committees of the Management 
Committee; the Managing Director; the Secretary; the Advisory 
Council of the SME; and the President of the Republic. 
3.4 Composition and Powers of Constitutional Organs 
A. The Employees' Conference 
The Employees' Conference of an SME is composed of 
representatives of all the employees(38) of the enterprise. 
These are elected to the Conference by the whole employee 
body of the company. The maximum number of elected employee 
delegates permitted in an enterprise with more than fifty 
employees is fifty. Where a company has less than fifty 
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employees, it is permitted only to elect a third of these to 
the Employees' Conference under section 5(2). 
The Employees' Conference is, under section 5, the 
overall policy making body of the SHE. The Conference is 
required to meet once in a year, and is presided over by a 
Chairman elected among the members of the Employees' 
Conference itself. The functions of the Conference are 
generally to "exercise the corporate powers of a self- 
management enterprise", and in particular to: 
a) formulate policies for the smooth operation of a self- 
management enterprise; 
b) consider and where appropriate, approve the development 
plans of a self-management enterprise; 
c) consider and approve the investment plans of a self- 
management enterprise; 
d) elect members of the Employees' Board of Directors; and 
e) give directives to and exercise control over the 
Employees' Board of Directors. 
B. Standing Committee of the Employees' Conference 
As the name suggests, this organ is a derivative of the 
Employees' Conference, in the sense that it is composed of 
persons elected among , the members of the Employees' 
Conference. The required numbers on the Standing Committee, 
under section 8, is five to ten members. 
According to section 8(2) the statutory duties of the 
Standing Committee are: 
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a) to hear and determine any appeal from any decision made 
by or on behalf of the Employees' Board of Directors. 
b) to confirm, vary or set aside any disciplinary decision 
made by the Board, or make auch other order as it may 
consider necessary. 
In short, the Standing Committee of the Conference is not 
an intermediary of the Conference in management decisions, but 
a quasi-judicial body of the self-management company. 
C. The Employees' Board of Directors 
The Employees' Board of Directors of a self-management 
enterprise is appointed by the Conference of Employees, and 
approved by the President of the Republic under section 9. 
According to section 10 the board is composed of the following 
eight persons: 
a) one representative nominated by the Party Committee; 
b) one representative nominated by the trade union 
operating at a self-management enterprise; 
c) four employees of the SME; 
d) one representative nominated by the local community; 
and 
e) one representative from the department of industrial 
Participatory Democracy. 
The duties of the Employees' Board of Directors are both 
general and specific. The board is charged with the duty, 
under section 12(1), generally to supervise the operation and 
management of a self-management enterprise. Specifically, the 
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Board has the following functions under section 12(2): 
a) to supervise the Management Committee and the Managing 
Director in the performance of their functions; 
b) to consider and approve where appropriate the annual 
budget of a self-management enterprise in accordance with 
the development plans of an enterprise as well as those of 
the national development plan of Zambia; 
c) to be responsible for approving the raising of new 
capital; 
d) to approve where appropriate the appropriation of 
surplus funds; 
e) to consider and approve where appropriate any 
alteration in the administrative organisation, structure 
and establishment of a self-management enterprise; 
f) to recruit, employ and provide for the training of, 
employees for a self-management enterprise; and 
g) determine the terms and conditions and salaries of 
employees of a self-management enterprise. 
D. The Management Committee 
The creation of the Management Committee in a self- 
management enterprise is envisaged by section 18 of the Act. 
The Management Committee is the executive organ of the SHE. 
In that capacity, the Management Committee has responsibility 
for the administration of the affairs of the enterprise. Under 
sections 19(1)(2), it is composed of the Managing Director 
(also its Chairman), the Secretaries of Sub-committees of the 
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Management Committee, and such number of employees as may be 
appointed by the Employees' Board of Directors. The committee 
is regulated by section 20(1) to meet at least once every 
month to review, and decide on, the affairs of the SME. 
E. Sub-Committees of the Management Committee 
Under section 21, the fianagement Committee shall establish 
Sub-committees for the purpose of performing its functions 
under the Act. However, the Management Committee is specifi- 
cally obliged to form the following Sub-committees: 
a) Financial Sub-Committee 
b) Legal and Administrative Sub-Committee 
c) Social and Personnel Sub-Committee 
d) Development and Planning Sub-Committee 
e) Marketing Sub-Committee 
f) Technical and Production Sub-Committee and 
g) Security and Safety Sub-Committee 
It is provided under section 21(2) that these Sub- 
committees should be headed by a full-time Secretary and 
should be provided with such other administrative and 
operating staff as deemed necessary to the performance of 
their functions. The Management Committee may also, under 
section 21(3), delegate to any of the Sub-committees such of 
its functions as it considers fit. 
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F. The Managing Director 
The office of the Managing Director is created by section 
22 of the Act. The post holder is the Chief Executive of a 
self-management enterprise and therefore individually respo- 
nsible for the overall day to day administration of the 
affairs of the enterprise. Specifically, the Managing Director 
is obliged, under sections 22 to 23, read together with 
regulations 41 and 44, to exercise control over the acts and 
proceedings of all employees of 's Self-management enterprise; 
to initiate disciplinary action against any employee; and 
where necessary, to recommend dismissal of any employee. He 
is also responsible for coordinating the functions of the 
various sub-committees set up by the Management Committee. 
Under section 22(1) and regulation 42, the Managing 
Director is nominated for appointment by the Employees' Board 
of Directors among the candidates applying for the post, and 
is popularly elected by a majority of votes cast by the 
Employees' Conference. According to section 22(2), the 
Managing Director holds office "on such terms and conditions 
as may be specified in his contract of employment". But in 
certain circumstances specified in the proviso to section 
22(1) and regulation 43, the Managing Director may be 
appointed by the President of the Republic. This would be the 
case where the President initially declares a state company to 
be a self-management enterprise or where the Employees' 
Conference has failed to elect a Managing director. In the 
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circumstances where the Managing Director is appointed by the 
President, the incumbent holds office, according to regulation 
43, "at the pleasure of the President". In all other 
instances, regulation 42(4) provides that: 
The Chief Executive shall remain in office for a full 
term(39) as long as he has not resigned or been found 
guilty of misconduct by a court of law or has 
incapacitated himself in any other way and the Employees' 
Board of Directors certify him as incapable of carrying on 
his duties as Chief Executive efficiently. 
G. The Secretary 
Under section 24, each SME is to appoint a Secretary. The 
Secretary, according to section 24(2), " shall be responsible 
for the administration of the day to day affairs of the 
enterprise under the general supervision of the tianaging 
Director". The Minister's regulations are more specific on 
the duties of the Secretary. It is his function, under regu- 
lation 30, to conduct elections of the Chairman of the 
Employees' Board of Directors. Regulation 40 requires him to 
act as the link between the Advisory Council of a self- 
management enterprise and the other constitutional organs 
created by the law. 
H. The Advisory Council of the SHE 
Section 13(1) states that "there shall be an Advisory 
Council for every self-management enterprise which shall 
consist of not less than three and not more than five persons 
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who are not employees or members of the Board". According to 
sections 13(2((3), the Council members are to be appointed by 
the President among persons with "wide experience in business 
and management". The tenure of office for the Council members 
is determined too by the President, who Is also responsible 
for fixing the amount of allowance or remuneration payable to 
Council members under sections 14 to 15. In addition, the 
President is given powers to remove any person from membership 
of a self-management Advisory Council(40). 
Regarding duties, the Advisory Council is, under section 
16(1), to, 
monitor the performance of the SHE and give such advice as 
it considers necessary for the attainment of the objects 
of the enterprise. 
In carrying out these statutory duties, the Advisory 
Council may delay, for at least one month, the implementation 
of any decision made by any organ of the SHE under section 
s16(2) and regulation 38. These powers may be exercised in 
situations where the Advisory Council thinks that the decision 
taken by the other organ of the SHE is not "in the best 
interests of the enterprise". Under those circumstances in 
which the Advisory Council blocks decisions of other 
constitutional organs, the enterprise organ which had made the 
decision complained of is obliged to review its decision 
within the one month period. In the event of failure by that 
organ to resolve its dispute with the Advisory council, the 
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subject of the dispute must be referred by the complaining 
organ to the President. The President retains however the 
right to consult the Advisory Council on any matter relating 
to the running of a self-management enterprise at any time. 
The law on these points is contained in sections 16(2)(3). 
I. Office of the President 
The office of the President of the Republic features in 
several places of the Act as one of the important sources of 
authority in the management structure of a self-management 
enterprise. Beyond the powers to declare a state company as a 
self- management enterprise under section 3(1), and powers 
generally to set the political climate within which economic 
institutions operate, the President has other important powers 
directly relevant to the actual running of a self-management 
enterprise. These powers are: 
a) Power to approve the composition of the Employees' 
Board of Directors under section 9. 
b) Powers to appoint, remunerate and remove members of the 
Advisory Council of a self-management enterprise under 
sections 13 to 15. 
c) Power to appoint a Managing Director in certain 
circumstances specified by section 22 and regulation 43. 
d) Power to resolve disputes between the Advisory Council 
of the SME and other constitutional organs of decision 
making provided by section 16(2). 
e) Power to make regulations for the better carrying out 
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of the purposes of the self-management law under section 
34(1). , 
f) Power to give directions in writing to the Employees' 
Conference, Board of Directors, Management Committee or 
the Managing Director as to how they should discharge 
their functions provided by section 34 (3). 
4. Discussion of the Power Structure in the SHE 
4.1 Comparison with the Company law model 
Classical company law represents the structure of 
corporate decision making as a pyramid. The General Meeting 
of shareholders at the base elects a Board of Directors. The 
board in turn selects the senior management, who in their turn 
engage operational staff(41). Together, the General Meeting, 
the Board and Senior Management form the core organs of the 
company structure of decision making. Under the company law 
model followed in Zambia, the relationships between the 
general meeting, the board and senior management is regulated 
by the interaction of the Companies Act, the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association and general rules of contract law and 
commercial agency. 
Between the various organs of company administration, the 
General Meeting of shareholders is the principal organ of 
company decisions 'with formal powers to vote for important 
decisions in the life of a company(42). In addition, by virtue 
of the common law interpretation of the contract contained in 
the Memorandum and Articles of Association, a shareholder in a 
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commercial and industrial company has the right to petition 
other shareholders, the company or its, agents to-comply with 
the regulations of the company of which, he is a member(43). 
These formal rights of a shareholder to directly intervene in 
the managerial decisions of his company affirm, in the common 
law scheme of company law, the sovereignty of a shareholder. 
Until the SME legislation in 1988, there was no law in 
Zambia tampering with this pyramid structure of corporate 
power. The nationalisation measures and the works council 
legislation of 1971 were all carried out in a context which 
respected capitalist principles of commercial organisation. 
Thus, notwithstanding the points made earlier about the 
Zambian case fitting the scenario described by Paul Blumberg 
about the political inspiration for workers' participation, 
there had been no actual repudiation of capitalism and its 
form of organisation in Zambian Industries. The SME 
legislation outlined above sought to change all this by 
attempting to make the employees the conceptual centre-piece 
of company decision-making. Under that legislation the 
Employees' Conference resembles the General Meeting of 
shareholders. The Conference, like the General Meeting, is 
composed of the supposed primary beneficiaries of the self- 
management organisation - the company employees. As the 
General Meeting is the principal organ of control in the 
capitalist scheme of commercial and industrial organisation, 
the Employees' Conference is also given formal powers to 
-348- 
exercise the corporate powers of a self-management enterprise 
and to direct the Employees' Board of Directors. To the extent 
that the Zambian legislation sought to make employees the 
repository of company decision-making powers, it appeared to 
be in accord with the supposed theoretical and philosophical 
aspirations of systems of workers' self-management. 
The Zambian law however failed to follow a simple reversal 
of the pyramid structure found in capitalist organisations. 
The outline of the legislation given above shows that the 
Zambian Act created instead a system of countervailing blocks 
of power. The most important of these are the Employees' 
Conference, the Employees' Board of Directors, the Managing 
Director, the Management Committee, the Advisory Council and 
the President of the Republic. The efficacy of the SMEs as the 
instruments for carrying forward government policies on 
workers' participation needs to be examined in the context of 
the structures mandated by the legislation. To what extent 
does the countervailing power-block model make the workers and 
their representatives the main instruments of decision-making 
in the Zambian system of workers' self-management? 
4.2. Implications of the countervailing power-block model 
The main criticism of the countervailing power-block 
model followed in the Zambian legislation is that it fails in 
practice to mark out, in more distinct terms, the lines of 
responsibility over company decisions between the various 
organs which the legislation creates. This, at any rate, is 
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the view seen from the simplicity of the hierarchical model 
postulated by traditional management structures and the 
company law model which underpins them. 
Part of the problem blurring the lines- of responsibility 
between the various constitutional organs is to be attributed 
to the repetition in the statutory language. This is 
particularly so in relation to the language used to empower 
the Managing Director, the Management Committee, the various 
Sub-committees, with their mandatory full-time Secretaries, 
and the office of the Company Secretary proper. 
The main underlying problem, however, would seem to lie in 
the lack of discrete functions to justify some of the 
institutions created by the statute. The Employees' Board of 
Directors and the Advisory Council of the SME provide a good 
example. Half of the members of the Employees' Board are 
persons who are potentially non-employees of the SME(44). What 
extra value, it may be asked, does a permanent Advisory 
Council provide which could not be made a function of the 
selection process of outside Board members? Furthermore, since 
the Board does not run the 'day to day affairs' of the SHE, 
what is its actual role if it , would not be to advise and 
block irresponsible decisions? 
These remarks do not imply that in practice there will be 
no meaningful scheme for overall company supervision in the 
Zambian SHE. Rather, what seems reasonable to suggest in the 
circumstances is that in the absence of a standardised and 
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visible line of authority, effective management of the SHE 
will fall into opportunistic power centres. This means, 
individuals, one organ or possibly a few of these rather than 
the whole apparatus of power blocks is likely to dominate 
decisions in Zambian SMEs. The irony of the matter is that, 
in the way the legislation stands, such dominant individuals 
or organs are not likely to come from the supposed centre 
gravity of the self-management system: the employees of the 
company. Should this be so, it would be a development running 
against all the proclaimed postulates of systems of self- 
management . 
4.3 The Position of employees in the SME Legislation 
In order to clarify the basis of our perspectives on the 
Zambian legislation, it is necessary to furnish further 
information on the actual position of employees under the 1988 
legislation. The starting point of our discussion is that the 
Zambian legislation underestimated the importance of rela- 
tionships between organs of decision-making. By not respecting 
the principle of hierarchy and the consequent failure to grant 
general rights to all employees, the law actually diminished 
any prospects that power in these SMEs would derive from its 
supposed power base- the company employees. The case is not 
that the legislators were ignorant of the appropriate models 
on which to structure decision making in the Zambian SMEs. The 
legislative history of the 1988 Act suggests that it was an 
intentional decision taken by the authorities not to allow 
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employees to be the basis of all power in the SMEs. 
The earlier draft of the Self-Management Act incorporated 
the principle of universal suffrage in the Employees' 
Conference(45). This would have permitted every employee some 
direct nominal say in decisions of the SMEs. In the scheme 
enacted, decision making by employees, to the extent this 
takes place, is the prerogative of those employees elected to 
the Employees' Conference under section 5. In a company which 
may employ hundreds, the majority are restricted to electing 
the fifty members of the Employees' Conference. But from the 
point of view of workers' participation, any influence this 
right might have had on the decision making process is 
countered by the absence of procedures in the law by which 
individual employees could influence activities of the elected 
Employees' Conference and other decision-making bodies of the 
SME. Both the parent legislation and the subsidiary rules do 
not address the subject of renewal of Conference members. This 
omission leaves the impression that there are no employee 
intermediary rights at all in the life of the self-management 
company. Without safeguarding such intermediary rights, the 
law ensures that self-management for the majority of employees 
is an indirect process through elected representatives in the 
Employees' Conference. 
There would be little concern for the position of the 
majority employees if their representatives in the 
Employees' Conference, to whom they surrender self-management 
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decisions, were seen to be in charge of decisions in the SHE 
system. This however, is not the case. The reality is that the 
operation of the Employees' Conference is circumscribed by 
decision bodies over which the Conference could not, in law 
and fact, exercise control. The Managing Director, Employees' 
Board of Directors, the Advisory Council and the President 
are decision-making bodies in the SME over which the 
Conference of Employees has little or no control at all. 
Though the Employees' Conference has powers to elect the 
Managing Director under section 22, and to appoint the 
Employees' Board of Directors in section 9, it is sufficiently 
clear from the other provisions already presented that the 
powers of the Conference in these matters are not without 
significant qualifications. Firstly, members of the Employees' 
Board of Directors are not head-hunted through the free will 
of the Employees' Conference. It is a fundamental requirement 
of the law that such board members should be drawn from fixed 
constituencies indicated in section 10. In fact, only half of 
the members of the Employees' Board of Directors are supposed 
to come from the employee body itself. Moreover, the 
appointment of all board members is subject to approval by the 
President under section 9. The latter condition might look 
innocent, but it may actually operate to impose restrictions 
on the choices of board members nominated by the employees 
among themselves(46). 
Secondly, though the Employees' Conference is supposed to 
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elect the Managing Director, there does not seem to be any 
real criterion upon which the Employees' Conference could 
reject a candidate presented to it by the Employees Board of 
Directors. [Note that the name 'Employees' Board' betrays the 
reality of its composition]. In those cases in which the 
President chooses the Managing Director, as is the case in 
current schemes, the Employees' Conference has no influence at 
all over the appointment and dismissal of the Managing 
Director. 
Therefore, despite the pretensions of the self-management 
legislation, the Employees' Conference - the only genuine 
organ of the self-management system in which employees are 
represented- has no decisive influence over the appointments 
of the Employees' Board of Directors and the Managing Director 
in SMEs. With regard to the powers of the Advisory Council and 
the President in the SHE, the pendulum swings away from 
employees to the extent that even the legislation does not 
pretend to give the Employees' Conference control over these 
two powerful organs. Fundamentally, and without fear of 
contradictions, the President can give directions to any other 
organ of the SME under section 34(3). Similarly, as against 
the Employees' Conference, the Employees' Board of Directors, 
the Management Committee and the Managing Director, it is the 
Advisory Council that can decide finally, under section 16(2), 
whether certain decisions are in the best interests of the 
SHE. 
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We submit that these powers of the President and the 
Advisory Council in SMEs challenge the professionalism of the 
Employees' Board of Directors, the Management Committee and 
the Managing Director. Above all, powers such as those yielded 
by the President and the Advisory Council render superfluous 
the language of the law in section 7(1) that the overall 
function of the Employees' Conference "shall be to exercise 
the corporate powers of the self-management enterprise". It is 
inconceivable, and also illogical, that overall authority and 
power in a decision structure could be exercised by a body 
subject to directives from another. 
Therefore, what we find to be true of the Zambian self- 
management legislation is that neither the employees as a 
whole nor their immediate representatives in the Conference 
are the masters of the decision-making process in self- 
management companies. This we suppose is a negative assessment 
of the position of employees in the Zambian self-management 
legislation which is justified by the letter of the law. 
4.4 The clash between parent and subsidiary legislation 
The argument so far is that the countervailing power-block 
model adopted in the Zambian SME legislation under-represented 
the employees in the structures of decision-making. Another 
way of sustaining the same conclusion is to examine and 
highlight the anomalous relationship that exists between the 
Self-Management Enterprises Act and the regulations issued by 
the Minister, supposedly under its authority. 
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The Minister's regulations recognised that the parent Act 
was weighted towards constitutional organs made of persons who 
are not supposed to be the primary beneficiaries of power in a 
system of self-management. Consequently, we find that the 
Minister's regulations seek to correct some of the key 
assumptions of the parent legislation. 
Under section 9 of the parent Act, for instance, the 
Employees Board of Directors is supposed to be appointed by 
the Employees Conference and approved by the President. The 
legal interpretation of this should be that until the 
President has approved the list of directors their appointment 
by the Employee Conference is ineffective, and by extension, 
such directors cannot lawfully act on behalf of the SHE. As 
against this interpretation of section 9, the Minister's 
regulation 25 reads: 
Within twenty-one days after the election the names and 
addresses, together with information respecting the terms 
and conditions of office of all 'persons elected as 
directors shall be forwarded to the President. 
The length of the intervening period before submission to 
the President, and the omission of the phrase 'for approval' 
after the President in regulation 25 suggest that the Minister 
intended the President merely to be informed of the persons 
appointed as directors of a self-management enterprise. In 
fact, the short title of regulation 25 is Election report to 
the President. 
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We think that no reasonable interpretation of section 9 
could justify the Ministers' result. The Employee Board, under 
section 10, is also made up of persons drawn from certain 
constituencies. From this, it is unlikely that it was the 
initial intention that the Employees' Conference alone should 
approve the personalities behind the political balancing 
characteristic of the board of the SME under that section. 
This, therefore, means that regulation 25 is a Ministerial 
mischief, a deliberate action that seeks to change the assump- 
tions of the parent legislation by moving away from the powers 
of the President as contained in the SME Act 1988. 
There is another example where the Minister's regulations 
clash directly with the parent legislation. In sections 13-15, 
the 1988- Act states unambiguously that the appointment, 
remuneration and removal from office of the Advisory Council 
is the function of the office of the President. On the other 
hand, regulations 36 and 37, respectively, give such powers to 
appoint and remunerate the Advisory Council to the Employees' 
Board of Directors. They are silent, however, on who will 
remove the Advisory Council from office. They also fail to 
clarify the exact role of the President in selecting advisors 
to SMEs. 
Nonetheless, the general tenor of the Minister's 
regulations cannot be mistaken. These seek to derogate from 
the assumptions and intentions of the SME Act in so far as 
that sought to grant more powers to the President and the 
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Advisory Council in decisions of the SHE. But what also needs 
to be grasped at this point is that it is a settled principle 
of law that blatant flouting of an Act of Parliament by a 
subsidiary legislation is unlawful. This being the case, it is 
important, within a contextual discussion of law, to ask why 
the Minister sought to change the views of Parliament in the 
way he was doing. In other words, who are supposed to be the 
beneficiaries of the power to manage and control a self- 
management enterprise under the Minister's regulations? 
To answer this question we shall need to look at the 
totality of the Minister's regulations. But of immediate 
interest are Regulations 35 and 44". These regulations state 
respectively the powers of the Employees' Board of Directors 
and the Managing Director in a self-management company. One 
significant feature of these two regulations is the tightness 
with which the Minister seeks to allocate authority in the SME 
to the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive. In 
addition, regulations 45 (c)(d) sever any loose relations that 
might have been implied to exist between the Employees' 
Conference and the Managing Director. These provide that the 
Managing Director will be answerable to the enterprise and to 
the Employees' Conference only through the Employees' Board of 
Directors. 
In effect, the regulations restore to the SME organisa- 
tional principles familiar to other commercial enterprises 
operating under the Companies regime. The language of 
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empowering the Chief Executive makes this point abundantly 
clear: 
44. (1) The Chief Executive shall have all the executive 
powers and shall be responsible for the attainment of the 
enterprise's plans and objectives. 
(2) In exercising his powers and discharging his 
-duties under sub-regulation (1) the Chief Executive 
shall: - 
(a) constitute a management committee which shall consist 
of all heads of departments and any other persons he shall 
deem necessary; 
(b) establish as many sub-committees of management as he 
deems necessary for the efficient discharge of his duties; 
(c) preside at the management committee meetings and 
nominate, where it is not possible for him to, preside, 
persons to preside at meetings of the sub-committees of 
management; 
(d) co-ordinate functions of various sub-committees of 
management; 
(e) draw up job description for all the employees or 
assign such tasks to heads of departments; 
(f) direct in any manner he deems suitable the heads of 
departments in the execution of enterprise's policies and 
attainment of the enterprise's objectives. 
What is happening is that regulation 44 rids the SME of 
all those Sub-committees mandated under the principal Act. In 
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their place comes familiar language of departments with their 
professional heads. As it stands, indeed, regulation 44 might 
please shareholders of Ford Motor Company in Detroit as the 
kind of powers which a Chief executive of a commercial company 
ought to possess. The main difference is that all the 
shareholders at Ford will have rights in law to challenge the 
decisions of their Managing Director and the Board, either 
through the General Meeting or by way of the equitable right 
of derivative action. 
In the Zambian scheme, complaints by employees against the 
real managers will require a compromise within the machinery 
of the Standing Committee of the Employees' Conference. This 
body, our analysis indicates, is most likely to be an 
accessory to complaints of employees rather than an impartial 
umpire of the constitutional struggles in the self-management 
system. The Minister did not help to give employees a leverage 
over the professional management. Instead, he seemed to be 
more concerned with whittling down the powers of the President 
and the Advisory Council than actually granting influence to a 
group that was the essence of adopting the self-management 
system. This may be hardly surprising given all that has been 
said in this study about the origins and development of the 
Zambian participation policies. 
5. The impact of SME legislation on participation policies 
The self-management legislation was only enacted in 1988. 
The enterprises to operate under its regime began to do so 
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legally on 1st March 1989 when that law came into force(47). 
During our fieldwork in December 1989, the self-management 
project was barely nine months in progress. This was too short 
a period to attempt an assessment of the practicality of the 
scheme in operation. 
Besides, the companies which were operating under the 
legislation were still subject to tight supervision from IPD 
and the National Steering Committee on Self-Management 
Projects(48). These conditions meant that either little had 
changed or one was more likely than not to get official views 
from the workers, even assuming, in fact, that we would have 
obtained the necessary clearance to conduct interviews with 
worker representatives at such a sensitive phase of the self- 
management project. 
To avoid these problems, we only asked IPD to allow us to 
visit and speak to one of the Managing Directors. This request 
was kindly granted in respect of F. Z. Simenda of Zambia Pork 
Products SME Limited in Lusaka. It is obvious, however, that 
the Chief Executive of Zambia Pork Products, though well 
placed to assess the whole context of the government 
programme, could not speak for the ordinary workers involved 
in the scheme. In short, what we gained at Pork SME was a 
panoramic managerial perspective, not quite relevant to the 
context. 
Therefore, the only real measure of the impact of the 
self-management legislation on the Zambian participation 
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policies we could assess was the law put in place. The 
foregoing analyses of that law leaves us with very pessimistic 
conclusions about the prospect of workers to influence 
decisions in the SME in Zambia. Yet, even those who have had 
the opportunity to monitor the scheme in practice do not seem 
to reach different conclusions. Our conclusions are in fact 
shared by the results of the National Review Conference on 
Self-Management Pilot Projects held in Lusaka from 14th-16th 
May, 1990. At the, end of its deliberations, the Review 
Conference resolved and recommended that: 
1. A thorough review of the Act be undertaken, on a 
tripartite basis, with active participation of all parties 
concerned. 
2. The review recommended above should include, inter 
alia; 
a) the provision for access of Self-management enterprises 
to the Industrial Relations Court, including its grievance 
procedures. 
b) the definition of the Minister responsible. 
c) redefinition of the roles of the different organs of 
the Self-management enterprise. 
There is still little materials on which to judge the 
impact of self-management legislation on the Zambian workers' 
participation programme. But on the basis of what is known it 
is unlikely that the 1988 Act will fair better than the works 
council law. There are no works councils in SMEs. Trade unions 
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are ideally not supposed to be present in SMEs(49), while 
individual workers have no access to the courts of law over 
managerial and employment decisions. 
This gloomy picture may improve once the review of the law 
called for by the Review Conference is undertaken. But that 
may well be the time to look at other dimensions which have to 
be considered if workers' self-management is to be a genuine 
advance of government participation policies in Zambia. The 
question of how many Zambian companies will operate under the 
self-management legislation is particularly important because 
a pilot scheme attains significance only if it is the 
intention that more samples will be drawn into the 
arrangements in future. Currently there are two state 
companies participating: Zambia Pork Products and Choma 
Milling Company. Zambia Pork and Choma Milling are marginal 
entities even within the food sector of the Zambian 
parastatals. The real national companies of Cold Storage Board 
of Zambia (cattle and meat distribution) and R. O. P (1975) 
Limited (formerly Lever Brothers - for cooking oil, and other 
oil based products) which Professor Grozdanic studied and 
recommended for the pilot self-management projects, were 
turned down in the final decisions by the authorities because, 
it was found that both companies were experiencing serious 
financial and operational problems which rendered them 
unsuitable as pilot enterprises in self-management(50). 
We know from our research, however, that to select Choma 
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Milling and Zambia Pork, the authorities turned down Mwaiseni 
Stores Limited, a well established retail outlet nationalised 
in 1968, and Indeco Estates Development Company, a state 
property company in Lusaka. Between Zambia Pork and Choma 
Milling, the rural based Choma company had been easy to secure 
from ZIMCO and INDECO. For Zambia Pork Limited, it was 
released to IPD only "after protracted consultations with 
INDECO, the holding company"(51). 
These are not good signs that anyone else will be willing 
to enter the self-management schemes. Yet, even if two or 
three more other companies joined in and became as successful 
as for example, the Scott Bader Commonwealth in Britain(52), 
they would still be atypical for purposes of justifying 
workers' self-management as an advance of a national indus- 
trial relations policy. More companies'would need to be drawn 
in the scheme in order to make self-management a significant 
development in Zambia. 
The chances of this happening are not good. The finance 
for organising the experiments at Choma Milling and Zambia 
Pork Products were provided by two United Nations Agencies, 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the ILO. If 
these United Nations agencies decide to withdraw from the 
experiments under way, the future of self-management in Zambia 
will be in question. The National Review Conference of 1990, 
in fact, called on the government to establish, as a matter 
of urgency, a Consolidated Fund to assist the self-management 
-364- 
enterprises financially(53). But money will not be the only 
issue to confront SMEs in future. The Review Conference also' 
released the following recommendation: 
Ownership of self-management enterprises be in a form as 
will be decided by the Boards of Directors of the SMEs, 
and'in particular; 
a) A programme for employee' equity participation in the 
SMEs be urgently worked out; 
b) Profit sharing measures amongst employees be introduced 
in the pilot SMEs to cultivate interest and sense of 
belonging and ownership among workers54. 
These points show that the goals of the workers' self- 
management in Zambia still needs to be clarified, the 
organisational structures defined and the resources provided. 
Any prospects in these developments, however, has to be set 
against a changing political and economic environment in the 
1990s. We elaborate on this last point in the final Chapter. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This Chapter has presented materials on how the Zambian 
government attempted to expand workers' participation laws 
beyond the works council legislation of 1971. The starting 
point of our presentation was IPD, the government agency 
specifically created to provide the organisational focus for 
workers' participation policies. Its terms of reference and 
organisational structure were presented. The ambiguities in 
the terms of reference and of the department itself within 
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government structures were highlighted in section 1. 
In section 2, we examined what the department was able to 
do in order to carry out its mandate within the Zambian body 
politic. Beginning with the big slate of ideas coming from 
the First National Convention on Industrial Democracy in Kabwe 
in 1976 to the letter of the Law Development Commission to the 
Director of IPD in 1987, on company law, we have shown how 
every idea to promote and carry forward government policies 
faded away in the domestic policy making machinery. 
The Zambian government's appeal to the ILO in 1983 brought 
hope in the area of workers' self-management. Within the 
limited framework of pilot schemes endorsed by Professor 
Grozdanic, the Zambian government was presented with a unique 
opportunity to do what it had always said it wanted to do - to 
bestow on every Zambian worker the right to participate in 
decisions of companies in which he worked and on which his 
livelihood depended. The result of the Zambian attempts in 
this area is borne out by an already lengthy analysis of the 
1988 SME legislation. In brief, as one institution/ structure 
of decision-making was piled on another, the bulk of workers 
in SMEs got even more legally emasculated in their ability to 
challenge managerial decisions in employment. The nominal 
rights of employees under the 1971 works council law to 
challenge managerial decisions in the Industrial Relations 
Court effectively closed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE STATE, LAW AND WORKER'S PARTICIPATION POLICIES IN ZAMBIA: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
This study was undertaken with the object of learning how 
the state in Zambia developed policies and laws regarding 
workers' participation in management decisions. But it has 
also sought to underline and evaluate the significance of 
these government measures in the context of that country's 
structures and institutions in the decades 1969-1989. In this 
final Chapter we review our findings and then consider their 
implications on whether the experience suggests that the 
involvement of the state, and the use of law in particular, 
has made a useful contribution to the development of workers' 
participation policies in the country. Before turning to these 
concluding themes, however, it is useful in the first place to 
indicate more clearly where we have ended in our attempts to 
follow the development of law and participation policies in 
Zambia. In particular, we need to set out the possible future 
developments on the workers' participation policy to which our 
main findings in this thesis relate. 
1. Workers' participation in Zambia: The continuing business 
This thesis has examined the Zambian policy of workers' 
participation over a long span of time running from 1969 to 
1989. At the end of the two decades under study, the process 
of development and change in the industrial relations policy 
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of workers' participation had not abated. In fact, by the end 
of 1989, the stage seemed set for the 1990s to repeat the 
decades 1969-89 in terms of the discussion of law and workers' 
participation policies in the country. Three factors point 
towards continuing future developments. 
Firstly, the Companies legislation which we found on 
stencil at the Law Development Commission in January 1990 
avoids altogether the subject of workers' participation in 
management decisions. This however was the issue which had 
given impetus to the formation of The National Working Party 
on the Companies Act in 1981. While it would be tempting to 
believe that the letter of the Law Development Commission in 
July 1987 brought the Company law aspects of the workers' 
participation policy to a neat and satisfying conclusion, it 
would be premature at the time of writing to pass that final 
judgment. Trade unions continue to have anomalous represe- 
ntation on boards of directors in the public sector. The 
reason is that the country is still awaiting the outcome of 
the Companies Bill. As late as August 1986, a national seminar 
on Workers' Participation At Board Level observed that "The 
Committee was aware of the fact that legislators were already 
working on . appropriate. changes to the company law. It is 
felt 
that they should be urged to speed up the completion of those 
changes... "(1). It was our impression in January 1990 that the 
communication in July 1987 between the Directors of the Law 
Development Commission and IPD on the future of workers' 
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participation policy in Company law had not been widely circu- 
lated among all the interested parties. Both the Deputy 
National Chairman of the National Union of Commercial and 
Industrial Workers, himself a worker director, and the Assis- 
tant Company Registrar in the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, responsible for administering the Companies Act, had 
no knowledge of what had transpired between the Law Develop- 
ment Commission and IPD over the Companies Project(2). 
The government, on the other hand, was preoccupied with 
the self-management project in the last two years covered by 
our study. Since co-ordination of the various government 
agencies involved in the participation policy has not been 
evident in the past, the possibility exists that in the future 
the President or some other Party official may question the 
decision not to have accommodated participation policies in 
company law. But whether or not the new Companies Bill comes 
off stencil, the matter of workers' participation policy in 
company law may still be raised because of the obtaining 
situation of trade unionists sitting on boards of directors in 
the public sector. Trade unionists are understood to be weary 
of their institutional legitimacy on these boards without the 
security of changes in company legislation. Thus, without a 
major shift in government policy, there exists in the public 
sector all the hallmarks of future further initiatives on par- 
ticipation policy. 
Secondly, the 1988 draft Industrial Relations Bill, which 
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had not been presented to Parliament in 1989, contains 
substantial amendments to Part 7 of the Industrial Relations 
Act, 1971. It proposes, among other things, to reduce the 
requisite number of 'eligible employees' necessary to form a 
works council from 100 to 50, with powers to the President to 
lower the threshold further. There will be a need for a 
written annual report to all employees of a company on the 
activities of works councils. All decisions, recommendations 
and resolutions of works councils will have to be forwarded, 
for the first time, to the Commissioner of Labour. Companies 
will come under a new duty to provide 'facilities' for the 
activities of works councils. The term of office of works 
councillors is to increase from two to three years. Most 
important of all, the Bill proposes to widen the scope of 
areas over which works councils will have rights to be 
consulted and to 'participate fully'. Specifically, those 
areas covered by section 72 of the Industrial Relations Act, 
1971 under which works councils are entitled only to receive 
information will in future require consultation with, and full 
participation of, works councils before the board, the propr- 
ietor or management can take decisions(3). 
It can be seen that the scope of discussion opened by 
this Industrial Relations Bill is substantial, and there is 
every reason to believe that whenever the Government decides 
to bring forward these changes to the Industrial Relations 
Act, further interest will be aroused in the development of 
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law and workers' participation policies in Zambia(4). 
Thirdly, looking purely from a lawyer's perspective, the 
Self-Management legislation of 1988 is messy. The duplication 
of decision structures in the parent Act and the conflict 
between that and the Minister's regulations seem to require 
further attention if the new self-management system is to be 
provided with a respectable legal framework promoting workers' 
participation in management decisions. We have seen, however, 
that the conclusions of the National Review Conference on 
Self-Management Pilot Projects add a different dimension. 
Those conclusions indicate that the changes to the law of 
self-management need to be greater than a simple resolution of 
technical ramifications in the 1988 legislation. It is sug- 
gested there that the nature of equity holding in self- 
management companies be changed so that individual employees 
may have personal interests in the capital structure of self- 
management firms. Suggestions such as these, if followed, will 
engender a radically different system of self-management, and 
with that, perhaps a different kind of workers' participation 
legislation. The latter will be necessary in order to achieve 
new definitions of social relations in self-management enter- 
prises. Once again, the momentum for change appears inherent 
in the structures and institutions examined by this thesis. 
There is no way of predicting how all these possible deve- 
lopments are going to blend together in future. As has happe- 
ned several times in the past, the Constitutional form of the 
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Zambian state is set to undergo changes in the 1990s. On 29 
November 1990, the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act re- 
pealed Article 4 of the 1973 Republican Constitution which 
enshrined the One Party State form of Government in the 
country. Other political parties have since registered, and a 
government constituted within a plural framework of politics 
may be in place by 1992(5). These constitutional developments 
will in future change, at least legally, the political envi- 
ronment under which workers' participation policies have been 
nurtured for much of the last twenty years. The consequences 
of constitutional and political changes for economic policies 
in general, and industrial relations in particular, are uncer- 
tain. 
Against this background, the picture for the future is 
too hazy to permit definitive judgements on what direction the 
Zambian participation policy will take in the 1990s. 'What can 
be stated, with some degree of certainty, is that whatever the 
future will be the events of the past two decades on 
Industrial Participatory Democracy are likely to form an 
important part of enquiry for Zambian studies of law and 
industrial relations. If workers' participation policies con- 
tinue as some integral part of industrial relations policies 
in future governments, their success will depend in part on 
whether the lessons of the past two decades can show how 
workers' participation policies might be approached by the 
state. In order to be able to draw lessons from past 
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experience, it is necessary that the past itself is accurately 
grasped in its very different descriptive and analytical 
dimensions. It was one of the principal aims of this thesis 
to contribute to the building of the necessary base knowledge 
upon which future strategies might be designed. In the 
remaining pages we review what the study has done to enhance 
our understanding of Zambian developments and discuss what 
implications these have for the future. 
2. The origins of workers' participation in Zambia 
A key to the analysis of Zambian participation policies 
lies, to a greater degree, in explaining why workers' partici- 
pation was introduced at all. Existing writings pay attention 
to this point but do not give satisfactory answers. They have 
either provided restricted accounts or have been concerned 
with workers' participation policy only as one factor causing 
or reflecting 'problems' in government economic policies. On 
either count, we argue, they fail to locate accurately the 
history of workers' participation policies in Zambia, and to 
differentiate the variations of strain to which these policies 
have been exposed since 1969. Four perspectives which previous 
writers have advanced to explain the origins of the Zambian 
policies were introduced and considered in Chapters 2 and 3: 
the Philosophy of Humanism; the political concept of Partici- 
patory Democracy; the idea of new role of labour In develop- 
ment; and the role of international influences. 
We found that the Philosophy of Humanism on which official 
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explanations of the origins of participation policies are 
predicated is helpful, but only to the extent of exposing the 
existence of institutionalised views on workers' participation 
in Zambia. Our discussion in Chapter 3 demonstrated that the 
policy of workers' participation in management decisions 
precedes by far President Kaunda's Chapter 13 in Humanism: and 
Its Implementation Part 2 on which Industrial Participatory 
Democracy is advertised today. There was nothing in the 1967 
outline of the Philosophy of Humanism articulating the rights 
of workers to participate in management decisions. Thus, it is 
scarcely surprising to find that the attempts to explain the 
development of workers' participation policy in the shape of 
the progress of the Philosophy of Humanism in Zambia led to 
superficial accounts which hardly recognised the scale of 
tension and contradictions that have existed over the policy 
of workers' participation since it was introduced(6). 
On the view that workers' participation has been pursued 
in Zambia in order to carry out the political philosophy of 
Participatory Democracy we concluded that this was even less 
credible. The history of political democracy in Zambia in the 
last twenty years and the accompanying centralisation of 
decisions in its economic institutions thoroughly undermines 
that proposition. On the other hand, Shimaponda's statements 
on the international influences of the origins of workers' 
participation were found useful. His study pointed to prac- 
tical sources of concepts arrived at in the Zambian industrial 
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relations system. But while accepting that the ideas about 
workers' participation were probably borrowed from European 
and Scandinavian practices in industrial relations, the value 
of Shimaponda's perspectives were somewhat reduced, from our 
point of view, by the fact that his study 
did not seek to 
explain why it was particularly necessary to adopt workers' 
participation policies in Zambia. 
Therefore the main perspective we considered, and which 
has addressed directly the issue of the origins of workers' 
participation in Zambia, was that provided by Evance Kalula 
and those who share his premises on the history of the 
relations between the State and trade unions in Zambia. We 
accepted in this study that the incorporation thesis, in 
its 
different variations, has had considerable influence in 
interpreting labour relations developments in Zambia. Its 
origins in the country is to be found in Robert Bates' 
examination of Ministerial statements on labour matters in the 
1960s. It was Bates who confirmed for Zambia what was to be 
established throughout the Third World industrial relations 
studies as the 'new role of labour in development'(7). Thus, 
in more general terms, the influence of the incorporation 
thesis on interpreting the Zambian motivation for industrial 
relations legislation cannot be underestimated. There is much 
value in supposing that the Zambian state promoted workers' 
participation policies in 1969 in order to control trade 
unions in the drive for economic development. The question we 
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had to address in this thesis was whether that general 
proposition was applicable to the development of the indus- 
trial relations policy of workers' participation in management 
decisions? 
After a careful consideration, we found that application 
of the incorporation thesis to the development of the workers' 
participation policy in Zambia is problematic. This is the 
more fundamental because the place of trade unions in the 
development of Zambian participation policies is more obscure 
than exponents of the incorporation thesis pretend. But it is 
our case too that the incorporation thesis, whatever its 
merits, has been overweighted in its application to the Zamb- 
ian labour legislation developments. This is particularly so 
in the way Kalula has used the incorporation thesis to explain 
the whole range of post-independence labour legislation in 
Zambia. Kalula's interpretation of the Zambian state's use of 
law in industrial relations has painted a rather homogeneous 
and visionary drive by the state to incorporate labour for 
economic development. What we point out is that such an over 
emphasis on trade union or worker control as the exclusive 
terrain of state-labour legislation in Zambia could very much 
oversimplify matters. Even Bates, against whose work Kalula's 
is a sequel(8), accepted that the Zambian labour policies in 
the 1960s were not solely driven by considerations of economic 
development goals. Bates indeed identified two strands in the 
Zambian government's labour policy in the 1960s: the first, a 
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development labour policy; the second, a policy of social 
justice. The former was the one concerned with winning 
cooperation of workers and the trade unions in the country's 
attempts to maintain and expand industrial production. The 
latter focussed on the government's commitment to a programme 
of improving the rights of workers in employment. Bates 
confined his study of Zambian labour policies to the first 
strand and said very little about the policy of social 
justice(9). From this distinction Bates made, it is reasonable 
to assume that he would not have regarded the incorporation 
thesis as an explanation for all aspects of industrial 
relations legislation in Zambia. It is possible, however, that 
Kalula might have found reasons to link the development of 
participation policies to the wider political goals of 
incorporating the trade unions for economic development. 
What we have suggested in this thesis is that he does not 
provide sufficient evidence for the interconnection. There 
was, of course, many industrial relations problems in the 
1960s, but there is evidence too that the Zambian state found 
several other avenues of addressing those specific problems 
over which many employees protested in the aftermath of the 
country's political independence (10). Kalula does not suggest 
that workers and the trade unions in Zambia requested 
participation policies in industry as a possible way through 
which they could channel their discontent with employers and 
supervisors. But neither does his research on the history of 
-382- 
workers' participation and the Zambian state attribute the 
confusion and uncertainties which mark the policy of workers' 
participation in the country to labour's resistance or 
otherwise to state incorporation policies. To the contrary, he 
accepts, even if implicitly, that throughout the history of 
workers' participation in Zambia workers and the trade unions 
have been passive and parasitic forces waiting for the state 
to deliver the promise of workers' participation in management 
decisions(11). Now, what explanatory value can the incorpora- 
tion thesis have if it cannot explain the passivity of labour 
in the evolution of the Zambian participation policy? 
There are other unsatisfactory elements in the incorpora- 
tion argument in so far as it applies to workers' participa- 
tion legislation. It is explained that from the beginning 
employers and managers resented the Zambian state policy- of 
workers' participation in management decisions. At the same 
time, the trade unions and the workers welcomed the policy- 
(12). Why? Why should employers resent policies intended to 
immobilise labour, and the unions welcome policies restrictive 
of their independence? Secondly, why did it take so long to 
implement workers' participation laws after their enactment in 
1971? Thirdly, did a One Party State really need to go to the 
ILO to bring measures to discipline labour? Fourth, and 
finally, do attempts to change company law in the 1980s 
perfect incorporation? These are all issues in the development 
of participation policies in Zambia to which the incorporation 
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thesis does not do justice. 
As against such explanations for the origins of workers' 
participation policies, this thesis has supported a different 
and historically derived account why the industrial relations 
policy of workers' participation was adopted in Zambia. Our 
premise is that there is no need to attribute different 
motives to the Zambian state or to accept ipso facto 
rationales in order to understand and appreciate the reason 
why the industrial relations policy of workers' participation 
was adopted in the country. The view we have urged is that 
the industrial relations policy of workers' participation has 
its foundation in the broader (and much more successful) 
social and economic policies associated with the period 1968- 
70. The aim of these policies was to ensure Zambian 
participation in the ownership and the control of economic 
institutions. The means of achieving these specific aims 
within a framework respecting the rule of law, the constraints 
of an internationally-driven copper economy, the internal 
limitations of managerial skills and financial resources, the 
external economic and political pressures imposed by Rhodesian 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, all limited the range 
of options open to the Zambian state to those which could 
receive justification in the specific political context of the 
1960s. Partial nationalisation, state creation of industrial 
and commercial companies, the reservation of exclusive zones 
for Zambian entrepreneurship, active state encouragement of 
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Zambianisation of managerial personnel in the private and 
public sectors, and in this case, the drive toward workers' 
participation in management decisions, were all aspects of the 
burning question of the time, 
how we should face squarely the difficulties that we expe- 
rience in Zambia in so far as full control of our economy 
is concerned. We do not want to lament about the past as 
it is only too well known that we were neglected by 
successive British Governments,... Our task is to identify 
those difficulties that make it hard for us to control our 
economy and then to plan to do something about it(13). 
It is central to the arguments developed in Chapters 2 and 
3 that the industrial relations policy of workers' participa- 
tion was first introduced in Zambia as an armoury in the 
country's struggle against the social and economic domination 
of the 1960s. It is this which explains not only the leading 
role of the state in the adoption of participation policies in 
Zambia but also why the country came out in favour of radical 
schemes of workers' participation far ahead of developments in 
many major economies. Northern Rhodesia's exclusionary colo- 
nial policies provided a basis for strengthening the moral and 
political case against foreign economic domination, for which 
the Philosophy of Humanism was a relevant derivative. Bates, 
that foremost exponent of Zambian labour policies in the 
1960s, was in no doubt that the impetus for the policy of 
social justice he identified was in the "uneven distribution 
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of wealth along racial lines in Zambia"(14). We have argued in 
this thesis that measures to implement economic participation, 
in various forms, was an area where the government found 
political support from the different ensemble of factions 
present in the 1960s. To this extent, our Zambian study of the 
origins of workers' participation confirms the hypothesis 
first suggested by Paul Blumberg that repudiation of economic 
elites leads to adoption of workers' management in the Third 
World. It is further confirmation of our arguments to find 
that those who observed the evolution of Zambian economic 
policies in the 1960s understood the expression 'self- 
management' in terms of the Zambianisation of the ownership 
and managerial functions than the expression of new economic 
relations in industry that the term acquired after 1974(15). 
3. The Development of Law and Workers' Participation Policy 
From the premise that the industrial relations policy of 
workers' participation was adopted mainly as a strategy to 
countervail foreign domination in economic institutions follow 
the distinctive and peculiar features of the Zambian workers' 
participation policy developments documented in Chapters 4-7. 
Compared with workers' participation developments elsewhere, 
the Zambian policy arose anomalously. Despite its presentation 
as an industrial relations policy, it was, in fact, not driven 
by the interests of industrial relations as such. As we have 
stressed, when the Zambian government introduced its policy in 
1969 more consideration had been given to the broader social 
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and political goals of assuring Zambian participation in 
economic institutions than the promotion of workplace rela- 
tions(16). The scale and speed with which greater workers' 
participation was to be introduced in 1969 support our 
interpretation of the interconnection which this policy had 
with the economic policies of 1968-70. Not surprisingly too, a 
policy which put a premium on historical and external threats 
of domination was by definition likely to pay insufficient 
consideration to its internal conditions and requirements for 
development. What this study has found is that there had been 
no prior systematic questioning of the basis on which workers' 
participation could be promoted in Zambia as a national 
industrial relations policy. The economic prosperity and full 
employment conditions upon which participation policies found 
favour in Western Europe and Scandinavia in the 1960s and 
early 70a were conspicuous by their absence in Zambia. This 
meant that if workers' participation was to be started and 
continued in the country as a national industrial relations 
policy, the supportive conditions were needed to be invented 
by the structures and institutions of post-colonial Zambia. 
Chapter 4 investigated the extent to which the evolving 
structures and institutions of post-colonial Zambia could 
support industrial relations policies of workers' participa- 
tion. We looked in particular at political processes; economic 
structures; industrial relations developments; and the legal 
context of company decisions. The results showed that there 
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existed a real contrast between the notional requirements of 
industrial relations policies of workers' participation and 
the foundations upon which the Zambian policy was erected. In 
particular, the One Party State political system and its 
consequent centralisation of economic decisions was the very 
antithesis of what was required to engender a participatory 
philosophy in the economy. This at least was the view gained 
from reading European developments, especially the materials 
by the German Trade Union Federation. But we found too that 
neither the new Zambian entrepreneurs promoted by government 
policies nor their foreign counterparts could have been in the 
position in 1970 to support wholesale participation policies 
in the economy. On the other hand, many other changes were 
introduced in the industrial relations system alongside 
participation policies to deny the latter any special 
treatment from the point of view of employers and the trade 
unions. In addition, the Zambian company law legislation of 
1908 was still very liberal in its conception of the economy, 
hence, it was not receptive to notions of workers' 
participation in management decisions. In short, the policy of 
workers' participation in Zambia van from the start without a 
sound foundation. The structures and institutions of post- 
independence Zambia which alone might have helped to pull the 
policy from the confusion of its historical setting seemed, in 
fact, to be the greatest sources of uncertainty. 
We have argued that much of what has happened to law and 
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participation policy in Zambia in the last two decades is best 
understood in terms of the ambiguities in the foundations upon 
which law and policy were erected. Workers' participation had 
not been asked for by any of the primary parties to industrial 
relations. Yet, the government had not explained sufficiently 
how workers' participation would fit the other different 
arrangements in the economy and politics to which the State 
appeared equally committed. The scepticism which employers 
and the trade unions have shown towards this government policy 
is thus explained by the clashes in the overall framework of 
government policies. 
Chapter 5 shows that, in fact, by 1971 the point seemed to 
be taken that Zambia could not tolerate a radical scheme of 
workers' participation, as was perhaps thought possible in the 
different economic circumstances of 1968-70. The result of 
this belated appreciation of contextual factors in the deve- 
lopment of participation laws was the very diluted legislation 
discussed there. The 1971 law bore no resemblance to earlier 
government pretensions to enact a root and branch scheme of 
participation legislation. The law was weak, inconsistent 
and in some cases added nothing new to the existing 
arrangements with the trade unions. We demonstrated too that 
even Ministers were explicitly withdrawing from earlier public 
statements about the objectives of workers' participation in 
the country. 
It was this theme which we carried in Chapter 6. We argued 
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there that the delay in implementing the law of 1971 was not 
due to the necessity for transitional arrangements as exp- 
lained by official statements. The delay of five years was 
related peculiarly to domestic opposition to wholesale 
workers' participation in the management of the economy. 
Though doubts about the wisdom of state participation policies 
had existed before the legislation, it was really after 1971 
that workers' participation policies came under scrutiny. This 
was because by this time the social and political basis upon 
which workers' participation had been accepted in 1969 had 
ceased to be relevant. Part of the reason here lay in the 
success of the other measures implemented by the government in 
getting the Zambians into the active parts of the economy. The 
other was the style of political and economic management in 
the One Party State which reduced the scope of what workers' 
could achieve in the'decision structures of an expanding state 
economy. Thus, the economic problems which the country started 
to experience more severely after 1971 merely reinforced the 
scepticism that was already aroused. 
The above notwithstanding, workers' participation policies 
continued into the 1970s and beyond. Three factors were 
offered to explain why this had happened. First, President 
Kaunda was personally interested in schemes of workers' 
participation. This was most reflected by his close 
supervision of this government policy. Secondly, there was a 
coincidence of favourable international opinion in the 1970s, 
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especially between 1974 and 1978, which gave moral and 
political encouragement to the Zambian government. The main 
stay of participation policies, however, were the changes in 
the domestic economic policies. In the 1970s Zambian economic 
policies in the One Party State shifted to an emphasis upon 
'social ownership' of the means of production. This shift, we 
stressed, had a significantly different rationale from the 
policies of 1968-70 directed at Zambianisation of the economy. 
The impact of the latter thinking on industrial relations 
policies was a renewed interest in workers' participation, 
leading to developments such as the creation of IPD in 1975, 
and the implementation of the 1971 law a year later. 
From the point of view of the development of the partici- 
pation policies started in 1969, what we have indicated is 
that the new situation in the 1970s precluded a meaningful 
review of the basis on which the industrial relations policy 
of workers' participation was accepted in the first place. The 
overall result of this failure by government to take stock of 
workers' participation as an industrial relations policy in 
the 1970s was, as Chapters 6 and 7 have shown, to allow this 
policy to remain firmly in the hands of the state and to 
proceed on a course which seemed even further removed from the 
legal, social and economic situation obtaining in the country. 
Neither implementation of the 1971 law in 1976 nor the 
creation of IPD a year earlier had the effect of adding 
significant support to government participation policies. The 
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law, once implemented, had little impact on management 
decisions and the attitudes of the trade unions. Apart from 
the fact that the law was weak, inconsistent and in many 
respects without substance, its implementation was as well 
overshadowed by threats of new and better legislation. The 
latter created a political environment which constantly 
undermined the confidence of employers, managers and trade 
unions in the works council scheme. There was in particular 
uncertainty since 1975 as to what the government was going to 
introduce in order to improve and strengthen the 1971 law. 
Under such circumstances, companies which reported benefits 
from implementing the works council scheme were the ones who 
would probably have benefited from any scheme of information 
and consultation regardless of its legal status. The absence 
of the works councils in the machinery of the Industrial 
Relations Court discussed at length in Chapter 6 confirms the 
generally held view that informality has been more of the rule 
than the exception in the operation of the Zambian works 
councils. 
Yet if the law of 1971 was not helpful, we found too that 
the political make up of IPD and its insistence on legislation 
as the means to introduce greater workers' participation 
further alienated government policies from the supporting 
attitudes of the managers and trade unions. The attention of 
employers, managers and trade unions since about 1975 was 
increasingly drawn to the state of the economy to which 
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exponents of Industrial Participatory Democracy seemed to pay 
insufficient attention in their contempt for promoting 
capitalism. But without the supporting attitudes of a greater 
part of managers and trade unions, the government lacked the 
confidence to produce sound strategies towards its own version 
of workers' participation in management decisions. The demise 
of the many proposals since the Kabwe Symposium of 1976 and 
the very outcome of the 1988 Self-Management legislation 
illustrate the point most clearly. 
4. The State and Participation Policies: An Assessment 
Given the origins of participation policies in Zambia, the 
form of law introduced and the organisation of institutions to 
promote government policies, what can be said to have been the 
contribution of the state in the development of industrial 
relations policies of workers' participation in Zambia? To 
answer this question, one important finding of this thesis 
needs reiteration. This is that at the heart of the Zambian 
state's experience with participation policies has been the 
consequent failure to look directly at workers' participation 
as an industrial relations policy. The pursuit of industrial 
democracy and greater workers' participation, as experience 
elsewhere shows, is a process which necessitates significant 
co-operation between the state, employers, trade unions and 
the workers. This is as it should be for industrial relations 
policies in general. But throughout the main phases of the 
Zambian participation policy, we have found that the 
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essentials of industrial relations policy developments had 
been subordinated to the broader economic and political goals 
of the Zambian state. Attempts at consultation with other 
labour market parties were certainly made at various stages, 
but the governing principle seems to have been the overriding 
right of the state to unilaterally adopt and enforce schemes 
of workers' participation so long that these were deemed 
necessary to the satisfaction of political objectives in the 
economy. This strategy alone kept the Zambian participation 
policy actively alive in the public arena for two decades. But 
at the same time it ensured that the policy of workers' 
participation had no clear focus, and was not widely 
understood and supported. 
The advent of IPD in 1975 might have assisted to explain 
the concept of workers' participation, outline its industrial 
relations benefits and generally suggest possible approaches 
which would have increased the willingness and capacity of 
employers, trade unions and workers to support state parti- 
cipation policies. But we have seen that this department was 
not intended to be a professional body delivering education 
and training, advice and assistance, research and information 
to the labour market parties. Its set up entailed that Party 
priorities took precedence over the more general interests of 
industrial relations to establish the environment on the basis 
of which employers and workers could be persuaded to change 
from traditional practices. 
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This is the background against which the assessment of 
the contribution of the state to the development of workers' 
participation in Zambia has to be undertaken. Despite the 
time, human and financial resources that have been allocated 
to Industrial Participatory Democracy over the past years very 
little can be shown for this investment. Scepticism still 
abounds about the wisdom of participation policies in the 
country. This study has shown that in so far as Zambian 
developments are concerned there are good reasons to question 
the public expenditure on workers' participation policies. The 
state, more than any other factor, seems to have been 
responsible for the confusion, contradiction and uncertainties 
which have marked the development of workers' participation 
policies in Zambia. 
5. Implications of the study for the near future 
Our assessment of the Zambian participation policy, and of 
the involvement of the state in its development, may seem 
somewhat negative. Some advantages have been gained from the 
state's relentless pursuit of Industrial Participatory Demo- 
cracy. Over the years, workers' participation has become more 
understood in the political arena, thereby providing the 
necessary ideological underpinning for these policies. A gene- 
ration of Zambian managers have been persuaded to recognise 
that companies need to be managed in a way which takes into 
account and accommodates the interests of the employees. There 
was evidence in this study that in some companies workers are 
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in fact guaranteed a measure of consultation and information. 
The credit for part of these practices cannot be denied the 
Zambian government wholly. Indeed, without some form of direct 
government encouragement and involvement, it is unlikely that 
workers' participation policies would have survived as an 
integral part of the Zambian industrial relations system. The 
use of law in particular seems to have had impact on attitudes 
to the subject of workers' participation in industry. We saw 
in Chapter 6 that for some people workers' participation in 
industry was justified simply because it was enshrined in the 
law and supported by the government. From this perspective we 
have found insufficient reasons in this study generally to 
disparage state involvement, and the use of law in particular, 
to promote workers' participation policies in Zambia. 
What has been argued in the thesis is that the proactive 
strategies of the Zambian government in pursuing participation 
policies have not produced substantive changes in the 
behaviour of actors in the industrial relations system. A 
major factor seems to have been in the failure by the state 
to encourage the development of conditions supportive of 
workers' participation provided for in the legislation. There 
was notable failure on part of the state, for example, to 
proceed with workers' participation policies on the basis of 
broadly shared objectives with other labour market parties. 
This was the case both as to the focus of participation 
policies in industry and as to the means of achieving 
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participation goals. From this view point, there now seems to 
be a case for putting the onus on and equipping employers and 
employees to be the principal agents of change in the Zambian 
industrial relations system. Future initiatives might also 
consider whether, and to what extent, the legislative strategy 
is appropriate on workers' participation policies. Too much 
emphasis has been placed by the state in the previous years 
upon enactment of laws. But whatever the merits of law in the 
reform and regulation of industrial relations, legislation 
alone, even if adequately designed and implemented, has a 
limited impact on processes of industrial relations. The long 
experience of Western Europe and Scandinavia suggests that 
there is, in addition to legislation, the need to create the 
political, economic and industrial relations conditions needed 
to induce confidence in employers, trade unions and workers to 
change behaviour in dealings with each other. Strategies which 
build upon current industrial relations activities, which 
promote skills and competence and develop consensus on what is 
intended and what is sought to be achieved from participation 
policies are as important as favourable legislation. These are 
the points neglected for a long time and to which the state 
will need to pay attention if workers' participation is to 
remain a national industrial relations policy in Zambia. 
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APPENDIX A 
[Extracts from speech of H. B. The President Dr. K. D Kaunda at 
Second National Convention, Kitve- December, 1969] 
May I now turn to this equally important subject of 
industrial relations. Time has come for us to establish 
relations between the worker and the employer that are in 
keeping with the the Philosophy of Humanism. In other words, 
our legislation must be such that it creates an atmosphere 
which will be conducive to the creation of a man-centred 
society... 
It is with this view in mind that I wish to announce certain 
reforms which should lead to better industrial relations and, 
ultimately, to a more equitable distribution of our national 
income. Before getting down to the details of the proposed 
reforms, let me briefly outline what I am aiming at. I want 
all of us, employers and employees, workers and peasants, 
producers and consumers, government and governed, to co- 
operate in the struggle against inequality, exploitation and 
mutual aggression... 
Please do not misunderstand me. This' Is not intended as an 
invitation to ignore all differences and pretend that the 
interests of all groups are in perfect harmony. Such a state 
of affairs would be Utopian. It cannot be attained, and indeed 
there is no reason why it should be attained. The interests of 
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employees are necessarily different from those of employers; 
the interests of industrial workers are different from those 
of peasant farmers; those of producers are different from 
those of consumers. 
But does the conflict of interest between these different 
groups exhaust the interdependence between them? Is the 
employer not dependent on the employee, and industrial worker 
on the peasant farmer, the producer on the consumer and vice 
versa? It seems to me that the opportunities for co-operation 
are more numerous than the occasion for conflict, but that for 
selfish reasons we prefer to fight each other rather work 
together. We are more adept at excluding people from our 
society than including them. 
Is it right, for example, that employees should be excluded 
from participating in the functions of ownership and 
management just because they do not happen to belong to these 
privileged groups? I believe not. It is therefore the 
intention of my Party and Government to change the whole 
system of industrial relations, so that our workers can 
effectively participate in the decisions of management.... 
The principal change I would like to announce concerns 
representation at the Board of Directors level. Proposals will 
be outlined during the course of this meeting for workers to 
be given representation on the Boards of Directors of all 
joint stock companies, including state enterprises. Steps are 
being taken to amend the Companies Act in order to establish 
the legal right of workers to such representation. This, of 
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course, is a very complicated matter and the amendment of the 
law will take a long time. 
At a different level, proposals will be made to establish 
works councils in all undertakings of a certain size. The 
purpose of these Works Councils will be to provide machinery 
within the undertaking for participation by the workers in 
management decisions. In certain clearly defined areas, which 
have traditionally been regarded as so-called 'management 
prerogatives', decisions will only be taken with the 
participation of the Works Councils after the proposed law has 
been enacted. 
I know that the first reaction to the proposals for workers' 
participation is going to be; but are workers ready for it? 
The most important question is: are the managers ready for it? 
But let us for one moment pretend that the attitude of the 
workers will not also have to undergo an equally drastic 
change. To a large extent the new system of industrial 
relations will put the onus on the workers to discipline 
themselves. If they refuse to accept this responsibility, then 
they will destroy our economy and themselves with it. However, 
I have sufficient faith in my workers to believe that this 
will not happen. I am fully confident that they will rise to 
the occasion. The law will for the first time abolish the 
hated system of master and servant. For the first time workers 
and managers will be equal partners in industry. This means 
the coming of age of the workers will at last be legally 
recognised. From adults one expects adult behaviour. 
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In closing, I would like to say that no one should be 
mislead into thinking that we do not mean these changes 
seriously. We are not experimenting with a few liberalising 
measures which may or may not work, and which can be withdrawn 
at will. Today we are taking a deliberate step into the future 
for our nation. There will be no going back. Our commitment to 
the restructuring of our society is fundamental and we mean 
that Humanism will not only be discussed but lived. The right 
of the people of Zambia to control their own destiny is not 
negotiable. 
[This part of the President's speech also appears in the 
Industrial Relations Handbook, President's Citizenship 
College, Kabwe, 1976, p. '] 
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APPENDIX B 
[Note: The pledges produced below were adopted by a tripartite 
labour conference held in Livingstone on 7-8 April 1967. 
Nationalisation and threats of participation legislation 
later betrayed any confidence in the system of self-regulation 
advocated by the pledges] 
PLEDGE TO TUE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
WE THE WORKERS, PLEDGE THAT- 
we will put the interests of Zambia before our own 
interests, either as individuals or as members of trade 
unions 
we will work hard to play our part in the National 
Development Plan 
we will do a fair day's work on every working day and will 
strive to increase not only our own productivity but also 
the productivity of our fellow workers; 
we will accept every opportunity we are given for 
education as workers and trade unionists and for 
industrial training; 
we will pull together as workers of Zambia, from whatever 
part of the country we come from and wherever we may be 
working, and whether we are local or expatriate workers; 
we will carry out the just instructions and orders of our 
supervisors and and employers and co-operate with them, 
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whether they are Zambian or expatriate, to ensure maximum 
levels of productivity; 
we will abide by the terms of all agreements negotiated 
between our unions and our employers and observe the 
provisions of Zambia's labour legislation; 
we use all our efforts to maintain industrial peace. 
WE THE EMPLOYERS, PLEDGE THAT 
we will run our businesses in auch a way as to promote the 
interests of Zambia and to ensure increasing levels of 
productivity through efficient management and close co- 
operation with with our employees; 
we will provide the maximum possible job security to our 
workers in return for a fair day's work and increasing 
productivity; 
we will continually examine our wage structure, conditions 
of service and social conditions of our workers to ensure 
that they are conducive to increasing productivity and 
healthy industrial relations; 
we will Zambianise our undertakings as rapidly as possible 
and, to this end, will provide opportunities to our 
workers for industrial training; 
we will improve by every means possible and with co- 
operation of the government and the trade unions, our 
communications with with our workers so that they 
appreciate the importance of their work to the success of 
the National development Plan; 
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we will strive to create healthy industrial relations and 
to this end we will co-operate with and encourage the 
development of trade unions and the formation of works 
committees; 
we will abide by the terms of all agreements negotiated 
with unions and observe the provisions of Zambia's labour 
legislation; 
we will remove all vestiges of racial discrimination in 
our undertakings and do our best to improve the racial 
attitudes of all employees so that there is understanding, 
tolerance, respect and good will at all times at work; 
we will do our best to ensure that supervisors and 
managers in our employ, in the carrying out of their 
duties, respect the human dignity of the men working with 
or under them and will take firm action against any 
supervisor or worker who is racialistic, abusive or 
unjust. 
Finally, we the workers and the employers jointly pledge 
ourselves to honour the code for Industrial Peace and the Code 
for Enhanced Productivity in Zambia adopted at this conference 
and to build in unity the great Zambia of the future, 
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LIST OF ORGANISATIONS WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES SIGNED THE PLEDGE 
TO THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
EMPLOYERS 
Zambia Federation of Employers 
Zambia Builders and Allied Trades Association 
Zambia Industrial and Commercial Association 
Livingstone African Traders association 
Mining Companies 
Rhodesia Railways 
Zambia Association of Civil Engineering Contractors 
Zambia Iron and Steel Employers Association 
Zambia Motor Trade Association 
Zambia-Tanzania Road Services 
Zambia Tobacco Co-operative 
Zambia Commercial Farmers' Bureau 
WORKERS 
Zambia Congress Trade Unions 
Zambia Mine Workers' Union 
Zambia Expatriate Mineworkers' Association 
Zambia National Union of Teachers 
Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union 
Railway African Workers' Union 
National Union Of Building and General Workers 
National Union of Commercial and Industrial workers 
National Union of Local authorities Union 
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National Union of Plantation and Agricultural workers 
National Union of Posts and Telecommunications Workers 
National Union of Public Services Workers 
Mines Local Staff Association 
Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(Source: ILO, Basic Agreements and Joint Statements on Labour- 
Management Relations, Labour-Management Series no. 38, 
Geneva, 1971, pp. 233-237) 
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